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“Empowerment” is a term used liberally throughout feminist theory. However, 
the term has a number of assumed meanings, depending upon the context of its use. In 
this dissertation, I examine primarily second-wave feminist theory arguments, dividing 
the concepts according to quadrants of human experience (Habermas, Wilber) in order to 
reveal the context of the theorists’ views of “empowerment.” I also examine relevant 
worldview perspectives (Beck & Cowan, Graves) within each quadrant in order to reveal 
the underlying assumptions about what it is hoped “empowerment” might achieve. I 
show that there are two primary types of “empowerment”: empowerment of the 
autonomous self and empowerment of the relational self. These two distinctive types are 
of utmost importance because, though largely unacknowledged, they lie as the core 
foundation of conceptual frameworks that divide feminists into two opposing camps. 
Further, within these two primary types, there are diverse, nuanced understandings of 
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 "Empowerment" seems to be the rallying cry of modern women. Websites 
boasting membership in the "Female Empowerment Web-ring" display everything from 
encouragement for women who breastfeed to family violence information to protests 
about the American taboo against female-toplessness to information about goddess-
based religions (2005)1. The "Center for Women's Empowerment" (Watertown, MA) 
teaches Yoga and provides psychotherapy and retreats for lesbian couples (2005)2. One 
individual within a group of young feminist women interviewed by National Public 
Radio (NPR, 1998) used the term "empowered" repeatedly to describe how working 
with the group made her feel. An exhibitor at the Cosmetic Enhancement Expo 2004 in 
Los Angeles California even used the notion of female-empowerment to help sell her 
cosmetics. Given the seeming importance of and confusion about the meaning of 
"empowerment," academic examination of the term is in order. Yet among feminist 
theorists the term seems to be just as much of a fetish and no better defined than among 
women outside of academia.  
 In spite of the presence of implicit and explicit notions of "empowerment" 
throughout much of feminist theory, and in spite of the fact that "empowerment" looms 
______________ 
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as a catch-all solution to the collective and individual problems of women, very little 
attempt has been made to clearly conceptualize the term. Those who do make such an 
attempt often fail to accomplish actual clear definition. What is of perhaps even graver 
concern is that they fail to acknowledge the multiple uses of the term that would, if 
carefully examined, reveal multiple, varying notions of what this single term might 
mean. Making matters worse still, this inadequately defined term has been fetishized. 
That is, "empowerment" seems thought to be something relatively concrete that an 
individual can obtain which will magically make the complications and problems facing 
modern women disappear.  
A striking example of this phenomenon is the attempt to define the term, and the 
comments made thereafter, by Rowland-Serdar and Schwartz-Shea (1991). First, they 
borrow a notion from Alcoff (1988), who states that, through empowerment, women can 
"come to believe in their ability" to be responsible for their own identity, their politics 
and their choices. They then contrast this "empowerment" to "powerlessness," which 
they define as "the continuing subordination of women to men in public and private 
spheres" (607). Finally, they tell us that empowerment involves developing "a sense of 
self able to make, and take responsibility for, choices affirming [this] sense of self" 
(609). 
 This particular attempt to define “empowerment” has a few problems. First, these 
theorists give only a vague definition of the term as it might be conceived within 
"liberal" feminist theory. They do not ask what empowerment might mean within other 
theoretical frameworks. Second, they do not define the term directly, but instead 
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expound upon what they see to be its direct opposite, "powerlessness," which they 
further equate with subordination. Third, they only understand "empowerment" as it 
applies to the individual "self," as though this self exists independent of a social context. 
This is an ironic problem, given that they place the "disempowered, subordinated" 
woman within a set of social contextual problems in the first place. I will return to a 
discussion of this matter below. 
What is more disturbing than the definition, however, is that "empowerment" is 
established as a seeming end in itself that will somehow cure "subordination" and 
thereby end "domination." Yet if women are truly dominated by men within all realms of 
interaction between the two sexes, how do we know that "a sense of self" will give them 
any real choices? And, within the context of this overriding domination, insisting that 
women "take responsibility" for choices could be construed as a blame-the-victim idea. 
Subordination is, after all, often only a survival mechanism for those who cannot escape 
domination. Obviously, this work contains more assumptions than may at first be 
apparent. 
 Rowland-Serdar and Schwartz-Shea are not alone in presenting a muddy, 
paradoxical concept of empowerment. Hartsock (1983) declares that "power is a relation 
among persons that cannot be exercised apart from a social situation" (82), and 
concludes that "theorizations of power are cultural productions" (261). However, she too 
does not divorce the concept of powerlessness from the concept of subordination. She 
states that "an analysis that would not require that one sever biology from society, nature 
from culture" would be able to "expose the ways women both participate in and oppose 
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their own subordination" (261). Once again, if powerlessness and subordination are the 
same, and if women have always had to put up with being dominated by men, then to try 
to define empowerment for women by equating it with an ability to take responsibility 
for participation in subordination is either a contradiction of terms or a statement of 
defeat at the outset.  
The equation of the "powerlessness" of women with their "subordination" to men 
was strong and constant in "second-wave" feminist theory, the feminist theorizing that 
swept through the halls of academia and in front of "national publics" roughly beginning 
in the 1960s (see Nicholson, ed., 1997). In spite of this, however, concepts such as 
"subordination," "domination," and "powerlessness" or "empowerment" should be 
divorced from each other. Otherwise, we cannot be clear about what we mean by these 
terms. Further, it must also be recognized that the term "empowerment" has different 
meanings within different contexts. Each different meaning establishes different goals 
and therefore different pathways to obtaining those goals. In fact, the term has such 
diffuse meanings that notions about how to obtain it often lead to recommendations for 
political, social and personal action that are incompatible with each other. This is one 
reason the varying types, or categories, of feminist thought have all too often strained 
against each other. 
 Yet, in spite of the strain between the varying lines of theory that emerged out of 
second wave feminism, these women did have one unifying cry that would be at least 
partially challenged in relatively recent times, that is, in what is now sometimes referred 
to as the "third wave" of feminist thought. Second wave feminists declared almost 
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unanimously that, collectively, men cause, promote and benefit from the 
"powerlessness" of women, which, of course, is why they unanimously demand that 
women must be somehow “empowered.” To find the roots of this theoretical notion, we 
do not have to look too far back in time. For example, Beauvoir (1949) wrote that men 
have gained increasing strength for themselves by degrading and exercising power over 
women. This came about, according to Beauvoir, because woman did not share man's 
way of "working and thinking" and because she "remained in bondage to life's 
mysterious processes" (82). Man's power increased significantly when he "became 
owner of the land" (83). Because he saw woman as "other" and not like himself, he also 
began to claim ownership of woman as he did the land, the animals and slaves (83). We 
see these particular notions manifest again and again throughout various styles of 
feminist theory that emerged out of second-wave feminism.  
 
Categorical Division and Analysis 
In her 1981 book Public Man, Private Woman, Jean Elshtain lists the primary 
categories of feminist thought as radical, liberal, Marxist and psychoanalytic (202). She 
tells us that the divisions between these categories are not precise, and that there is some 
overlap between and among positions. She also notes, however, that there are important 
differences between them. Indeed, while it can and has been argued that these four 
categories do not adequately encompass all of feminist theory, especially today, these 
four can be correctly drawn as the cornerstones of second wave feminism. These second-
wave feminists were searching for the source of women's oppression. As Firestone 
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(1970) said, in order to change something, we must first understand how it came to be, 
how it evolves over time and through what institutions it still operates. Each one of these 
four separate categories of feminist thought proclaimed to have found at least part of the 
answer to this puzzle about the origin, evolution and operation of the oppression of 
women.  
Further, parallels can be drawn between these categories and the types of 
"domination" suffered by women, according to Beauvoir. They all start from a notion 
that women are almost universally subordinated to men and that men exploit this 
subordination deliberately in order to gain increasing power for themselves. Marxist 
feminism, from which socialist-feminist theory evolved (Jaggar, 1983), focuses on 
women's social oppression and its manifestation in social situations, such as the fact that, 
historically, men and women have performed different types of work (Kollantai, 1977; 
MacKinnon, 1989; Olsen, 1993a). This parallels Beauvoir's concern that women did not 
share men's way of working. Psychoanalytic theory focuses on how and why women's 
thought processes may differ from those of men (Chodorow, 1978; see also Butler, 
1990). This parallels Beauvoir's belief that women did not share men's way of thinking. 
Radical theory blames women's oppression on cultural norms centered on biology 
(Firestone, 1970; see also Jaggar, 1983). This parallels Beauvoir's notion that woman 
remains "in bondage to life's mysterious processes." Liberal theory focuses on political 
processes and corresponding philosophical ideas such as rights (Friedan, 1963; 
Eisenstein, 1981) that can be traced back to early concepts of "ownership" (see Pateman, 
1988a; Okin, 1979). 
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 What these ideas led to in second-wave feminism was the creation of various 
theories meant to "empower" women within each of these realms. But these various 
notions of "empowerment" and how to accomplish it soon began to create division and 
discontent among academic theorists, even as they continued to fail to address how or 
why the notion of empowerment might mean very different things to different women. A 
brief look at each of the four types of feminist theory described by Elshtain and an 
examination of the arguments that proliferated within and around them will begin to 
reveal the extent of this phenomenon.  
 I begin with early Radical Theory, which targeted the biological differences 
between men and women and the "burdens" to women that sprang from these 
differences. These feminists were disturbed by what they saw as evidence that some 
form of male privilege has existed in every known human society. If women's 
oppression is so universal, they reasoned, it must be grounded in some universal 
difference between men and women. They turned their attention to biological difference, 
because it is constant across time and culture (Jaggar, 1983). For example, Firestone 
(1970) blames reproduction necessities for women's oppression. Women, she wrote, are 
weaker than men as a result of their reproductive physiology. Further, babies are 
dependent upon adults for survival, and human milk, or a substitute, is a primary need 
for at least the first year of life.  
To Firestone, this means that women, particularly if they bear children, are 
necessarily dependent upon men in some way. She therefore declared that reproduction 
was costly and demeaning to women. To her, nature had placed an unfair burden on 
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females, but because of our human ability to seek out and find medical and scientific 
miracles, there remains no need for women to remain in "bondage to life's mysterious 
processes." For Firestone, the way out would be technological advances that could free 
women from the traditional reproductive role. That is, according to her, biological 
reproduction can and should be replaced by some technological process that is carried 
out apart from the female body. To her, this is the only viable solution for ending the 
thus far eternal suffering of womankind. 
Other radical theorists, however, would charge that Firestone's ideas cast a dark 
shadow on the natural processes that could just as readily be seen as beautiful and as 
contributing to a unique power that only females have. That is, for example, Firestone's 
arguments lead to the conclusion that women's natural biology is bad for women. An 
opposite conclusion presented by some radical feminists (see for example Alpert, 1973; 
Daly, 1978; Griffin, 1980) is that women are naturally superior to men, beginning with 
the ability to give birth that men do not share. To strip a woman of this natural power 
and right is to take from her one of the greatest sources for happiness and empowerment 
in her life. Therefore, rather than believing that nature must be somehow overcome, 
these feminists conclude that woman's natural physiology makes her special, allowing 
her to experience and even to know and feel things that men cannot.  
In other words, although their "frameworks" and conclusions differ vastly, what 
the theorists who have been categorized as "radical" have in common is the notion that 
men and women are different in some fundamental ways, and this difference begins with 
biology. Again, it is further assumed that women have been oppressed by men 
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specifically because of that difference. While this makes for some cohesion within the 
category, it does not mean that these feminists have any similar notions about what 
female empowerment would actually mean or accomplish. To Firestone, 
"empowerment" means, among other things, freedom from the "burdens" of pregnancy 
and childbirth. For those who argued against her on this, "empowerment" means a social 
enhancement of woman's prestige, based in part on her unique ability to bear children. 
Next, I turn to Marxist Feminist Theory, which evolved into a socialist-feminism 
that sought ways to equalize women with men socially, economically and politically 
(Jaggar, 1993). Addressing issues of labor-division and class, socialist-feminism tries to 
address "the abstract nature of the category Woman" (Grant, 1993, 47). For example, 
MacKinnon tells us that "simply being a woman has a meaning that decisively defines 
all women socially" (1989, 90). It is noted that women have less money, less power and 
even less free time than men (Jaggar, 1983). Ideas about capitalism are united with ideas 
about patriarchy (Ehrenreich, 1990) in order to focus in part on the free labor that 
women perform in the home, which supports public structures that are assumed to 
produce profit primarily for men.  
This parallels the conditions of the proletariat as described by Marxism, which 
painted the proletariat as working to support an economic structure that primarily 
profited the bourgeoisie. Because work and economic conditions received a high profile 
in this line of theorizing, the public/private split and woman's "traditional place" in the 
home received a great deal of scrutiny and criticism. It was not uncommon for socialist-
feminist theorists to describe the traditional work of women as demeaning and part of an 
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economic structure that, again, served primarily men. Very similar to the way Marxism 
had encouraged the proletariat to rise up together to throw off the yoke of their labor 
class structure, these feminists called for women to forsake work in the home and insist 
on equal participation in the public realm of wage earners. 
Yet this line of reasoning almost immediately gave rise to a protest by women 
who pointed out that work performed within traditional roles, such as quality childcare, 
continued to be necessary whether provided in the home or elsewhere (for example, 
Mason, 1988). These feminists noted that movement into the public, wage-earning work 
force only doubled the necessary work that the average wife and mother must do in order 
for the human race to survive. This was especially true for poorer women who could not 
afford to hire housekeepers or afford quality childcare for their children. Among other 
suggestions, this category of feminism produced the argument that women should be 
paid for their in-home labor and the care of their own children. This line of reasoning 
produced political theory that suggested movement of the public sphere into the private, 
for example, through state payment to women for their in-home labors. This was the 
direct opposite of the notion that women should move from the private sphere, the home, 
into the public sphere.  
Again, this position implies definite ideas about what "empowerment" might 
mean for women and just how that empowerment should be accomplished. Theories that 
suggested women should always work outside of the home wished to empower them 
with financial security, independent of the family and, if applicable, of their husbands. 
Theorists who suggested that women should be paid for their in-home labors instead 
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sought to empower women with social prestige and with some control of family 
finances, even though their financial security would still remain largely dependent upon 
their husbands, ex-husbands and/or the state. 
Obviously, like the radical feminists, socialist-feminists did not agree with each 
other about the type of empowerment they wished to seek for women or even what the 
end result of that empowerment might be. They did, however, agree with each other and 
the radical feminists that women are oppressed and that, again, oppression is both 
profitable to men and deliberately exacted against women by men. But unlike radical 
feminism, socialist-feminism did not address why it is women particularly, instead of 
men, who are oppressed. It also failed to fully address why women are oppressed in 
ways that cut across class lines and have little or nothing to do with capitalistic 
production (see Jaggar, 1983).  
This, of course, is what the radical theorists had tried to address through their 
analysis of biology and reproduction. Another line of thought, however, would try to 
address the issue of the social reproduction of women's oppression. That is, they would 
examine the perpetuation of said oppression across generations. They would do this by 
focusing on "mothering," because traditionally, most children are cared for by women. 
In other words, the mother-to-child relationship was closely examined, and this scrutiny 
led to the development of "mothering theory" (Jaggar, 1983). This group of theorists 
included both psychoanalytic feminists and cognitive development feminists. What 
mattered to this theoretical group was that a social-norm of "mothering" creates a 
fundamental psychological difference between men and women, a difference which 
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affects how women think and behave. Further, how we understand and respond to that 
difference, or what we do about it, is of great importance. 
Gilligan (1978), the cognitive development theorist whose work inspired “care 
theory,” set out to show how Western society in particular has stigmatized feminine 
social norms. She stated that a difference between the ways boys and girls play has been 
used as an example by those who suggest that girls develop more slowly intellectually 
than boys. Gilligan argues that the difference is real but the notion of "slower" is 
incorrect. The notion of slow development, according to Gilligan, is a mistake rooted in 
the fact that other differences are not properly recognized or allowed for in the cognitive 
measurements. Gilligan suggested that the difference measured between the social norms 
of girls and the social norms of boys had to do with their socialization as caregivers, 
which gave rise to a reverence for human relational interaction at a level not shared by 
most males. 
Further, Gilligan forwarded a type of empowerment for women which meant a 
recognition of woman's role as nurturer and caregiver as a good thing for all of mankind. 
She and other "care theorists" sought to "empower" women by instilling in society and 
academic scholarship a notion that this difference need not be equated with "bad" or 
"inferior." In fact, the particular elements which researchers had found primarily in 
feminine social norms and the feminine psyche, such as the tendency to be other-
regarding and nurturing, were ingredients needed by the human race, particularly as a 
counterbalance to individualistic masculine social norms and psyche. 
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From the outset, however, "mothering theory" split into two opposing camps. 
Like the cognitive development feminists, psychoanalytic theorists proclaimed that the 
primary difference between men and women is located in the psyche. They, too, stated 
that this difference is spawned primarily by social conditioning. This conditioning arises 
in response to the biological necessity of mothering and the fact that, traditionally, 
women have been the primary caretakers of children. For example, Chodorow (1979) 
focused on how human beings develop certain thought processes at a very early age. She 
theorized that young boys begin to learn a different social role than girls because they 
perceive that they and their mothers are "different" and identify with the male figures in 
their lives who are not caretakers. But to Chodorow, this creates an array of social 
problems. 
Unlike Gilligan and the other care theorists, Chodorow and some of the other 
mothering theorists charge that the traditional mother-child relationship created and 
maintained male dominant societies (for examples, see Myers, ed., 1997; Trebilcot, ed., 
1984). These women, like many of the radical theorists, claim that childcare is indeed 
bad for women and for society, at least so long as it is primarily carried out by women. 
The result of the traditional mother-child relationship, they tell us, is the creation of 
dominating males and docile and dependent females. In other words, to these theorists 
"different" can indeed be very bad and does serve to develop female personalities that 
"participate in their own subordination." To them, "empowerment" came to mean an 
ability to recognize this participation and find ways to overcome it. 
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Here again we see two opposing notions of "empowerment" and of what 
empowerment would hope to accomplish. Care theory seeks recognition and prestige for 
women for their roles as nurturers and caregivers. It is further hoped that this prestige 
will allow women the opportunity to promote nurturing and communitarian ideals within 
the family and ultimately within larger political realms. Opposing this idea is the notion 
set forth by Chodorow and others that women should remove themselves as far as 
possible from the stereotypical role of "caregiver." It is hoped that this removal will 
empower them to demand equal responsibility from men in all necessary care-giving 
roles, thereby freeing women from this too-exclusive and self-perpetuating 
"responsibility."  
Finally, I turn to liberal feminist theory, which began to dissect political 
theoretical debate about issues such as rights and justice, and began to call for the 
equalization of women and men before the law. Unlike other second-wave feminists, 
liberal feminists largely sidestep the question of why women are "oppressed." Starting 
from the observation that women are oppressed by men and male-centric society, these 
feminists jump straight to the matter of seeking ways to end said oppression.  
In order to accomplish the goal of legal equality, liberal feminists have seen it as 
their task to show that women are in fact equal to men, because liberal ethics state that 
equals must be given equal legal rights. One way to show that women are equal is to 
show that they are fully capable of reason (Jaggar, 1983). It is important to note that 
there is a reason why such demonstration of and emphasis on cognitive ability has been 
seen as important. There has been a long-standing stereotypical notion that women are 
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not fully rational beings and therefore not capable of the same kind of decision-making 
as men. While I will discuss one possible origin of this notion in a later chapter, the 
important point to note for now is that, according to liberal feminist theory, because 
women are fully rational beings, their physiology is relatively unimportant and therefore 
physical difference between men and women is also relatively unimportant (for example, 
see Baer, 1999). Further, psychological difference, such as it exists, is thought to be 
caused by social problems, for example, inferior education (see Jaggar, 1983). In other 
words, minimizing gender difference in order to focus on "equality" instead became the 
norm among liberal feminists (Dietz, 2003). That this tactic was seen by these theorists 
as perhaps the only possible path to attaining legal equality for women began the heated 
“sameness versus difference” and “equality versus difference” debates that persist inside 
feminist theory to this day. Obviously, these debates set liberal feminism at odds with 
both radical feminism and psychoanalytic feminism.  
Liberal feminist theory is likewise set apart from socialist-feminist theory, but in 
this case because of its focus on individualism rather than on the rights of women as a 
social category, group or class. This is true even though Eisenstein (1981), who is 
sometimes categorized by other feminists as a liberal-theory feminist,3 insists that the 
problems of women should be understood first as a group/class struggle. This matter 
presents a need for explanation that all categories of feminist theory bleed into each 
other to some extent. For example, all hope to change laws that affect women and, as 
Eisenstein (1981) points out, demand equality and freedom of individual choice for 
women. Also, all recognize that women have some biological difference from males. 
  
16 
Likewise, all feminist theories recognize to some extent that women as a group are on 
lower levels in both social and economic realms than are their male counterparts.  
However, what distinguishes the different categories can again be found by 
examining what it is that theoretical arguments in a particular group share, such as which 
elements of the given situation that they consider to be most important. And, most liberal 
feminists, like traditional male liberal theorists, focus primarily on the autonomous 
individual, with that emphasis seen as being of primary, even urgent, importance. This is 
because to conceptualize womankind as a group or class is to emphasis that which sets 
them apart from other groups, or in other words, to emphasize difference. Within the 
confines of a theoretical frame that sees an urgent need to minimize difference, this fact 
is problematic at best. 
Yet as with other theoretical categories, we nonetheless see a division of the 
ranks within liberal feminist theory over the conceptualization of "empowerment," over 
how said “empowerment” might be obtained and over exactly what it is that said 
“empowerment” might hope to accomplish. For example, some liberal feminists have 
focused on the public/private split, locating many of women's problems in her 
"privatization" (for example, see Elshtain, 1981). Further, because states focus laws 
primarily on the public realm and ideally refrain, according to liberal-democratic theory, 
from interfering in the "private" lives of individuals, one highly recommended way for 
women to gain equality is for them to "go public." That is, they must be educated and 
employed outside of the home (see Jaggar, 1983). From this line of theory arose the 
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assertion that women could best be empowered by laws which would treat them the 
same as their male counterparts in public realms such as the workplace.  
But this, too, drew a line of opposing commentary. A question was raised: did 
not equal treatment often mean that those with unequal needs were disadvantaged? 
Theorists would soon point out that certain female experiences such as pregnancy and 
nursing are not and cannot be shared by men. Because of this, it has been argued, a 
difference in the way women in general and mothers in particular are handled in 
workplace law and policy may be the only way to truly bring "equal opportunity" to 
women (Littleton, 1997). It must be recognized in the workplace, some of these theorists 
proclaim, that women are very often also mothers. Otherwise, there is no hope for equal 
chances of employment advancement, provisions for necessary time off for childbirth, or 
allowances for the complications that nursing and childcare bring to the working 
women's employment reality. Within this theoretical frame, “empowerment” actually 
requires different treatment. This notion, however, immediately reveals the magnitude of 
an as-yet unresolved dilemma, because a supposed need for the “different” treatment of 
women based on their reproductive biology has been used historically to make sure that 
they did not have employment opportunities equal to those enjoyed by men (see Baer, 
2002). 
These are but beginning examples of the varying and opposing concepts of 
"empowerment" that can be found in feminist theory. Theory itself evolves over time. 
We see feminist theory emerge as a critique to male-centered theories that shaped 
political and social life for millennia. But then an interesting but not unexpected 
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phenomenon began to take place. Feminists began to critique feminists, to point out the 
weaknesses within the arguments. While such criticism sparks more debate about its 
own accuracy or usefulness, theory nonetheless evolves to incorporate at least some of 
the new ideas. Further, various branches of theory emerged that focus on particular 
aspects of women’s lives that had thus far been left unexamined by public discourse. 
These branches interact with each other, with individual theorists both writing and 
debating across the branches. This further evolves the theory, even as it sometimes 
splinters it. 
If we see feminist theory as an evolving entity with multiple branches that also 
evolve and mutate across time, we can begin to understand the patterns of discovery and 
growth therein. We can also begin to understand the underlying notions about 
empowerment, which also evolve to some degree over time. By carefully dissecting the 
above and other arguments, one can begin to outline exactly what "empowerment" may 
mean within each theorist's perspective.  
It is not enough to simply point out, as I have done so far, that differences 
obviously exist, because to do so does nothing to resolve the conflicts and confusions 
within feminism. What is needed is a careful analysis of why the differences exist. This 
can be done by carefully untangling the multiple definitions of the term "empowerment." 
Language often eludes us. Particularly, multiple concepts are often assigned to a single 
word. If we assume that everyone understands the word to have a single meaning when 
it in fact does not, then we commit a grievous error. The process of untangling and 
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clarifying concepts is a difficult one but is not impossible. Further, it is necessary if we 
are to ease confusions and clear a path for progress. 
 
Clarification of Categories 
 The following pages untangle the messy conceptual confusions that surrounds 
the catchword "empowerment." The process uses a step-by-step analysis of second-wave 
feminist theory. The method of analysis, which involves the categorical sectioning of 
theory, should not be thought of as a statement or restatement about how feminist 
theories should necessarily be categorized. Rather, I categorize the four basic "types" of 
feminist theory primarily as a matter of research convenience and in order to attempt 
extensive coverage of second-wave feminism in my work. The categorical framework is 
based primarily on work by other theorists and is not intended, in and of itself, to assert a 
position about these categories or to establish any new ground. In fact, I recognize that 
these categorical groupings have definite inadequacies. However, in spite of 
inadequacies, I find the categories to be a very useful and easily defended research tool, 
as I am about to demonstrate.  
Of foremost importance is the fact that these "basic four" cover all of the areas of 
human social study as outlined by Habermas, that are the human realms of "I," "we" and 
"it" (Honneth and Joas, 1991). In fact, it happens that Elshtain's categories, as mentioned 
before, align almost perfectly with Habermas' theory, if we simply take his analysis one 
step further. First, we must acknowledge what it is that each of Habermas "human 
realms" refers to. Simply put, "I" refers the internal cognitive processes of the individual. 
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"We" refers to “interior-collective" processes. That is, "we" is the inner workings of 
social and/or cultural constructs - those things which give groups and cultures their 
unique, internally-shared identities. "It," on the other hand, refers to those things which 
are externally observable, such as the rituals of a particular group or the laws and 
political organizations that a particular society creates. If we realize that "it" has both a 
plural component - collectively created constructs, and a singular component - individual 
observable behaviors, we have "four quadrants" of human reality.4  
Returning to Elshtain's categories we see this interesting alignment: 
Psychoanalytic/cognitive development theories examine how individuals think and learn 
to think ("I"). This corresponds to the "interior individual" or "intentional" quadrant. 
Socialist-feminism theories examine how humans interact culturally and socially ("we"). 
This corresponds to the "interior-collective" quadrant. Liberal theories examine 
government and legal constructs collectively created to regulate the ways that humans 
interact with each other ("external, plural”-“its"). This corresponds to the exterior-
collective quadrant. Finally, radical theory, although it partially grounds itself in theories 
about human instinct, nonetheless corresponds nicely to the exterior-individual quadrant 
because its theories are extrapolated from modern-day externally-observable behaviors 
and assumed historical behaviors of individual human beings ("external, singular”-“it"). 
I find this explanation of quadrants both useful and necessary, because as I move into 
analysis of the array of conceptualizations of "empowerment," it will become apparent 
that each category of theory presents an "empowerment" that would correspond to 
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human existence in each of these separate realms. Therefore, the usefulness of these 
particular categorical groupings to this research becomes readily apparent. 
In spite of this, however, I find it necessary to present a few clarifications 
concerning the distinctive boundaries that I have drawn for these "basic four" categories. 
To begin, it is understood that some theorists quoted herein may not agree with the 
categories in which I have placed their work. There are, in fact, few precise boundaries 
in any of these categories. For example, as I examine texts that theorize biological 
difference between the sexes, I include writings which may also point to socialization or 
other factors as the current "true" cause of women's oppression. I place these writings in 
the category I have labeled as radical/biological theory anyway, because they point out 
specifically that certain problems faced by women are only faced by females and not by 
males, and so biological differences therefore must have been the starting cause of the 
oppression of females. 
 Jaggar (1983) explains the problem with attempting to define the different types 
of feminist theory. She says: 
Feminist theorist and activists do not always wear labels and, 
even if they do, they are not always agreed on who should wear 
which label. Moreover, there are differences even between those 
wearing the same label and, in addition, dialogue between 
feminists of different tendencies has led to modifications in all 
their views. (123) 
 
As my earlier brief discussion of Eisenstein’s work indicates, I recognize that theoretical 
writings do not always fit neatly into any single category. As further example, Grant 
(1993) identifies MacKinnon as a socialist theorist, yet MacKinnon's notion that women 
were restricted to the private sphere because of reproductive physiology and child-care 
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practices is borrowed directly from radical theory. In fact, as will be seen as this project 
unfolds, it is not uncommon for the work of any given single theorist to cross two or 
more categorical boundaries. 
Further, I choose to focus on these "basic four" in spite of the fact that new 
categories have been drawn for feminist theory in recent times. As Dietz (2003) states, 
"the effort to simplify, categorize, and review the alternatives [in feminist theory] has 
become a small industry in the literature" (403). And yet the "basic four" still stand as 
the clearest division so far of the "types" of feminist theory. This is partly because other 
theories are either derived from or argue against these basic four. For example, 
"mothering theory" (see Grant, 1993) has its roots in the most common approaches 
found within what Elshtain titles the psychoanalytic theory category (for example, see 
Chodorow, 1978) and cognitive development theory (Gilligan, 1977), as mentioned 
above. Likewise, the original "woman's standpoint theory" (see Jaggar, 1983) stood on 
the premise that women's experiences which produce "ways of knowing" are different 
from those of men. This, again, has roots within psychoanalytic theory and cognitive 
development theory, although it could also fall under the umbrella of socialist theory or 
radical theory. 
 Further, the "basic four" are the foundations of other categories and ideas 
established and/or recognized relatively recently. For example, Dietz (2003) lists the 
following categories: difference feminism, diversity feminism and deconstruction 
feminism. Under the category of "difference feminism," she lumps together a number of 
subcategories, which she states "were forged out of second-wave feminism," which 
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during the 1960s and 1970s included "the liberal feminism of Friedan (1963), the radical 
feminism of Millet (1970), the socialist-Marxist feminism of Rowbotham (1972), and 
the psychoanalytic feminism of Mitchell (1973)" (Dietz, 2003, 404). Out of these four, 
Dietz tells us, the following categories emerged: Marxist historical materialism, 
psychoanalytic theory, cognitive development analysis and moral psychology, social 
psychology, situational sociology, interpretive social science, standpoint feminism, and 
the literatures on female spirituality and bodily essence. She further mentions that liberal 
theorists "predominant in the 1970s" (415) wished to minimize gender difference in 
order to focus on "equality" instead. Nonetheless, she places liberal theorists in the 
"difference feminism" category anyway, stating that these theorists make two basic 
assumptions: that persons are either male or female and that females have been 
oppressed because of patriarchy. "Equality," she tells us, is presented as an "alternative 
to masculinist citizenship" (415).  
 Having lumped all previous categories into one, Dietz then lists two separate 
categories: deconstruction feminism and diversity feminism. Deconstruction feminism, 
she tells us, responds primarily to "symbolic difference," which is rooted in the 
psychology of how and why "woman" might be given some distinctive definition. This 
feminism asks "whether it is possible or desirable to forward a collective concept of 
woman" (407). Diversity feminism, on the other hand, responds to "social difference," 
which is rooted in social difference and "socialist theory." This feminism says that we 
must also consider "race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, and other ascriptive identity 
categories" (402). Obviously, these new categories do not preclude the "basic four," but 
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rather either attempt to dismantle them (deconstruction) or add to them (diversity). I do 
not argue with Dietz's evaluation of the current categories within feminism. However, I 
find it both necessary and appropriate to return to the "basic four" to find a clear 
understanding of the roots of various feminist arguments and, again, of some varying 
definitions of "empowerment." This is because given the goal of "empowering women," 
which is more or less the understood goal of feminism, deconstruction feminism and 
diversity feminism examine and challenge concepts of "woman." I instead intend to 
examine and challenge concepts of "empowerment." Further, these two types of 
feminism are generally categorized as part of "third wave" feminism, which I will 
consider as I inquire about the various notions of empowerment in relatively recent 
feminist literature. 
As I will demonstrate, using these particular theoretical groupings also helps to 
clarify distinctive notions about the roots of "women's oppression," as well as why 
suggestions regarding how women might overcome this oppression vary so widely. 
Further, cross-categorical debates that have often pitted theorists within different 
"categories" against each other help to reveal the multiple and varying 
conceptualizations of “empowerment.” For example, some feminists charge that any 
universal concept of "woman" is essentialist and exclusive (Lugones & Spelman, 1983; 
Alcoff, 1988; Grant, 1993). Their concern is said “essentialism” actually stands to 
increase the oppressive problems that individual women face. On the other hand, 
Hirschmann (1992) declares that "obligations do in fact exist [for women] that are not 
chosen but rather stem from the crasis and history of human relationships" (12). This 
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argument suggests particular types of oppression that womankind as a collective group 
may face and have need to rise above. Further, Jaggar (1983) writes that if liberal theory 
would take biological necessity and other facts of human need into account then instead 
of community and interdependence seeming puzzling and problematic, "the existence of 
egoism, competitiveness and conflict" would be thought puzzling and problematic (41). 
This argument refers to an “interdependence” that is tied to biological reproduction. This 
hints at something both unique and important about the universal role that the women 
collectively play in the survival of the human race. These arguments over how "woman" 
is to be conceptualized led feminism into what has been called an "identity crisis" within 
feminism (Alcoff, 1988) that has still not been resolved today (Dietz, 2003). 
Finally, within the “quadrant” categories as I outlined them earlier, I collapse 
some varied but related branches of theory. For example, while this research will 
necessarily include some coverage of feminist literature that discusses empowerment as 
it is understood by women of color, women of low economic status, and so forth, I do 
not find the need to use "diversity feminism" as a separate category for the research. As 
noted above, diversity feminism often challenges concepts of “woman,” but I wish to 
challenge concepts of “empowerment.” Further, because understandings of race, 
problems of race relations, economic class and the problems of low economic status are 
all social constructs, I combine some relatively recent theories about these and other 
social issues with the second-wave socialist-feminist theory that examined how social 
constructs affect the lives of women. Finally, it was from within a dialogue5 between 
socialist-feminists and black feminism theorists that the modern “diversity-feminism” 
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first emerged. This is why I have titled this category socialist-feminism and emergent-
diversity feminist theory.  
As an aside intended for further clarification, I do not include here the social 
movements or theories that were part of “first wave” feminism. “First wave feminism" 
encompasses historical women's movements that were efforts to liberate women in 
multiple situations and in multiple ways, such as granting them suffrage and eradicating 
the social expectation of women to wear corsets. However, academic theorizing about 
these movements during their occurrence was scarce. "Second wave feminism," 
however, saw a massive ballooning of theorizing about women's issues within 
universities and academic journals and books. Because I wish to focus on how theorists 
have defined empowerment, I choose to focus primarily on second wave feminism, with 
some smaller amount of attention paid to the relatively recent third wave literature. 
Also, I place psychoanalytical theory together in one category with cognitive 
development theory. This is because both types of theory examine the internal 
construction of thought processes and the influence of cultural norms on individual 
views and behaviors even though they use different methods to do so and often reach 
different conclusions. I also find it useful to place these two side-by-side within a single 
category because they both gave rise to types of "mothering theory." This is not meant to 
imply that feminists writing within other categories of thought did not ever focus on 
"mothering." In fact, as Trebilcot (1984) asserts, the "centrality" of mothering in 
women's lives is centrally "reflected in feminist theorizings" (1). However, 
psychoanalytical theory and cognitive development theory are both particularly 
  
27 
preoccupied with theoretical notions concerning the psychological effects of the 
nurturing of children when it is carried out predominately by women. 
Finally, under the heading of liberal theory I will examine not only liberal 
political theorists, but also theorists who examine laws in a liberal democracy, 
particularly America, from an individualistic viewpoint. This is because the 
individualistic viewpoint is standard throughout liberal political theory and is in direct 
opposition/contrast to communitarian theory. Communitarian theory, on the other hand, 
can be shown to have close parallels within “care theory,” which is one outgrowth of 
"mothering theory."  
 
Research Method, Step by Step 
With these categorical structures in place to help sort out the broad array of types 
and styles of feminist theory, attention can be turned to the task of unraveling the tangle 
of the multiple conceptualizations of “empowerment.” This is not the impossible task it 
may at first seem. An understanding of the theoretical "frameworks" which support 
divergent notions of empowerment can be obtained by asking a few precise questions. 
This understanding will reveal distinctive definitions of the term "empowerment," all of 
which fall within two broader but distinctive types of empowerment. We can then make 
some sense of the conflicts and contradictions that arise across and within feminist 
theoretical frames. 
I have formulated a step-by-step process of theoretical questioning intended to 
reveal these varying definitions of empowerment. The first step (1) is to identify the 
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addressed problem. The second step (2) is to inquire as to the context of the problem that  
"empowerment" is intended to overcome. This "context" includes both (a) the assumed 
cause or causes of the problem and (b) the kind of human interaction that is being 
addressed. The third step (3) is to ascertain the method which the theorist in question 
recommends as the best way to attain "empowerment." The fourth step (4) is to 
understand the theorist's goal, that is, what the "empowerment" intends to accomplish.  
Taking these steps will reveal at least two distinctive "types" of empowerment, 
and within these two types, multiple nuances of what this "empowerment" really means 
to the theorists. These two distinctive types are of utmost importance because, though 
largely unacknowledged, they lie as the core foundation of conceptual frameworks that 
divide feminists and other theorists into two opposing camps. These must therefore be 
acknowledged and understood before other distinctions of definitions can be pursued. 
 
Untangling the Skein 
These two types of empowerment are important enough to be discussed at length 
separately. However, I will give briefer attention to the first, only because in western 
political thought, especially in relatively recent times, this has not only been discussed at 
length, but has been often been mistakenly thought to be the only legitimate type of 
empowerment. The two types are: 
A. Empowerment of the autonomous self, in which ways are sought to allow women 
to  live well as individuals and to be independently willed. Particularly, ways are 
sought to allow women to stand on their own without the aid of men and to gain 
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autonomous power within the public realm. When the private sphere is addressed, 
women are often encouraged to forsake interdependent relationships that are seen 
to create burden, responsibility and oppression. 
B. Empowerment of the relational self, in which we see concepts of the individual as 
necessarily embedded in social interactions with other human beings, including 
males. It is assumed that no humans can ever entirely be independent of or 
separate from others, and that it is beneficial to human societies for this 
interdependence to be recognized and improved upon. Ways are sought to gain 
social prestige for caregivers and to improve the quality of intimate, 
interdependent relationships in order to provide for the happiness and care of all 
human beings, including those such as children who cannot care for themselves.  
 
Empowerment of the Autonomous Self 
Kant calls moral autonomy the "unconditional value" (Palmquist, 1995). 
Autonomy means that the individual must be free to choose his or her values, goals and 
corresponding actions. It is based on the Lockean notion that under God and the law of 
nature, "all men are free and equal" (Schochet, 1971, 15). If they are truly "free and 
equal," no man may define for another man what is "good." Barry (1965) states that 
freedom is measured according to the degree to which one is able to pursue wants 
against the contrasting tensions of restriction and control. Berlin (1969) gives further 
clarification to these ideas by telling us that there is more to liberty than merely not 
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being controlled. Negative freedom is the freedom from control. Positive freedom, 
however, is the freedom and ability to pursue one's own will. 
Keeping these thoughts in mind, let us return for a moment to Rowland-Serdar 
and Schwartz-Shea's definition of empowerment: "a sense of self able to make, and take 
responsibility for, choices affirming [this] sense of self." In the context of individual 
autonomy, this definition makes a limited sense. Such "sense of self" is necessary in 
order for one to recognize one's own individual will as something separate from the 
demands and/or controls of others. Further, the process of overcoming outside control 
and pursuing one's own will takes personal responsibility and action. However, while 
"sense of self" may ensure that one is able to choose one's own values and goals as Kant 
suggested, it does not ensure that one also has the corresponding ability to take action 
according to those values and goals. This is where the need for positive freedom, or the 
ability to pursue one's own will, comes in. The combination of "negative" and "positive" 
freedom, together with a "sense of self," allow for the empowerment of the autonomous 
self. My research method allows for the isolation of and understanding of this type of 
"empowerment" wherever it appears in political theory. 
 
Empowerment of the Relational Self 
 In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle made the following observation:  
The term self-sufficient denotes not merely being sufficient for 
oneself alone, as if one lived the life of a hermit, but also being 
sufficient for the needs of one's parents and children and wife, 
and one's friends and fellow countrymen in general, inasmuch as 
man is by nature a social being. (circa 382-322 B.C., Book I, 




It has been recognized since antiquity, then, that human beings live interconnected and 
interdependent lives. This theme did not die with Aristotle. Although Aristotle did not 
consider the family to be a political matter, communitarians throughout the centuries 
have continued to carry his concept of "self-sufficiency" of the social being as it 
involved interdependence between "countrymen in general," applying this to the political 
wellbeing of the community, the state and the individual citizen. Etzioni (1995), for 
example, says that neither individual liberty nor human existence can be sustained for 
long outside of social communities. These communities, for Etzioni, necessarily entail 
pursuit of common goals which are only attainable as common goals. Dewey (1925) said 
that democracy is "the idea of community life itself"(156), and added that what 
constitutes democracy is "the clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its 
implications"(156). Sandel (1996) makes the point that this communal life cannot be 
understood without understanding the nonpolitical aspects of life, i.e., the social aspects 
that form our very identity. He argues that the inclusion of these aspects is necessary in 
order to understand our conceptions of the good life. Walzer (1983) tells us "goods with 
their meanings because of their meanings are the crucial medium of social relations” (7). 
Crittenden (1993) further declares that individuals are not simply born with autonomy, 
because autonomy requires both rationality and self-reflection. He says, "We cannot 
know we are and cannot claim to be, acting autonomously without some social context 
that will validate the process" (47). 
I return one last time to the 1991 discussion of "empowerment" by Rowland-
Sedar and Schwartz-Shea. They carry the concepts about the individual, autonomous self 
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from the public sphere into the private sphere in order to address issues of cultural norms 
about woman's responsibilities within the family. They attempt to reshape liberal 
theory's notion of the autonomous self by including how that self is shaped by the family 
and by cultural norms. Their efforts are to be applauded in that they recognize the 
shaping of the self by relational forces. But they fail to understand the empowerment of 
the relational self as such is put forth by other theorists even as they purport to address 
the same. The reason for this failure is two-fold. First, although they mention that 
"female children's learning about their sexuality" within social and cultural contexts 
produces results that span a "continuum" from one "extremely empowering and 
supportive end point"  to "another profoundly disempowering and devaluing end point" 
(610), they thereafter only focus on family processes that produce the disempowering 
end, using this as a tool to attempt to discredit the work of other theorists.  
Second, they state that "empowerment" must include redefining "responsibility" 
to mean "encouraging" others, including children, to take care of themselves, thus 
limiting the woman's "responsibility." Unfortunately, this fails to take into account the 
fact that all individuals have at least one prolonged point in their lives when they cannot 
"take care of themselves": when they are infants and young children. This, then, 
sidesteps the empowerment of the self as it applies to empowering one to take care of 
helpless others by assuming that no one is ever truly helpless and dependent. The 
argument by some theorists who promote what I define as "empowerment of the 
relational self" (for example, Gilligan, Fox-Genovese, Hewlett) is not that women must 
be "dependent" upon men, as Rowland Serdar and Schwartz Shea imply (607-608), but 
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rather that women often do find themselves responsible for individuals who cannot care 
for themselves (i.e., babies). The confusion about this begins with the assertion that 
mothers tend to desire a "partner" to help them in this responsibility, and for 
heterosexual women, "partner" means a male.  
Rowland-Serdar and Schwartz-Shea confuse certain cultural norms that have 
defined how this "partnership" is structured with "helpless dependency," because they 
are focusing only on dysfunctional families. This is a common mistake in feminist 
theory and is one major reason for the splitting of feminist theory into multiple opposing 
camps. It is not my intention here to take a side in this dispute, but to demonstrate that 
some fundamental miscommunications have been in play. Rowland-Serdar and 
Schwartz-Shea are a prime example of theorists who make some valid points, but err in 
that their disapproval of "opposing camps" is based largely on misunderstanding. This is 
evidenced by accusations they make that do not apply very well to the theories they are 
criticizing. An understanding of the various definitions of "empowerment" found across 
feminist theory, coupled with a reexamination of empowering elements of cultural 
norms, could, if not create agreement between opposing camps, at least forge a bridge of 
understanding that better addresses the real, multifaceted concerns of today's women 
within the contexts of the various social landscapes in which they find themselves. 
 However, if we are to understand what interdependence means to the individual 
and what this has to do with empowerment, we must focus not just on the community 
and the state, or even on the notion of autonomy and how it is defined. We must also ask 
what interdependence has to do with the well-being of the family. This is not only 
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because of the oft-stated biological fact that babies cannot survive without adult care. It 
is also because the family cannot be independent of outside help, that is, self-sufficient, 
unless all members of the family, including helpless members such as babies, are 
properly and continually cared for by the family or by some means provided for by the 
family. It is within this context that the empowerment of the relational self first emerges. 
This is because, for example, a mother with an infant cannot be said to be empowered 
unless that "empowerment" entails an ability to see that her child is properly cared for.  
Yet, this concept reaches well beyond the mother-child relationship. Anyone who 
wishes to care for any loved one - a child, a sibling, an aging parent, or even a pet - will 
feel utterly powerless the moment he or she loses the ability to help or care for said 
loved one, so long as the help or care is still needed for the wellbeing of the loved one. 
Further, this sensation of powerlessness has roots in a concrete reality: with failure of the 
ability of such care to take place within the family, in civil society care becomes the 
responsibility of and/or the burden of the community and/or the state. This problem 
arises even if concern for the care of others does not exist within the society, because 
this breakdown of in-family care produces such burdens to the society as "street 
children," homeless elderly and even high infant mortality. Within this context, 
empowerment of the relational self becomes a matter of political concern. The research I 
present will disentangle this relational empowerment from other concepts that surround 
it, to reveal a second type of empowerment prevalent in much of Second and Third 
Wave Feminism.  
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As a final point concerning these two distinct types of "empowerment," I return 
for a moment to Hartsock's analysis of power (1983). She tells us that male theorists 
have tended to define power as domination and control/ coercion, while female theorists, 
whether feminists or not (for example, Hannah Arendt, Hannah Pitkin, Dorothy Emmet), 
tended to define power as capacity/energy and relation. Hartsock applauds the 
"feminine" definition, states that an understanding of power that takes both definitions 
into account is needed, but then proceeds to limit the definition once again to the 
"masculine" definition by stating that an "adequate theory of power" (254) would 
address domination and locate sources of oppression. If she had truly intended to include 
the feminine version, she would also have maintained that this "adequate theory" must 
address limits to capacity/energy and breakdowns in relation. Here we see the root cause 
of the split of a definition of "empowerment" into two major types of empowerment: that 
power has at least two distinct definitions that have not been reconciled in theory. The 
"masculine" definition is concerned primarily with the autonomous self, while the 
"feminine" definition is concerned primarily with the relational self. 
I do not suggest that these two types should or can be reconciled with each other, 
but rather that recognition of the existence of two distinctive types is imperative to 
theoretical clarity. I also do not suggest that Hartsock's "masculine" definition is truly or 







Chapters II through V each address one of the "basic four" categories. Within 
each of these, I analyze the work of some predominate second-wave theorists as I search 
for various conceptualizations s of “empowerment” and also untangle the types of 
empowerment. Chapter II discusses radical theory. While second-wave radical theory 
focused almost exclusively on empowerment of the autonomous self, it nonetheless 
presented two distinctive notions within this single type of what "empowerment" entails. 
As I demonstrate in the chapter, the predominant idea is that empowerment for women 
entails a limiting of male coercive power over the female. However, within a relatively 
small group of radical theorists, we see instead that “empowerment” for women entails 
giving social prestige to them based on their unique ability to give birth. Note that 
Hartsock mentions that "power to coerce" and "social prestige" are actually two 
distinctive types of power. I elaborate on this concept in the chapter. 
Chapter III examines socialist-feminism and emergent-diversity feminist theory. 
Second-wave socialist-feminism theory almost exclusively addressed the autonomous 
self, in part because of its ties to radical theory. However, diversity feminist theory, that 
began with a dialogue5 between socialist-feminism theorists and black feminism 
theorists and later blossomed to include many groups, has often addressed problems that 
require scrutiny of the relational self within social contexts. Black feminist theory, for 
example, has long taken issue with second-wave feminism for advocating "female 




Chapter IV addresses liberal feminist theory. This theory originally dealt solely 
with the autonomous self as it had been defined within non-feminist liberal theory. 
However, relatively recent theories within this category have begun to discuss the 
relational self. They have done so in two ways. The first deals with concrete laws and 
the corresponding problems that women face. For example, laws and policy that deal 
with family leave affect how working women interact with their families. It has been 
suggested that empowerment of women must include an understanding of their relational 
roles as wives and mothers. The second type of theory that has brought in discussion of 
the relational self is theory that takes issue with Rawls' concept of justice as it was 
applied to an "abstract other." These theorists maintain that the concept of the "concrete" 
other is needed in justice theory because it is the concrete other that places the self in a 
relational role to others who may be different than, and have needs different from, the 
autonomous self.  
Chapter V examines cognitive development/psychoanalytical feminist theory, 
sometimes known as "mothering" theory. This category has been split into two camps 
since it began in the late 1970s. Gilligan and so-called "care theorists" have focused 
almost exclusively on the relational self, asking what this relational self is like, what role 
it plays in society and how it might be empowered against problems such as oppression 
and patriarchy. Chodorow and some other "mothering theorists" have focused more on 
the empowerment of the autonomous self. Because they largely attribute patriarchy and 
"subordination" to feminine relational norms, they see these norms as detrimental to the 
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autonomous self and ask how these might be eliminated from society in order to 
empower the autonomous self. 
Finally, Chapter VI discusses my interpretation of findings and my own 
theoretical ideas. Very briefly stated, I find that the theoretical arguments diverge 
specifically along the lines of variance in the theorists' understanding of 
"empowerment." Further, said variance is created by the multiple social and cognitive 
frames from which distinctive theories are drawn. An understanding of this creates a 
"big picture" view of the rich tapestry woven by the numerous and vastly differing 
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Some have argued that the subordination of women and the 
concomitant power accruing to men are rooted in biological 
differences between the sexes. Of all the differing political 
perspectives, it is radical feminism to which the latter view has 
often been attributed; that is, it is frequently claimed (although 
not commonly by self-defined radical feminists themselves) that 
radical feminism is biologically determinist, that it believes that 
existing gender differences are firmly rooted in, and determined 
by, underlying biological differences. (Birke, 1986, ix) 
 
This statement reveals a very common misunderstanding about radical feminism. 
Yet clearer understanding does not come so easily as one might at first suppose, because 
radical feminist theory does in fact turn to biology to find the roots of women's 
oppression. As will be shown in this chapter, these theorists turn again and again to the 
same theme: women's problems all start with our reproductive physiology and with 
specific matters of sexuality faced only by females. For example, Douglas (1984) states, 
"Virtually all of our theories are to a greater or lesser degree biological" and asks, "How 
can one talk about a form of oppression that has been so linked with sexual relations and 
childbearing without talking about biology?" (22). However, a couple of clarifications 
concerning radical feminist theory need to be made at this time. 
First, it should be noted that radical feminist theory is to be differentiated from 
the radical feminist movement that took place in the mid 1960s.1 The movement largely 
dissolved into disarray over various differences by the early seventies. Because Echols 
(1989) does a good job of recounting the movement’s history, I have no cause to do so 
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here. The purpose of my analysis is instead to examine radical theory writings, which 
began to be published in earnest at about the same time that the radical movement 
unraveled. The theory grew out of the movement, with a number of the movement 
revolutionaries eventually becoming prominent writers.2  
Second, although the above passage by Birke contains some truth, it nonetheless 
contains two erroneous assumptions that have repeatedly drawn inappropriate criticism 
to radical feminist theory. The first assumption is that if radical theory turns to biology 
to find a beginning or root cause of the problems women face, then it must also assume 
this factor to be the major, perhaps only, determining factor of gender identification and 
ongoing male domination. I will address this assumption soon. The second assumption is 
that radical theory must therefore believe in a sort of predestination - that is, it must have 
a defeatist attitude of "nothing can be done," or at best, it presents impossible 
propositions which give credit to conservative arguments that the male-over-female 
hierarchy is "meant to be."3 Yet a number of plausible ideas are presented for how 
woman might be empowered, with each idea rooted in the theorist's perceptions of the 
present nature and condition of the human race. While it is admitted that the difficulties 
are large, it is also believed that they are not insurmountable. Different perceptions of 
the nature of woman as well as different perceptions about woman's current situation 
inevitably lead to different conclusions by the theorists of what female "empowerment" 
would mean and how it could best be accomplished. I will discuss these varying 




Radical Theory and Hobbes 
In order to understand radical feminist theory, one must understand the 
theoretical notions that feminists in this category share. First, they believe that "all 
women as a group are oppressed by men as a group" and "that this oppression is, 
speaking historically, the first human oppression" (Douglas, 1980, 15; see also Elshtain, 
1981). This assumption is sometimes argued against by feminists whose writings fall 
under other theoretical categories (for example, Elshtain, 1981; Gilligan, 2002). Second, 
there is a "story" behind radical feminist theory that explains how and why this 
oppression began. It is a story about the origins of modern human circumstance that 
closely parallels the story Hobbes told about the origins of civil society.4 
In the "state of nature," or pre-political world according to Hobbes (1651), 
human beings lived under perpetually violent circumstances. Their lives were constantly 
threatened not only by wild animals and the forces of nature, but also by other humans. 
Individual men were not strong enough or skilled enough to protect themselves alone. 
To alleviate their constant fear, social contracts were made between men and group 
leaders were selected. The leader of each group was responsible for making sure that all 
men in the group were protected. In return, the men became "subjects," granting their 
leader, or "sovereign," power to make decisions for them. Hobbes asserted that such 
loyalty and obedience was necessary to ensure survival. This is not unlike the necessity 
of obedience to commanders in modern military organization. According to Hobbes, this 
is how the system of man ruling over man began. 
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In Against Our Will, Brownmiller embraces the Hobbesian notion that all 
humans "in the state of nature" existed in a "violent landscape" (14). However, woman 
in this original "state of nature" would have been faced with multiple disadvantages not 
faced by man (Brownmiller, 1975; Firestone, 1970; Pateman, 1998). She was physically 
weaker than most of her male counterparts. This was because of her reproductive 
physiology, which ensured that she would menstruate, very probably be pregnant several 
times in her life, go through either miscarriage or childbirth at the end of each pregnancy 
- both of which are painful and debilitating, eventually, if she lived long enough, go 
through menopause, and even very likely suffer "female-only" maladies (Firestone, 
1970). She could also be raped in a way that could have particular consequences that 
men would never face, and that she could not retaliate in kind (Brownmiller, 1975). 
Finally, if she chose to care for any of her offspring, she then had both herself and the 
child to protect in any given battle or life-threatening situation (Hobbes, 1651; Pateman, 
1998).  
Realizing rapidly that other women could offer her little help, woman would 
have turned to man to be her protector (Brownmiller, 1975). Man would expect 
something in return for his protection, just as did the Hobbesian male sovereigns. Being 
less able to offer service as a warrior or laborer than her male counterparts, this 
"something" which woman offered to her protector would likely have been exclusive, 
willing and virtually unlimited sexual access (Brownmiller, 1975). Willing and 
unlimited access, of course, would have given him pleasure and satiation without 
struggle. Exclusive sexual access meant social prestige for him, based on the envy of 
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other males. It would also have been a guarantee that her offspring were his, which 
allowed for the development of patriarchal families (Engels, 1884). For her, however, it 
meant not only giving the male control over her sexual behavior, but even a restriction of 
her overall personal freedom in order that the male could be sure that she was keeping 
her end of the bargain. She would have found it necessary to allow this in order to ensure 
her own survival and the survival of her children (Pateman, 1998). And thus, according 
to radical theory, began the collective and universal subordination of women.  
This story explains why radical theorists collectively declared that "the personal 
is political" (see Echols, 1989; Rudy, 2001; Elshtain, 1981). Elshtain hints that this 
declaration was absurd. Yet I would argue that within the context of this Hobbesian 
theoretical frame the personal must be political. From the Hobbesian point of view, it is 
this natural state of struggle which not only gives birth to politics but which justifies 
sovereign right and might. Laws that give anyone power over anyone else as well as 
laws that limit individual freedom in any way are based on this core concept: that human 
beings must be protected from one another else they be engaged in constant and bloody 
battle. It was the goal of radical feminism to destroy the male-over-female hierarchy, 
which was seen as permeating not only politics, but also culture and even "the very 
organization of nature" (Firestone, 1970). If this patriarchy began and continues because 
of man's ability to dominate woman's personal life and physical body and/or her need for 
protection, then real and widespread change could only be created by politics that 
addressed these personal issues.  
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The Hobbesian story also tells us that it was not only woman's physiology that 
began her subordination, but also the hostile natural environment in which early humans 
had to live and particularly the narcissistic nature of man. It is assumed that "natural" 
man is warlike and aggressive (Hobbes, 1651; Brownmiller, 1975). It is further assumed 
that he is narcissistic and driven by instinctual appetites. This would have created a very 
hostile social environment for all humans, which Hobbes said was improved by the 
establishment of the social contract. But feminist theory complains that when stable 
social order began to improve the life situation of free men, women’s needs were 
forgotten, their plight ignored (Brownmiller, 1975; Pateman, 1998). 
Further, while humans have subdued the natural environment, making it safer for 
our species in many ways, nonetheless, according to radical theory, the nature of man 
has not improved much, if any, over the millennia. Elshtain (1981) comments that 
radical feminists  "sketch a vision of the male that is unrelenting and unforgiving in its 
harshness" (205). She reminds us that Ti-Grace Atkinson called men "frustrated and 
insecure," that Susan Brownmiller insisted that all men "lust for power," and that Mary 
Daly compared men to "demons." As Elshtain (1981) points out, a common style of 
writing within radical feminist theory uses "hard language" filled with talk of power, 
exploitation, manipulation and violence. A striking example of this is Firestone's 
description of the beginning of the "feminist revolution" as women who were "fleeing 
the massacre, shaking, and tottering" (1970). Men, Elshtain tells us, are cast by radical 
theorists as creatures who are cruel to women, and who are cruel because they can be.  
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Radical theory, then, begins from the debatable premise that Hobbes was correct 
about the violent, narcissistic nature of man. This can be contrasted to Rousseau's notion 
that the natural state of man is one of peace and harmony - a notion embraced by some 
care theorists, as will be demonstrated in a later chapter. But radical theory embraces 
Hobbes' notions that "in the state of nature" men would constantly, violently seek power. 
It further embraces the Hobbesian notion that women were disadvantaged in their 
defensive struggle against power-seeking males because of their weaker physiology and 
the necessity of biological reproduction. These are all large assumptions debated by 
other theorists, but I will not discuss these issues now. Instead, I wish to point out that it 
is not only biological physiology that is seen as the root of the problem, but also and 
particularly the nature of man. This is a crucial point, because the question of the nature 
of woman divides radical theory itself into three opposing camps. There is also 
divergence across the theories based on the varying notions about how woman is 
currently most seriously affected by the said narcissism and aggression of man. 
 
Sets of Radical Assumptions 
Elshtain argues that radical feminism sees women as "pure" and men as "evil" 
(1981). Yet this is far too simplistic an argument because it ignores the various nuances 
of radical theory. Jaggar (1983) comments that although radical feminists "do share 
some common assumptions," different radical theorists nonetheless "grounded their 
work in different views of human nature" (85). The four categories of radical thought 
presented by Jaggar, however, were not strictly based on ideas about "human nature" but 
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rather included one category based primarily on a proposed solution to the problem of 
oppression and three categories that focus on biology and sexual orientation. I propose 
instead that radical feminism can be divided into two sets of categories, the combination 
of which reveals each theorist's understanding of the "context of the particular problem 
that empowerment is intended to overcome," as I explained in Chapter I. This 
categorical division leads to varying empowerment goals, and therefore the methods for 
attaining “empowerment” vary also. 
The first set of categories splits the theoretical writings according to the specific 
"assumed cause of the problem" of oppression - step 2A of my analytical structure. That 
is, while the theorists share the belief that female oppression began during some original 
prehistoric physical power struggle between the sexes, they have differing opinions as to 
the specific and primary cause of Woman's current misery.  
The second categorical set splits the theories according to the human interaction 
that they address - step 2B of my analysis structure (see Chapter I). These concepts of 
human interaction are based on the theorists' interpretation of the "nature of woman" as 
she interacts with narcissistic man. Remember that 2A and 2B combine to equal the 
"context of the problem." I use two sets because it would be erroneous to say that the 
theoretical writings split cleanly with no overlap between the sets. Instead, some 
theorists moved from one category to the next and back again across time (see Echols, 
1989). Also, as I will demonstrate, at any given time there is cross-over between the two 
sets, with theorists who agree with each other in Set One disagreeing with each other 
over Set Two assumptions.  
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Set One: Specific Causes of Oppression 
Set One categories are based on what the theories see as the specific "cause of 
the problem," that is of woman's misery in her current situation. These categories are as 
follows: (1) Reproduction as burden to and/or as forced upon women; (2) Male lust and 
sexual aggression against women; (3) Male-defined and controlled sexuality of women; 
and (4) Lack of social prestige and privilege for women (low class status). Each category 




Theories in this category see the primary cause of woman's current misery as 
being her responsibility for the reproduction of the human race. As mentioned in the 
Hobbesian story above, woman's reproductive physiology and the burden of care-giving 
caused women to have an unfair disadvantage in competition with males and/or left 
women vulnerable to aggression. This unfair disadvantage is seen as continuing into the 
present time, now causing women misery in the modern world. As will be seen as this 
chapter proceeds, recommended solutions range from biotechnology that would free 
women entirely from the "burden" of childbearing, to options that would give women 
choice in their reproductive roles, to the suggestion that all women should refuse to 





Male Sexual Aggression and Lust 
Theories in this category see reproduction and preservation of the human race as 
only an indirect cause of the real problem that has caused women misery since the 
beginning of time: the aggression and animal-like lust of men. According to this view, 
lust is the driving reason for the male's conquest for power over the female in the first 
place. Then, when a woman turns to a particular male to be her "protector," he takes 
advantage of her need for protection in order to establish his own "right" to the sexual 
use her body. Suggested solutions range from laws that would control or ban 
pornography and stricter laws against rape, to teaching women to "fight back" against 
male violence, to separating women from men as much as possible.  
 
Male-Defined Sexuality 
These theories concentrate on what is seen as a serious consequence of male 
control of the female over time: male-defined and male-controlled sexuality of women. 
That is, the Hobbesian male conquest of the female is seen as only the beginning point of 
patriarchy, which, experienced over time, has usurped woman's right and ability to 
define and control her own sexuality. Solutions offered range from universal lesbianism, 
to celibacy, to separatism, to universal "free love." 
 
Low-class Status of Women 
These theories focus on the social status of women. According to these theories, 
men, who always desire and seek power, are jealous of the power-over-life that women 
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wield. While the Hobbesian male had no thought for his children, civilized man wished 
to control the family and reproduction (Engels, 1884). Because he had already gained 
power over woman, he used his authority to debase her, to keep her power and status 
low, so that he could have some measure of control of this enormous power-over-life.  
 
Set Two: The Nature of Woman 
The second set of categories of Radical Theory I label "Nature of Woman." The 
three categories in this set are as follows: (1) Woman as Competitor; (2) Woman as 
Victim; and (3) Woman as Goddess. Remember that, in all categories, men are seen as 
narcissistic and aggressive. Therefore the "human interactions" are: woman/competitor 
vs. narcissistic/aggressive male; woman/victim vs. narcissistic/aggressive male; and 
woman/goddess vs. narcissistic/aggressive male. 
 
Woman as Competitor 
Theorists in this category see both men and women as struggling for power and 
seeking pleasure. There is very little, if any, perceived difference between the "nature of 
man" and the "nature of woman." Women, however, are unfairly disadvantaged in their 
struggle for power. To these theorists, the situation of the original state of nature still 
exists for women. That is, they still struggle ceaselessly in a battle they have never 
collectively, and seldom individually, won. However, these theorists believe that the 
playing field must and can be leveled. They present varying, interesting ideas about how 




Woman as Victim 
Radical theorists in this category see men as eternal sexual aggressors and 
women as eternal-thus-far victims and slaves. According to these theorists, women do 
not tend to be driven by instinctual appetites and should not have to put up with the 
sexual aggression of the half of the human race that is. The aggression of males and 
particularly the coercive sexual power that they have held over women is branded as 
evil. These theorists do not seek a "level playing field" between the sexes, but rather a 
mass emancipation of women that could only be accomplished through the severing of 
all sexual-relational ties with men. Suggested solutions for emancipation include 
lesbianism, celibacy and separationism.  
 
Woman as Goddess 
To theorists in this category, the nature of man and the nature of woman are two 
entirely different things. Men are naturally narcissistic and aggressive. Women, 
however, are seen as naturally other-regarding and gentle. While other radical theories 
assume that women "in the state of nature" were very much like men - hostile and 
concerned foremost about self preservation (Brownmiller, 1975) - this set of theories 
assumes that women must have been different than men. How else would the children, 
and thus humankind, have ever survived? Babies, after all, are dependent upon adults for 
their survival. Human milk, provided only by the female and for which in pre-modern 
times there was no substitute, is necessary for at least the first year of life. Further, 
compared to other mammals, human children take a very long time to mature to a point 
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where they are able to care for themselves. If Hobbes was correct in his belief that 
prehistoric man felt no responsibility for and did not care for children, then survival of 
the human race would have depended upon the behavior of females (Whitbeck, 1984; 
Pateman, 1998). Therefore, it follows that women must have been empathetic, loving 
and nurturing. 
These ideas were present during first wave feminism, were furthered by lesbians 
during the radical movement,5 and finally were taken up with full enthusiasm by the 
"Mother Right" theorists of the 1970s (see Echols, 1989). These theorists see Woman as 
the pure nurturer and life-giver of the human race. She is a being of low status, even 
though, because of her goodness and great contribution to the human race, she should 
instead be of a social status higher than man. Lesbians in the movement used these 
arguments to ease the discomfort of women who viewed them as at-least-potential 
sexual predators, not unlike their male counterparts (Echols, 1989). Soon after, the 
Mother-Right radical theorists would use these same arguments to demand social 
prestige and privilege for mothers and caregivers. 
 
Theories and Proposed Solutions 
When examining the differences across the various categories of radical feminist 
theory, it is important to remember that they all address what they see to be the original 
and over-arching problem that women face today: that women as a group are oppressed 
and harmed by men as a group. This is believed to have begun in some time before fixed 
political institutions - i.e. the during the original Hobbesian "state of nature" - and to 
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have continued more or less unabated to the present time. However, in order to 
understand the specific modern problems they hope to cure, and thereby to understand 
their recommendations and hopes for the empowerment of women, one must also 
examine their various views concerning the specific problems women face within their 
current situation, as I have explained. Once this is revealed, then recommended methods 
for empowerment and the goals said empowerment hopes to achieve become readily 
understandable. I will discuss these matters as I go. 
 
Reproduction 
Firestone and those who agreed with her sought an empowerment that would free 
women from biological reproduction, allowing them an avenue to end "male 
domination" based on sex and "female weakness." This freedom from biological 
reproduction would have the added benefit of freeing them from the responsibility of 
taking care of children. This is turn would free them to live out their lives in a fashion 
similar to their male counterparts.  
Firestone (1970) blames reproduction for women's oppression. To Firestone, 
women who have children have always been necessarily dependent upon men in some 
way. She therefore declared that reproduction is costly and demeaning to women. To 
her, nature had placed an unfair burden on females, but because of our human ability to 
seek out and find medical and scientific miracles, there remains no need for modern 
women to continue to shoulder this responsibility. Technological advances, not so far 
out of reach, could free women from their traditional reproductive role. That is, 
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according to Firestone, biological reproduction can and should be replaced by some 
technological process that is carried out apart from the female body. 
 Firestone writes that "men and women were created different, and not equally 
privileged" (8). Women have had to endure menstruation, menopause, "female 
illnesses," painful childbirth, and the necessity of nursing and caring for infants. All of 
this, together with the relatively long time that it takes for human children to mature, 
places women and children in a position of dependency upon males for their physical 
survival (8). She argues, however, that "to grant that the sexual imbalance of power is 
biologically based is not to lose" or give up the struggle for equality (9). As humans, we 
have long worked against the forces of nature. We do not simply give in to the forces of 
nature, to be ravaged by them. Rather, we work to improve upon our condition, to 
subdue nature as necessary in order to improve our lives.  
Birke (1986) states that if "male dominance is everywhere and always the same," 
as some feminists assume, and that if it is also rooted in biology, "then there is precious 
little that can be done about it" (42). This, she says, is because biology is primary "both 
in the temporal sense (e.g. biology acting before birth) and in the sense of it assuming 
greater importance by virtue of its implied irreversibility" (54). Only social factors, she 
writes, "can be subject to significant change" (54). Obviously, Firestone would not 
agree. To Firestone, the answer to women's oppression lies in technological advances 
that would eventually dispel the need for painful and dangerous childbirth.  
 However, Firestone's complaint, and her solutions, are far more complicated than 
may at first be apparent. For Firestone believes that psychological problems, relationship 
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problems, degradation of women, the sexual conquest of women and an array of other 
social problems all trace their roots directly back to women's reproductive physiology 
and the mother-child relationship. The only way to truly create gender equality, to 
Firestone, is not only to end the need for biological reproduction, but also to end family 
interdependence altogether, including child-to-mother dependency. In fact, Firestone 
further argued that sex distinction, rather than only sex privilege6, should be eliminated 
in societies. Only if women are relieved of their role as child-bearers and the biological 
family disbanded can this revolutionary change take place. This, she believes, would set 
women and children "free" to "do as they wish," sexually and otherwise (209).  
 For Firestone, this freedom from reproductive necessity and sexual restrictions 
would accomplish an empowerment of women, the end result of which would be her 
idea of a utopian world: one in which there were no class structures, no biologically 
based families and no need for "drudge work" (242). Further, all humans, male and 
female, child and adult, could enjoy "complex play" - "activity done for its own sake" 
and without other purpose. And sexuality would be freely and openly expressed by all, 
"flowing unimpeded" (242). It is immediately obvious that Firestone's idea of "utopia" 
would not appeal to everyone. This, of course, is why the "empowerment" of women 
hoped for by most other theorists intends to accomplish a different goal. It follows, then, 
that the "empowerment" itself would be of a different sort. However, there are those who 
agree with Firestone that child-to-mother dependency is one of the root causes of the 
subjection of women. Remember, for example, that Pateman (1998) points out that in a 
Hobbesian "state of nature" any woman who chose to protect and nurture her own child 
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would thereby find herself disadvantaged in any battle against an unencumbered male. 
Although the “state of nature” is past-tense, keeping this notion of a “battle” between the 
sexes in mind helps to bring into focus the assumed context of the problem within this 
line of theoretical reasoning, as well as the type of empowerment sought for women.  
 Firestone sees "the burden of reproduction” as woman's specific, current 
problem, which can be cured, with male-defined sexuality and the low-class status of 
women as byproducts of this central problem. This pinpoints her assumption, and the 
assumption of those who agree with her, about the specific cause of oppression. It is Set 
One, number one: “reproduction as burden to and/or as forced on women.” Women are 
"competitors" in a modern-day “battle of the sexes” (for jobs, leisure time, sexual 
equality and so forth) who could rise to man's equal, enjoying equal pleasures with him, 
if only the unfair burden of reproduction were lifted. This pinpoints her assumption 
about the nature of woman. It is Set Two, number one: “woman as competitor.” Finally, 
she seeks an empowerment defined as freedom from the burden of reproduction. The 
type of empowerment she seeks for women, then, is of the autonomous self. This last is 
obvious because there is nothing here that would, or that would strive to, give women 
increased ability to care for others; in fact, the intent is to end all need for women to care 
for others entirely. The goal is to create a society in which no individual is ever coerced 
to or ever even needs to care for any other individual (care of infants would be done 
collectively). 
Other theorists reveal similar assumptions concerning the context of the problem 
and display a hope for the same type of empowerment. However, their ideas for attaining 
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said empowerment vary from Firestone’s proposed technological solution. For example, 
Jeffner Allen (1984) declares that this is a "man's world," and that "a mother is she 
whose body is used as resource to reproduce men and the world of men" (315). Her 
assertion that women should refuse to bear children (328) is grounded in a notion that 
said refusal begins an empowerment for women by allowing them to shape the "whole" 
of themselves in their "own lifetimes" (328). There appears to be no room for 
compromise, because Allen asserts that motherhood is "servitude" (325), is "imposed" 
on women by men (316), that it "endangers" (316) and annihilates (325) the individual 
woman. The empowerment she seeks is for the individual self in the present moment. 
She offers no solutions for the human race as a whole. Rather, she admits that her goal is 
not "to save the world," but to shape her own life "in the present" (328). Martha 
Gimenez (1984), on the other hand, although also holding a pessimistic view of 
motherhood, offers a more compromising style of empowerment: to Gimenez, women 
should have greater choice in whether or not they wish to give birth. She states that 
women must have a right to decide “not only how many children they want and when 
they want them, but also whether they want any children at all" (308). Like Firestone, 
these theorists see "the burden of reproduction" as woman's specific, current problem. 
However, they seek empowerment defined as reproductive choice (in addition to above 
texts, see also analyses by Echols, 1989 and Jaggar, 1983). The type of empowerment 





Male Sexual Aggression 
MacKinnon (1989) also discusses a need for reproductive freedom, but the 
principal focus of her writings is male sexual aggression and “supremacy.” MaKinnon 
sees rape and pornography as the primary problems faced by women. She tells us that 
"women often find ways to resist male supremacy," but that "they are never free of it' 
(1997, 166). Women are "silenced," says MacKinnon, by sexual abuse and by other 
social inequalities foisted on them because of their sexual vulnerability. Rape harms 
them physically and psychologically; pornography is exploitation and "sexual intrusion." 
Women, according to MacKinnon, face discrimination in all areas of their lives: "Sex 
inequality is the true name for women's social condition" (1989, 242). To MacKinnon, 
the cure is feminist jurisprudence - laws that stop pornography, that help to protect 
women from rape, that force equality and that work to end discrimination against 
women. She believes that states can and must take responsibility for ending sexual 
oppression. 
Like MacKinnon, Susan Brownmiller (1975) writes about male sexual 
aggression. Her primary focus is on rape and fear, lack of personal freedom for women, 
and other problems created by rape. To her, the problem is universal, even though not all 
women get raped and not all men rape, because the actions of rapists leave all women 
intimidated and turning to hopefully nonraping men for protection. Rape, she says, "is 
nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all 
women in a state of fear" (15). It is not that rape can only happen to women, but that, 
when raped, women cannot retaliate in kind. They also are particularly vulnerable 
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because of their relatively lesser physical strength. Further, for the female, the 
consequences of rape can be far greater than what a raped male might suffer. Not only 
might she suffer permanent injury or death, but she might also become pregnant, which 
is followed by the birth of a dependent child.  
Adding insult to injury, according to Brownmiller, once women began to turn to 
males to be their protectors against other males, they were reduced by their protectors to 
the status of "chattels" or property (16-17). A crime against the female body became a 
crime against the estate of the male who protected her. Retaliation for rape might be to 
rape the women who "belonged" to the rapist. Further, freely raping the women of 
conquered men was an accepted practice throughout history, because it was by this 
action that the conquerors increased their numbers (21). However, that men rape women 
and only protect them if they are willing to become their "property" is, to Brownmiller, 
only part of the problem. The other component of this situation is that women are 
socially taught to be submissive and not to fight. This passivity makes a woman even 
more vulnerable to rape and even more dependent on the male who is willing to protect 
her at the high price of the her personal integrity and freedom. The cause of the problem 
of women's fear and dependency, then, is a complex union of male lust and aggression 
with female learned passivity. Given this, it only makes since that Brownmiller's notion 
of how to achieve empowerment for women would be two-fold process.  
Like MacKinnon, Brownmiller turns to the law to empower women by restricting 
the sexual power of males. The definition of "rape" would be broadened and the 
punishment for rape would be certain and severe. Brownmiller (1975) writes, for 
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example, that the law should recognize forced intercourse carried out by a husband 
against the will of his wife to be a crime. This was unthinkable in the past, she says, 
because rape laws were originally conceived to protect the interest of the male, not the 
interest of the female. Further, sex outside of marriage, especially when carried out by 
force, was considered to be unlawful, but sex within marriage was considered to be the 
husbands lawful right, whether of not the wife wanted it; marital rape was unheard of. 
Modern law can, and should, correct this problem. 
 However, unlike MacKinnon, Brownmiller adds a second step to the 
empowerment process. Women, Brownmiller (1975) says, should learn to fight, to be 
aggressive against males who might otherwise do them harm. Women who learn to fight, 
Brownmiller states, are actually able to instill fear in men (401). When the tables are 
thus turned, women can overcome their own fear and eventually end their dependency 
on males for protection. Brownmiller sees women as victims, but sometimes, she says, 
this is because of their own socially learned behavior. She wants women to learn 
assertiveness and self-protection techniques. In other words, she wants them to learn to 
be physical competitors with men instead of behaving passively toward them, so that 
they may prove themselves to be at least equal to men in the modern physical arena, and 
thereby become able to “instill fear” when necessary. This, Brownmiller believes, will 
help to empower women out of their current “victim” status. 
Both MacKinnon and Brownmiller see the most important, specific problems that 
women currently face as rape and other sexual abuses exacted against women by men 
(note that MacKinnon defines pornography as a sexual abuse of women). Their goal is to 
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cure these specific problems by some means, in this case by changes in the law and, for 
Brownmiller, teaching women to fight. This pinpoints their assumption, and the 
assumption of those who agree with them, about the specific cause of woman’s 
oppression. It is Set One, number two: “male lust and sexual aggression against 
women.” It is also relatively simple to extrapolate from this their assumption about the 
nature of woman. It is Set Two, number two: “woman as a victim” who needs to be 
legally protected and/or who needs to be taught to protect herself. Finally, they seek an 
empowerment defined as individual and collective freedom from said male lust and 
sexual aggression. That Brownmiller suggests that women who learn to fight can instill 
fear of women generally in men collectively gives a slight nod to a possible relational 
empowerment, as this would allow women to help each other indirectly. As an aside, I 
also suggest also that safety and protection for women who face real aggression such as 
rape and family violence could, in fact, allow them to better care for others such as their 
children. This is evident if one refers back to the notion that women become more in 
need of “protection” of some kind when/if they give birth to children. Empowerment to 
better care for their children would, of course, be a relational empowerment. However, 




Dworkin (2002) states that "'victim' is a dirty word, [but] it is also a true word, a 
word that points one toward what one does not want to know" (194). Like Brownmiller 
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and MacKinnon, Dworkin's focus is rape, pornography and prostitution. However, 
Dworkin frames the problem as one of male definition of female sexuality. Dworkin 
examined fairy tales, pornography, Chinese footbinding and even mythology to 
demonstrate her notion of male domination. To Dworkin, male culture has always 
striven to keep women either passive, weak or both in order that men might maintain 
power over them. Her solution: refusal to participate in the roles she views as imposed 
upon women by controlling men. "We must refuse," she says, to participate or submit to 
"marriage, the nuclear family, religions built on the myth of feminine evil" (192). To 
Dworkin, the primary problem has been male abuse of the female, abuse intended to 
keep her in fear and him in power. Abuse which afforded him complete sexual freedom 
and sexual conquest of the female, while affording the female no option of choice at all. 
Sex, Dworkin says, has been the power dynamic between men and women.  
Also, Dworkin seems to see only men as evil, even though women have been 
known to betray other women - to commit incestuous molestation of children, to usher 
their own daughters into pornography or prostitution, and so on. The men are evil and 
not the women because these women are simply taking their own frustrations and anger 
out on other women because "betrayal is always an easier choice” (199). No matter how 
bad the things some women may do are, they seem by this logic not to be to blame. 
"Their venom goes in the direction of other women because it is easier than taking on 
men" (200). Eternal victims cannot be to blame for their own actions. 
 To cure the problem of male-defined sexuality, Dworkin writes that sex as we 
understand it must be changed. Much like Firestone, she suggests that sexual taboos 
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should be done away with. For example, she states that "unambiguous conventional 
heterosexual behavior is the worst betrayal of our common humanity" (184), and 
therefore states that male/female sexual roles must be eliminated. It is fine for males and 
females to mate, so long as they do not restrict themselves to this heterosexual 
orientation or fall into traditional male/female roles. She also thinks we should do away 
with taboos against bestiality and even incest (188-190). Even children should be 
allowed, even encouraged, to be "erotic beings" (191). Dworkin equates female 
empowerment with total sexual promiscuity and freedom because she believes that 
sexuality has been ruthlessly controlled by men for their own purposes. The goal of 
Dworkin's particular style of "empowerment" is the end of all sexual “control” plus all 
sexual social norms and taboos, because these things have been instigated by and are 
maintained by a male-dominated culture. 
 It is interesting to note that MacKinnon (1989) takes issue with the notion that 
sexual permissiveness will cure any of the problems women face. For example, she says 
that "lesbian sex, simply as sex between women, given a social definition of gender and 
sexuality, does not by definition transcend the erotization of dominance and submission" 
(119). MacKinnon argues that if the problem is truly that men have constructed the 
meaning of sexuality and femininity, then said problem cannot be cured by men's 
absence - separatism, advocated as a solution by a number of radical feminists in the late 
sixties (see Echols, 1989), or by sexual permissiveness. Yet MacKinnon also does not 
see sexually defined roles or sexual taboos to be the primary problem women face in the 
modern world. Her framing of the problem is therefore, of course, different than 
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Dworkin's frame. That she was seeing a different problem and is therefore seeking a 
different type of empowerment altogether apparently did not occur to her. 
 Dworkin sees the specific problem that woman face, and therefore the specific 
cause of their oppression, as Set One, number three: “male-defined sexuality.” Yet, as 
mentioned above, she, like MacKinnon and Brownmiller, see the nature of woman as Set 
Two, number two: Woman as Victim.  She seeks an empowerment for women that 
would allow them to redefine their own individual sexuality without hindrance from 
males and male-defined society at large. Her focus is exclusively on empowerment of 
the autonomous self. 
 
Low Social Class 
 Finally, one group of radical theorists sought an empowerment for women that 
would give social prestige to them based on their unique ability to give birth and on the 
debt owed to them by the human race for their nurturance of children. Feminists who 
hold these have beliefs been labeled "cultural feminists" by theorists who also say that 
they are not "true" radical theorists (Echols, 1989; Alcoff, 1997). However, I would 
argue that, based on the theoretical notions that they share with other radical feminist, 
these theorists, for all of their differences, do belong in the “radical feminists” category. 
Like other radical feminists, this group of theorists turns to biological differences 
between men and women to explain the beginning point of the problems between the 
sexes. They also address the male-over-female social hierarchy, and, like other radical 
theorists, assume that men gained their higher position through physical aggression 
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coupled with narcissism. However, these theorists do not advocate changes in the 
biological, reproductive “nature” of females as a solution, nor do they simply turn to law 
to restrict the power of males. 
Instead, “cultural” radical feminists seek a distinctive type of empowerment for 
women, an empowerment that is something other than power against male physical 
dominance. What they seek is power in the form of "social prestige." Hartsock (1983) 
explains that coercive power and social prestige are two separate and distinct types of 
power. The power to coerce is hierarchical power that involves domination and 
submission. If it is assumed that the primary problem women face is forced submission 
to male sexual coercion, then to empower woman means either to make her equal to man 
physically or to in some other way raise her up to equal to him or above him in the 
physical hierarchy. Power in the form of social prestige, however, may have nothing to 
do with physical hierarchical arrangements. Instead, it affords individuals the power of 
respect. Respect can exist between equals or can even be accorded to someone in a 
hierarchy from someone who ranks above them. Through respect, individuals may find 
that others cooperate with them without coercion. Further, those who can coerce may 
refrain from doing so it they have respect for the individual they would otherwise 
exercise their power of coercion upon. Social prestige also allows for self-respect, which 
in turn creates opportunity for fulfilling self-potential. 
For radical theorists in this category, "empowerment" means a social 
enhancement of woman's prestige, based in part on her unique ability to bear children. 
These theorists would charge that Firestone's ideas cast a dark shadow on the natural 
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processes that could just as readily be seen as beautiful and as contributing to a unique 
power that only females have. Firestone's arguments lead to the conclusion that women's 
natural biology is bad for women. An opposite conclusion presented by these radical 
feminists is that women are naturally superior to men, beginning with the ability to give 
birth that men do not share (Alpert, 1973; Daly, 1978; Griffin, 1980). To strip a woman 
of this natural power and right is to take from her one of the greatest sources for 
happiness and empowerment in her life.  
Therefore, rather than believing that nature must be somehow overcome, these 
feminists conclude that woman's natural physiology makes her special, allowing her to 
experience and even to know and feel things that men cannot (Alpert, 1973; Daly, 1978). 
If it is further believed, as mentioned above, that the human race owes woman a special 
debt for its very survival, it makes sense that she should command a high level of respect 
and prestige. Said prestige would be an empowerment that would allow her to fulfil her 
own potential and ensure that her children could fulfil theirs. This would, in turn, bring 
other rewards to her life.  
 Thus, the so-called “cultural” radical feminists see a “low-class status of women” 
as woman's most important specific, current problem, which can and should be cured by 
a change in social and cultural attitudes and norms. This is Set One, number four of the 
“specific causes” of woman’s oppression. Within the notion that women are superior to 
men and that the human race literally owes its survival to women, we find these 
theorists’ assumptions about the nature of woman. It is Set Two, number three: “woman 
as goddess.” The type of empowerment sought by these theorists is primarily 
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empowerment of the autonomous self, however, in that some of them suggest that 
prestige will also help them to help their children it also touches on empowerment of the 
relational self. 
 
Radical Theory's Influence on Other Second-Wave Theories 
It was the partially these very real and deep ideological splits within radical 
theory itself that promoted the outgrowth of the other three primary second-wave 
theories. Questions of ideological difference, rather than being recognized for what they 
were, dissolved into finger pointing and arguments about who qualifies as a "radical 
feminist" (Echols, 1989). Further, as radical theory itself largely receded to the sidelines 
of feminist theory, the other categories became main stream. This may have been partly 
because goals established by other categories of feminist thought often "seemed more 
palatable, not to mention more realistic, than the radical feminist project of 
fundamentally restructuring [all of] private and public life" (Echols, 1989, 11). 
Arguments which seem to present no realistic hope of relief for women are rejected 
outright, then, not because they cannot be true, but because they frustrate efforts for 
female empowerment. This is an important point, as this not only manifests itself 
throughout contemporary feminist theory, but is the primary reason for contention 
between types of theory. That one type of theory at least seems to frustrate the efforts of 
another type is at the root of most of the contention we see across the field. 
Yet, in spite of radical theory’s disagreements with the other categories of 
feminist thought, and in spite of the fact that these disagreements persist to this day, 
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these other categories can be seen to have roots within and paralleling the different 
perceptions of the nature of woman that I have outline in this chapter. That is, Socialist-
feminist theory is grounded in an underlying perception of Woman as Victim, while 
liberal feminist theory is grounded in an underlying perception of Women as 
Competitor, and psychoanalytic/cognitive development theories are grounded in an 
underlying perception of Woman as Goddess. These theoretical groundings will become 
starkly apparent in the chapters that follow. 
I begin the next section of analyses with socialist-feminist theory. The primary 
reason for this was the early second-wave entanglement of radical and socialist theory. 
We will see that some socialist-feminists grounded their theories first in Marx’s and 
other canonistic socialist’s writings, embracing radical theory only secondarily, if at all. 
Others grounded their theory first in radical-feminist theory, embracing socialist theory 
as a possible solution to the plight of women. Further, some socialist-feminists found 
radical theory a necessary and welcome addition to socialist understandings of class 
structure (Eisenstein, MacKinnon) while other socialist-feminists felt that radical theory 
was off-base - too extreme and too self-focused to be a viable political theory (Mitchell, 
Vogel). Because of this, we will find an interesting cross-over of radical theory into 
socialist theory, even as we see a spark of frustration with and even anger against radical 
theory within the ranks of socialist theory itself. The ensuing problems at the theoretical 
level eventually dissolved into disputes and disunity at the political-action level. This, of 
course, was not the only fracture in contemporary feminist theory, nor was fracturing 
among activist-feminists new.7 These disagreements are interesting to note, however, not 
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only because of the tension they caused, but also because of differing notions about 
empowerment that formed the foundations of the theory in the first place. 
To abate confusion, it should be mentioned here that the next chapters are 
structured somewhat differently than this chapter has been. This is necessary primarily 
because of the base theoretical frames that constitute the foundations of the next three 
categories of theory. That is, they each engage with some preexisting political, social 
and/or psychological theory that has been used to study and theorize about our current 
political systems and/or how political actors think about the systems in which they live. 
They either argue against some of the “masculine” premises of the theory, use the theory 
as a base upon which to build new concepts, or both. Therefore, the following three 
chapters are structured partially around examination of these aspects of theory 
engagement within the categories. 
Socialist-feminism, liberal feminism and even cognitive development and 
psychoanalytical feminism all have particular methodologies in common. That is, 
theoretical arguments from each either attack masculine theories from which these same 
categories are derived for failing to recognize the plight or needs of women, build new 
“feminist” theories using the frameworks of those masculine theories, or both. It is 
important to separate out these methods when examining the literature, otherwise the 
tangle of criticism versus acceptance of portions or styles of masculine theory is 
hopelessly confusing. Furthermore, it must be understood that the theorists themselves 
are not “categorized,” rather I categorize their theoretical writings. In each of these 
categories of theory, I examine both the critical arguments against the male versions of 
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the theories - regardless of the “type” of theory used to frame the criticism - and the 
arguments that use the male versions of the theories as skeletal frameworks of the 
feminist arguments. 
Jaggar (1983) says that what socialist-feminism and radical feminism have in 
common is that they both believe that “older established political theories are incapable, 
in principle, of giving an adequate account of women’s oppression” (124). I would argue 
that this is true of all second-wave feminist theory. They all pinpointed aspects of the 
“older theory” that was distinctly male, and therefore incapable of truly understanding 
woman’s standpoint. They also all felt it was necessary to develop new categories of 
political theory and in some cases economic, social and psychological theory as well. In 
their attacks on each other, what they often failed to see is that the problem of the 
“woman question” actually exists within all realms of human existence. This, in and of 
itself, explains the need for various branches of theory. That said, however, argument 
and contention between the theoretical categories has served some useful function, for 
the ensuing debate has helped to expand the views of all. Unfortunately, as will be 





1. Rudy (2001) says that the term "radical" has been "used by different groups with different 
ideologies at different times," but that the term "implies that adherents believe that the ideology 
and strategies of their particular group will ultimately lead to revolution and reconstruction" 
(193). This definition of "radical" is applicable to both the movement and the theory. Radical 
theory, however, is also defined by its quest to locate "the root source" of female oppression. 





2. For example: Jane Alpert, Ti-Grace Atkinson, Susan Brownmiller, Shulamith Firestone.  
 
3. That radical theory has been used to "underwrite feminist claims" as Birke (1986) accuses is 
true enough. However, it is common for opposing camps in political battles to take ideas out of 
context and reframe them to suit their own purposes. It is not my purpose to take sides in this 
battle, but rather to show that radical feminism has been misunderstood.  
 
4. While some may accuse that the use of a Hobbesian analogy would brand a theorist as a 
liberal rather than a radical (see for example, Jaggar, 1983), nonetheless I maintain that the 
analogy fits nicely with radical notions that patriarchy was the first human oppression -beginning 
before recorded history, that males are naturally aggressive and seek power, and that women 
originally succumbed to male authority because of her reproductive physiology. 
 
5. According to Echols (1989), lesbians within the radical movement used arguments about 
differences between male "aggressive sexuality" and female nurturing "sensuality" to attempt to 
calm the worries of heterosexual women who feared that the lesbians may be bringing predatory 
sexual desires into the movement (217-218). 
 
6. This parallels Marx’s argument that socialism should eliminate the class distinction, rather 
than only class privilege. 
 
7. The history of first-wave feminism in the United States, for example, reveals extreme splits in 
theory and political focus that often stalled the movement towards gaining basic political rights 
for women, such as the right to vote. For one reference on this subject, see Women, Politics, and 







WOMEN IN SOCIAL CONTEXT:  




Like radical feminism, socialist feminism is a daughter of the 
contemporary women’s liberation movement. It is a slightly 
younger daughter, born in the 1970s and, like most younger 
daughters, impressed by its elder sister, while wanting at the 
same time to avoid her mistakes. The central project of socialist 
feminism is the development of a political theory and practice 
that will synthesize the best insights of radical feminism and of 
the Marxist tradition and that simultaneously will escape the 
problems associated with each. (Jaggar, 1983, 123) 
 
 
As with radical theory, the first surge of early second wave socialist-feminist 
theory paralleled the feminist movement. For example, it was into the Freedom Socialist 
Party that a number of self-proclaimed “Radical Women” stepped in order to attempt to 
gain political power (Martin, 1978/86). Following the American socialist movement of 
the time, they grounded their political theories in “the best traditions of Marx, Engels, 
Lenin, Trotsky, and Cannon” (Martin, 1978/86, 3). However, they brought to the 
political table a notion of a necessity to “declare war on patriarchy, sexism, and male 
privilege” (Martin, 1978/86, xi), both within the system at large and within the party. 
Similarly, within socialist-feminist theory, ideas were grounded in traditional socialist 
theory but this theory was also criticized for failure to recognize the plight of women. In 
fact, socialist-feminist theory began both as a critique of Marxism and as a theoretical 
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perspective that made use of structural Marxist perspectives to explain discrimination 
against women as a class. 
It is also largely because of the political movement mentioned above that some 
feminists whose basic theoretical assumptions are grounded in radical theory wrote 
arguments that can also be classified as socialist-feminism theories (for example, 
MacKinnon). While radical feminism discussed notions about why oppression of women 
has existed that these theorists did not abandon, socialist-feminist theory presented them 
with seemingly more viable ideas that hoped to solve the problems politically and 
economically. Nonetheless, even as some theorists attempted to synthesize the two 
theoretical categories, creating a rather unsteady alliance between them (see Hartmann, 
1981/2003), cross-categorical tension remained.  
For example, on the one hand, Eisenstein (1979) comments that both socialist 
males and radical feminists “fail to recognize the political distinction between being a 
woman and being a feminist” (5). Of importance is Eisenstein’s notion that socialist 
women - that is, those who according to Eisenstein are not “feminists” because they are 
not radical feminists - needed to embrace radical theory in order to understand the true 
nature of capitalist patriarchy. She states emphatically that “understanding [the] 
interdependence of capitalism and patriarchy is essential to the socialist feminist political 
analysis” (5, emphasis mine). To her, radical theory is the explanation that must be 
wedded to socialist theory in order to change “the structure of oppression” (5).  
On the other hand, others sharply disagreed, finding some aspects of radical 
theory “annoying,” “simplistic” and lacking a sound “historical” or “dialectical base” 
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(Mitchell, 1972; Vogel, 1973, 12). Also, socialist-feminism’s socio-economic theoretical 
base was in many ways in conflict with radical feminism’s focus on the body as the root 
of oppression for women (see Kelly, 1979). Mitchell (1972), for example, argued that 
“radical feminists construct too rigid a theory” from biological instinct (93). She further 
argued that, by striving for an egalitarianism within biology, radical feminist theory set 
an empowerment goal that would not conquer male privilege but rather would eliminate 
sexual distinction. Rowbotham adds to this argument that the elimination of sexual 
distinction as advocated by Firestone would lead to an inhumane society. Mitchell 
(1972) also argued that to see male domination as the whole of the problem was much 
like “a worker seeing the employer himself as the only enemy, simply because he seems 
directly responsible for the individual exploitation” (93). She further stated that to take 
such a narrow stand would produce “not a political consciousness” but “simply a self-
directed gaze” that would tend to ignore the oppression of other groups (94).  
The ensuing argument about who “must” embrace what in order to forward the 
feminist cause generated tension that persists to this day.1 Because theoretical arguments 
are the foundations for ideas about how to achieve empowerment within political and 
social spheres, the tension mattered, affecting “broader social commitments and political 
alliances” (Kelly, 1979, 219). Yet part of what has been misunderstood is that the 
varying perspectives sought to empower women within different realms of human 
experience, as I began to explain in the previous chapters. To understand this, we need to 
closely examine the differences between theories and attitudes forwarded by radical 
socialist-feminists and non-radical socialist-feminists.  
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For example, it is important to realize that although they often worked and wrote 
at least somewhat within its frames, radical socialist-feminists were not only critical of 
writings by the canonistic socialists, and they were likewise starkly critical of the men 
who worked within the then contemporary socialist movement. This is because, although 
“socialism” or “communism” as utopian concepts were embraced, the canonized 
writings, the male-led movements and even men-in-general were largely rejected by 
radical feminists as male-chauvinistic and therefore downright evil in many ways. This 
tendency was revealed within both the socialist-feminist movement itself (Martin, 
1976/86; see also Van Allen, 1984) and within the radical theoretical writings 
(demonstrated in the previous chapter; see also MacKinnon, 1989). This male-hatred 
was born of a theoretical assumption that demonizes men as the purposeful initiators of 
female oppression which is also purposefully maintained through coercion and fear. Yet 
in spite of this “hard line” radical element within the socialist-feminist ranks, there also 
remained those non-radical socialist-feminists who called for all women to unite with 
each other and with men to bring about the emancipation of all humanity (Elshtain,  
1981, 256). 
This theoretical division between radical and non-radical socialist-feminists is 
important because of the theoretical confusion it created on both sides of the debate. As 
Mary Bailey, quoted by Pecheskey (1979), said: 
As Marxist-feminists we straddle an uneasy horse. We have not 
worked out what this means, this hyphen. … All too often all 
this has meant is that we are Marxist to our feminist sisters and 




The “feminist sisters” that Bailey refers to are the radical feminists. Indeed, further 
confusion ensues as radical feminists embrace Marxian theoretical frames, uniting these 
frames with primary assumptions that had formed within radical theories.  
 For example, MacKinnon (1989), one of the radical feminists who embraced 
Marxian theoretical frames, explains that Marxism sees society as “fundamentally 
constructed of the relations people form as they do and make things needed to survive” 
as human beings (3). She goes on to explain the perceived power-structure of this 
constructed society, which is class. For Marxism, class occurs because of the social 
process of production within capitalistic societies. The issue is the control of production, 
which is accomplished through the control of proletariat people, the working class, by 
the bourgeois, the upper class. Within socialist-feminism, a “parallel argument” is 
raised: gender and sexuality are socially constructed and “yet constructing” 
(MacKinnon, 1989, 3). The “issue” (3), according to MacKinnon (1989), is control of 
reproductive processes, including the rearing of children. While radical socialist-
feminism assumes that this control is deliberately exerted by all men for all men against 
all women because all men are aggressive and narcissistic, non-radical feminism does 
not.  
According to radical theory, sexual control is not only universal, it is insidious. As 
demonstrated in the last chapter, radical feminism assumes deliberate and sinister control 
of the sexuality of females not only for reproductive purposes but for the sexual pleasure 
of men. This control is exacted against all women universally by men at the expense of 
female happiness and freedom. Further, this control is so embedded in the social fabric 
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of human lives that women by and large are unaware of it.2 What is “constructed,” then, 
is heterosexuality and the issue is control of sexual behavior, which is accomplished 
through the control of all women through fear of and coercion by men. This, thanks to 
the influence of MacKinnon and other “radical women,” soon becomes one of the 
foundational assumptions of radicalized socialist-feminist theory, which, of course, 
happens also to be the foundational assumption of radical-feminist theory.  
However, while non-radical socialist-feminism agrees that part of the problem is 
rooted in sexuality, they focus first or dualistically on social and economic class 
structures and second or dualistically on gender as it is socially constructed both within 
capitalism and within a male-focused society. That is, because one primary focus is on 
capitalism as a cause of problems, empowerment for women as a class, as well as other 
class-groups, depends upon the destruction of capitalistic systems. Because focus is also 
secondarily or dualistically on male privilege and male perspective as problems for 
women, empowerment further involves remaking this “male-defined world view” 
(MacKinnon, 1989, 5) to include and give credence to female perspectives and needs.  
Some socialist-feminists complained that traditional Marxism assumes that the 
primary reason that women are oppressed is because they are excluded from public 
production, yet even as this exclusion is corrected, various other manifestations of 
oppression do not disappear. MacKinnon (1989), for example, comments that the 
primary complaint against traditional Marxism is that its demands can be “satisfied 
without altering women’s inequality to men” (5). Women, we are told, remain 
susceptible to rape, physical abuse, harassment and objectification. They also continue to 
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be the primary caregiver of children and primarily responsible for housework. They 
continue to have less money, less power and less leisure time than men (Jaggar, 1983). It 
is further charged by radical socialist-feminism that by being “gender-blind,” Marxism 
partially causes the continued oppression of women and that, in doing this, it becomes 
just “another ideology of male oppression” (Jaggar, 1983, 78).  
In fact, it should be noted that since women may face any of these stated problems, 
and since it is argued that all of these problems have impact on the collective female 
psyche, the theoretical split between radical socialist-feminists and non-radical socialist-
feminists is not only in underlying assumptions, but is also in the focus on what is 
understood to be the most serious problems that women face. When the primary focus is 
on the sociopathic tendencies of, for example, rapists, which stand to frighten and coerce 
females into roles they would not willingly play without this overriding fear, then we get 
a notion of female empowerment that involves not only control of the rapist male but 
freedom from the perception of male sexual coercion altogether. This is because when 
women are victimized, by rape for example, behaviors and psychological processes are 
altered because of fear and/or the desire to seek protection. Likewise, for some radical-
feminists, particularly those who are also lesbians, gendered constructs such as 
heterosexuality are seen as coercive problems created by males for males at the expense 
of the female. When this problem is the primary focus, it is insisted that empowerment 
for the female necessarily involves freedom from the very confines of heterosexuality. 
For this reason, it is important to note the various focus differences across the theories as 
well as the differing theoretical assumptions. This also explains why some radical 
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theorists, Dworkin (2002) for example, became frustrated with lines of feminist theory 
that focused on employment and labor issues; Dworkin considered the sexual 
exploitation of women to be a far more serious problem. 
As black feminists would later point out, these early socialist-feminists, 
particularly but not only the radical socialist-feminists, tended to focus on the problems 
that were most pressing in their own lives and the lives of the women closest to them. 
This is not altogether unexpected, because they were breaking new theoretical ground 
and because, since they were trying to add “female voices” to the predominantly “male 
world-view,” it made since for them to begin with what they most intimately knew and 
understood. However, the fact that they failed to understand exactly why their theories 
differed led to unnecessary contention between the women who nonetheless called each 
other “sisters.”  
Yet, as I have pointed out before, the confusion can be abated by beginning with 
an examination of the primary-focus addressed problem, then tracing the thread of 
argument forward to theoretical assumptions about the context of the problem that the 
empowerment hopes to overcome. These factors, once clarified, help to explain why 
theorists promote specific methods for achieving what they deem to constitute 
“empowerment” for women. The chart on the following page should help to disentangle 
radical-feminist concepts from socialist-feminist concepts. First, however, it is important 
to remember the basic theoretical concepts held by radical feminism, as outlined in the 
previous chapter. That is, the overarching problem addressed by radical-feminism is 
patriarchy, which is said to allow the abuse of females by males. While the assumed 
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context of the problem varies somewhat within radical feminism as I have shown, it is 
fair to say that, in general, all radical feminism identifies the following assumed cause: 
excessive power in the hands of males that is not shared by females. The human 
interaction that they identify is one of aggressive, narcissistic males as the purposeful 
oppressors of females. They then suggest methods to empowerment, all of which include 
ways to empower the female against the male, and most of which include some form of 
restraint on male behavior.  
 Socialist-feminism, on the other hand, follows a line of thought that nowhere 
identifies the male as the primary source of the problem, and does not define the male as 
a deliberate aggressor or as necessarily narcissistic. This may explain why Hartmann 
(1981), for example, contended that socialist-feminism had focused on capitalism alone 
as the cause of the problems women face. This, she declared, would fail because it 
overlooked the supporting role that patriarchy plays in both the capitalist system and the 
oppression of women. She therefore argued that socialist-feminism lost its “feminism” 
intent simply by wedding itself to Marxism. The union, she charged, simply subsumed 
feminism into Marxism in much the same way that under English law, a woman simply 
became an extension of the man the minute she became a wife, losing her own identity, 
simply to become a part of his identity.  
To Hartmann, it was therefore important to keep both the materialist approach and 
the sexual identity approach keenly distinct from each other, using both but not losing 
the one beneath the other. From Hartmann’s ideas came the “dual-systems” approach 
which considered patriarchy and capitalism simultaneously when examining the plight 
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of women in capitalistic states. She therefore later gets credit for creating the “dual-
systems approach to gender segregation” in the workforce and public/private spheres 
that was used by socialist-feminists to explain male control over the types of work that 
women perform and the level of pay, or lack thereof, that women receive for their labor 
(Wharton, 1991, 375).  
 However, Hartmann failed to acknowledge the sexual division of labor line of 
theoretical inquiry that had been present in socialist-feminist theory all along. She 
assumed that, because socialist-feminism is not as male-blaming as radical theory, it 
therefore ignores the role that male privilege plays in the hierarchal scheme of 
capitalistic labor. Notice, however, that even without the entanglement of radical-
feminist assumptions with the theory, socialist-feminism does address a dual set of 
problems, one of which includes male privilege. Because socialist-feminism argued that 
socialism alone would not and could not free or equalize all women, it attempted to 
follow two lines of theory from the start (see for example, Mitchell, 1972; Jaquette, 
1982). That radical socialist-feminists later used Hartmann’s similar dual approach stood 
only to further entangle and confuse radical feminist theory with socialist-feminist 
theory. Notice, though, that the difference between radical and non-radical socialist-
feminism is primarily one of where blame is placed, as can be seen by comparing the 
line of radical theoretical thought, given above, with the two lines of socialist-feminism 
thought as demonstrated in the following diagram. 
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 What is missing in the socialist-feminism line of reasoning is an assumption that 
men deliberately cause the male-over-female hierarchy seen in the sexual division of 
labor because they are aggressive, narcissistic and power seeking. The various branches 
of socialist-feminist theory followed both unadulterated lines of socialist-feminist 
a. Assumed Cause: social and cultural 
norms of “who does what,” reinforced 
by a distinctively “male” political view 
that gives privileged benefit to males 
while causing hardship to females 
b. Interaction: males as (privileged) 
producers & females as primarily 
(burdened/victimized) reproducers 
Class Division of Labor 
(Traditional Marxism) 
a. Assumed Cause: 
Capitalism 
b. Interaction: elites 
(bourgeois) benefit from 
exploitation of underclass 
(proletariat) 
 
Sexual Division of Labor 
(production & reproduction) 
 
Socialism 
a. Create equal opportunity for women for 
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b. Share reproduction and care-giving tasks 
with men 
c. Initiate movement of “private” labor to 
public realm and/or control of private realm 
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d. “consciousness raising” (strongly 
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thought shown in the diagram above. These branches of socialist-feminist theory share 
the “general addressed problems” and the contextual concepts, but can be better 
understood by using the “general recommended methods to achieve empowerment” as 
the distinguishing mark that separates one from the other. 
Theoretical divisions also occur across and between the various branches of the 
less-radically influenced socialist-feminist theory. Therefore, an important step in this 
analysis is to take a close look at exactly what it was that each branch of socialist-
feminism specifically was attempting to do and what types of empowerment were sought 
therein. However, as a foundation to this “empowerment” discussion, I will first discuss 
some of the criticisms brought to bear against traditional socialist theory by these 
feminists. Their writings discuss both inadequacies within said traditional theory and the 
fact that during the early part of the twentieth century, and before the advent of second-
wave feminism, the question of how to end women’s subordination was all but forgotten 
within the theory. 
 
Criticizing the Classics 
By the early 1980s, we see a proliferation of feminist literature devoted 
specifically to analyzing and criticizing the classic socialist texts, and by mid-decade we 
even see chapters by various writers devoted specifically to the synthesis of numerous 
socialist-feminists writings on just this subject. It is asked: just who is the “Marxist 
feminist” - “what does she want, and what sort of action shall she undertake?” (Elshtain, 
1981, 257, emphasis mine). As the feminists criticize each other for failing to be critical 
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enough of traditional Marxism and socialist theory, we see not only feminist critique of 
Marxism but feminist critique of feminist critique and/or acceptance of particular tenants 
of Marxism. As a result, overall critique of Marx and Engels intensifies. 
Eisenstein (1979) gives blanket approval to Marx for providing “the tools to 
understanding all power relations” (7, emphasis mine). She states further that “there is 
nothing about dialectical and historical method that limits it to understanding class 
relations” (7). As MacKinnon (1982) explains, both feminism and Marxism are “theories 
of power and its distribution: inequality” (516). As workers are exploited for the benefit 
of others, so females’ sexuality is exploited for the benefit of others - for reproduction 
and for the pleasure of men. Jaggar (1983) tells us that the “defining feature of socialist 
feminism is that it attempts to interpret the historical materialist method of traditional 
Marxism so that it applies to the issues made visible by radical feminists” (124). Indeed, 
Mitchell (1971) commented that feminists “should ask the feminist questions, but try to 
come up with some Marxist answers” (99). 
Yet even as many socialist-feminists made use of Marxist theoretical models to 
explain sexual exploitation, we also see stark criticism of “the inadequacies of Marxism” 
(ten Tusscher, 1986, 66). For example, it is said that Engels and Bebel both recognized 
the “Woman Question” - a term which “specifically dealt with the question of women’s 
oppression” in the public sphere of work and politics and the private sphere of family, 
marriage and sexuality (Hunt, 1986, 48). They even discussed “the ways in which the 
notions of the public and private (spheres) themselves were conceptualized” (Hunt, 
1986, 48). Yet they also both failed to fully develop their theories. Elshtain (1981), for 
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example, points out that Engels “insists that male domination requires as a prior 
condition, the holding, safeguarding, and inheritance of private property” (261), but fails 
to explain why male dominance is yet also present even among proletariats who own no 
property. This is one reason feminists stress that “gender relations cannot be subsumed 
under the categories of class and the economy” (ten Tusscher, 1986, 66). Traditional 
Marxism, then, is criticized as being “sex-blind” (Hartmann, 1981) and for viewing 
capitalist economic processes as gender-neutral (Wharton, 1991).  
Jaggar (1983) further complains that although Marxists claim that history 
explains the sexual division of labor and women’s oppression, the “historical reasons are 
obscure” and “unsatisfactory” (72). One example of this is Engels’ remarks that the 
purchase and capture of women began because of a shortage of women, but also began 
during a period when women had been social equals to men. Jaggar (1983) suggests that, 
if women had truly been equal when the “shortage” became a problem, women “should 
have been selecting, accepting or rejecting husbands according to preference, rather than 
being themselves captured or sold” (73).  
Engels and Bebel are further accused of having “effectively shelved” the Woman 
Question discussion by declaring that the problem of the oppression of women would 
have to wait until the problem of economic class struggle had been resolved (Hunt, 
1986, 48). We are further told that although the “Woman Question” became a part of the 
“classical heritage” of the socialist movement during in the nineteenth century, during 
the early part of the twentieth century, before the advent of second-wave feminism, the 
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question of how to end women’s subordination was all but forgotten (Mitchell, 1972, 
76). 
Marx embraced the Fourierian notion that increase in the degree of woman’s 
freedom as it is measured inversely to man’s brutality marks progress towards the 
emancipation of mankind in general (Marx and Engels, 1845/1975; see also Mitchell, 
1972). However, he, too, is criticized for losing this thread of discussion of woman’s 
oppression. We are told that rather than shelving the question, Marx buried it beneath his 
analysis of the family, wherein women “are not even mentioned” (Mitchell, 1972, 78). 
To Mitchell (1972), sexuality, reproduction and the socialization of children were 
subsumed by Marx under “the family.” This conflation obscured multiple levels of 
oppression that needed to be brought to light and discussed before women could hope to 
progress towards any real equality (see also Coole, 1988).  
 
 
The Various Branches of Socialist-feminism 
 
When we think about what these feminists had to say in criticism of Marx and 
Engels, as well as the ways in which they made use of Marxian theoretical frames, we 
begin to see what it is that they wanted to happen within feminist theory and even within 
the movement as ways to empower women. For example, if the complaint is failure to 
discuss woman’s position within the family, then it can be extrapolated from this that 
oppression within the family is assumed to pose a unique set of problems for women that 
have previously been overlooked or misunderstood. If the complaint is public “silence,” 
then it can be inferred that the feminists doing the complaining assumed that gaining 
  
86 
said voice would bring some kind of relief and power to women. With this in mind, I 
more closely examine some of the many socialist-feminist writings intending to 
illuminate some of their varied notions of empowerment. It should be noted, however, 
that many socialist-feminists believed that women needed to be empowered in multiple 
ways. Therefore, even as I divide the theoretical “method of empowerment” focuses into 
various branches of socialist-feminist theory, I acknowledge the overlap of a number of 
specific theoretical writings across these branches. 
 
On Class, Labor and Family 
Feminists charge that Marxism “never really explains why it is women who do 
‘women’s work’” (Jaggar, 1983, 71, emphasis mine). Marxist biological arguments 
concerning the sexual division of labor are rejected by feminists because these 
arguments are considered to be biologically deterministic. In Marxist theory, the 
biological division of labor in procreation is unquestioned (Jaggar, 1983; see also 
Hartmann, 1976). That is, it is taken for granted that women must not only give birth to 
children but must also be the primary caregivers of infants. Challenges against this 
assumption include a range of ideas, from the radical-feminist Firestone’s assertion that 
modern technology can end the necessity for women to give birth to the assertion that 
“there is no reason” why men cannot care for infants and otherwise rear the children 
(Jaggar, 1983, 76). Feminists also challenge the Marxist assumption that only changes in 
production can produce changes in women’s labor, suggesting, for example, that “the 
mode of procreation may partially determine production” (ibid, 76, emphasis mine). Yet 
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feminists also criticize each other for evading “the serious questions that arise when one 
attempts to express and examine the depth and complexity of family relations” (Elshtain, 
1981; see also Coole, 1988). 
In fact, some feminists, following the example of Marx, did simply collapse one 
problem, gender relations, into the other problem, class structure, analyzing women as 
they have existed as a labor underclass. Yet even within the labor, class and family 
focus, we also see other varying feminist uses of Marxian theoretical frames. For 
example, some theorists followed the Marxian model of historical analysis, discussing 
how the plight of women has changed across time as economic, political, and social 
systems have changed. Other theorists focused primarily on the public/private split of 




Just as socialism was concerned primarily with economics (Hunt, 1986), much of 
early socialist-feminism was concerned primarily with the economic state of women as a 
class. Feminist theorists specifically interested in this economic approach focused on 
women’s lives under capitalism and “the significance of women’s subordination for the 
maintenance of capitalist social relations” (ten Tusscher, 1986, 66). Jaggar (1983) tells 
us that Marxists theorize that women’s labor in the home allows the capitalistic market 
to be “relieved of the need to pay for the reproduction of labor power on which it 
ultimately depends” (71).  
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Jaggar further asserts that the ideology that suggests that it is men who must earn 
the primary wage for the family and that women do not regularly “belong” in the public 
market place allows women who are in the workforce to be paid less. This “not only 
provides capital with a pool of low-paid labor, but exerts a downward pressure on all 
wages” (1983, 71), allowing for increased exploitation of all workers.  
 Still, as mentioned before, Marxist theory does not tell us why it is primarily 
women who fill the roll of the “low-paid marginal” worker (Jaggar, 1983, 71). Jaggar 
(1983) also states that Marx and Engels call the “sexual division of labor” a “natural” 
occurrence and that they say it follows from “the division of labour in the sexual act” 
(68). Hartmann (1976/1990) agrees with Marx that “the roots of women’s present social 
status lie in this sex-ordered division of labor” (146). She therefore declares that 
 not only must the hierarchal nature of the division of labor 
between the sexes be eliminated, but the very division of labor 
between the sexes itself must be eliminated if women are to 
attain equal social status with men and if women and men are to 
attain the full development of their human potential. (146) 
 
Jaggar (1983), however, argues that starting from the notion of a sex-ordered division of 
labor creates a theory that is deterministic because it suggests that the only way to 
dismantle this division would be to “abolish normative heterosexuality” entirely (69). 
She further stresses that  
the traditional Marxist analysis fails to acknowledge the extent 
and depth of women’s oppression, and so it does not provide a 
satisfactory vision of liberation for women nor a workable 
strategy for achieving liberation. (69-70) 
 
To understand fully how these theories face off, however, we must, again, 
closely examine the underlying assumptions. Hartmann is assuming that the “division of 
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labor between the sexes” can be eliminated, yet Jaggar’s comments imply that this can 
not be accomplished unless we accept Firestone’s extreme solution of the elimination of 
sexual identity itself, or, at the least, heterosexual identity, as the lesbian radical 
feminists had suggested. Eisenstein (1979), on the other hand, suggests that we do not 
need to change distinction between the sexes, but rather the current social structures of 
sexually divided power. She says, “If we change the social relations of power, men have 
to change, because they will no longer have their hierarchical base” (51). Indeed, it is in 
an attempt to change these “social relations of power” that some feminists focused 
primarily on work done by women in the home, suggesting that it is on the backs of 
“unpaid” female home-laborers that the foundation of modern capitalism stands 
(Gerstein, 1973; Delphy, 1984; Vogel, 1973). Vogel (1973), for example, says that 
domestic labor - women’s labor in the home - is neither ‘productive’ labor - that which 
produces surplus capital that benefits a third party, nor ‘unproductive’ - that which does 
not produce surplus value but yet is directly paid for. Because of this, it falls outside of 
traditional Marxist analysis of labor. These feminists attempt to correct this oversight, 
hoping to show that this “unpaid” home-labor has contributed to the oppression of 
women in ways previously not understood. It is further said that women have been given 
jobs that men do not care to perform, given wages, if any, below that of men, and have 
been degraded for the very societal positions imposed upon them by this labor and wage 
division (Berkeley-Oakland Women’s Union, 1974; Hartmann, 1976; Kollantai, 1977; 
MacKinnon, 1989). Also, a number of socialist-feminist works in the 1970s and 1980s 
used historical case studies to demonstrate that women have been consistently relegated 
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to a lower economic and social class than their male counterparts (for examples, see 
Boserup, 1970; Kuhn and Wolpe, 1978; Dauber and Cain, 1981; Matthaei, 1982).  
Most of these socialist-feminists sought to empower women within the economic 
sphere as I have mentioned. That is, they sought mobility for women from 
“incarceration” in the home to public-sphere jobs and also sought choices of equal types 
of employment for those already in public-sphere jobs (for example, see Davies, 1974). 
They further sought equal wages for women, as studies clearly showed that women were 
regularly paid wages which were below the wages of men. As socialists, their primary 
concern was economic freedom and equal wages for all social classes, whether the 
classes were divided by gender, worker-relations or race. Within this branch of socialist-
feminism, “empowerment” of women entails an equal-opportunity chance for women to 
be employed in the public sphere of work in jobs equal to the jobs men held, and for 
equal pay (for examples, see Hartmann, 1976; Davies 1974). 
 
Empowerment Within the Family and the “Private Sphere” 
Wages being representative of and even the result of other structures in society, 
though, it was not too far of a leap to move away from strictly economic analyses in 
order to bring Marxist-style analysis to bear on social structures other than wage-earning 
labor. Close examination of the complex problems which socialist-feminism hoped to 
overcome begins to reveal a few inherent problems within the wage-focused branch of 
the theory. That is, the problems were complex, yet this theory seemed relatively 
simplistic, conflating most of woman’s oppression into her economic oppression within 
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a labor hierarchy. Without doubt, microscopic observation of other areas of oppression 
was needed. For example, Mitchell (1971) identified the “key structures” responsible for 
women’s oppression as “production, reproduction, sexuality and the socialization of 
children” (see Coole, 1988, 242). Because the problem was not simply one of being 
excluded from the public workforce, or even of not being paid for labor performed in the 
private home, their movement into that workforce alone could not solve the problem 
(Mitchell, 1971).  
This is why socialist-feminist writings that sought to empower women within the 
family suggested, among other ideas, a sharing of parenting duties (Chodorow, 1979; 
Matthaei, 1982; see also Jaggar, 1983), discussed the possibility of “socializing” 
housework (Gardiner, 1975), suggested a 50-50 split sharing of housework (Randall, 
1979), and demanded an improvement of women’s reproductive freedom (Gordon, 
1979). The intent of all of these ideas was to lift from women’s shoulders the unequal 
burden of responsibility for reproduction, childcare and housework within the realm of 
the traditional family structure. We see “empowerment” here defined as a lessening of 
care-giving duties (Chodorow, 1979), or public control of and payment for housework 
(Gardiner, 1975), or a lessening of the house-work load (Randall, 1979), or avenues for 
choice of how many, if any, children a woman might reproduce and then subsequently 
care for (Gordon, 1979). All of these ideas were intended to increase woman’s power to 





Argument Against Abolishing “the Division of Labor” 
Elshtain (1981), however, presents a hope for two different kinds of 
empowerment. First, like other theorists mentioned above, she sought mobility for 
women from “incarceration” in the home into public activity. She criticizes Marx for 
ignoring the “silence” of women in the public realm. That the plight of women is not 
thoroughly examined by Marx might have been, according to Elshtain, because he saw 
the “voice” of men in the public realm as “distorted,” thus rendering the fact that women 
were “silent” there a lesser problem than it may have otherwise seemed (1981, 194). We 
will see below that while Elshtain wants women to receive social appreciation for their 
work in the home, she nonetheless does not advocate that women should be isolated 
there. She states that her goal is empowerment of all persons to “determine for 
themselves the conditions of their labor” (1975, 476) to have equal social and political 
power to each other, and to live full lives “within the context of a just social order” 
(1975, 477). She wants women to be able to move freely between the public and private 
realm, which would be empowerment against coerced sequestering in the home. 
Elshtain (1981), however, like the cultural-radical feminists before her, also 
seeks a different kind of empowerment. That is, her complaint is also that the social 
norms that tend to sequester woman in the home serve to degrade the value of what she 
accomplishes there. In her own discussion of the family, Elshtain  applauds Marx for 
revealing the “hypocrisy of the celebration of the family under capitalism even as family 
ties are … eroded and family members exploited” (197). Yet she criticizes Marx for 
advocating the total elimination of the public/private distinction. For Elshtain, 
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empowerment for women would not entail an elimination of this distinction, but rather a 
“reconstruction” of the public and private realms so that, for example, the “private-
familial sphere” has “its own dignity and purpose” (1981, 334, emphasis mine). Elshtain 
promotes theory that hopes to achieve an equality of respect between and across the 
sexes that is not based on capitalistic merit. This, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, 
is a different sort of power than the “freedom from coercion” power that the other 
feminists, above, and even she in the other part of her theory, were seeking.  
 Brief discussion of the value of labor in the home should help to shed light on 
why we see these two very different types of empowerment forwarded here and why this 
matter created tension within the ranks of socialist-feminist theory. First, I refer back to 
Vogel’s statement that women’s labor in the home is neither “productive” labor - that 
which produces surplus capital that benefits a third party - nor “unproductive” - that 
which does not produce surplus value but yet is directly paid for (1973). Now, if we take 
our view off of money, which is after all only a specific medium to facilitate exchange, 
and think instead of a barter system, many women would agree that they do receive 
direct pay for their labor, in the form of food, living quarters, and other goods supplied 
by their husbands. Further, it can also be demonstrated that women who care for children 
at home produce value, for both parents in modern America and for the husband in more 
strictly patriarchal systems. Children under patriarchal systems are considered to belong 
to the father. Any money that the father earns is strictly “his” as well. In this case, the 
labor that a wife puts forth to take care of the children keeps him from having to pay for 
child care, which is a direct value for him, because he can then spend his wages 
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elsewhere. For the sake of theoretical conceptualization, one might imagine that a 
widower with children marries a woman with no children of her own, who then actually 
cares for his biological children. In this case, it is easy to see that the father gains direct 
value from his wife’s taking care of the children. 
Modern capitalistic society, though, is guilty of devaluing the work that mothers 
do in the home. It places very little value on childcare, even though parents are usually 
well aware of its actual high value. That is, if both parents in a two-parent household go 
to work, paid childcare becomes an immediate concern, whereas so long as one parent is 
able and chooses to stay at home to care for the children, paid childcare is unnecessary. 
This is why the charge sometimes leveled at modern “stay-at-home moms” in America 
that they are degrading themselves (see Wallis, 2004) is unfair. If this is actually their 
chosen, though temporary, vocation, if they do in fact see this as what they want to do 
and likely the most important thing that they can do, why would they choose a different 
career and then pay someone else to raise their children? 
Further, being a “stay-at-home-mom” need not then make the woman 
“dependent” upon her husband. If one considers the entire barter system in play, it is 
evident that she is no more “dependent” on her husband than he is on his employer. 
Although he needs the wage, and would likely be harmed should he be fired, he is not 
considered to be a “dependent” because he is exchanging his labor for wages. The 
capitalistic economic system works only if the employer gets value out of the bargain. 
That is, laborer and employer must be interdependent upon each other or else the 
employment system does not work. In the home barter system, if the wife exchanges her 
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labor for food, housing and so forth, the husband gets value out of the bargain in that he 
does not have to pay someone else to take care of the children. Thus, husband and wife, 
if they have children, in this arrangement are interdependent upon each other. This is 
true even if the children are considered to “belong” to and be the responsibility of both 
husband and wife. The husband pays his half of the expense of childcare to his wife in 
the form of food, housing and so forth. The couple also likely also does not have to pay 
outside help for housecleaning (although more affluent couples may choose to do so) 
and a number of other things because the stay-at-home mother performs these duties 
herself.  
The problem, of course, is patriarchal society’s tendency to coerce mothers to 
stay at home. The key ingredient in this system is choice. So long as women, or men, 
have the choice to either care for their own children or enter into the workforce and hire 
someone else to perform childcare duties, a real system of exchange can take place. To 
say that chosen domestic work is degrading to all women is to belittle the individual 
women who choose this vocation. Yet, in their attempt to justify why women should be 
empowered to leave the home if they chose to do so, some feminists described 
housework and other in-home labor in just this manor (see above). Elshtain’s argument 
is that to label domestic work as “degrading” only makes the problem of the lack of 
social prestige for women who choose to labor in the home worse. The solution to this 
latter problem is, according to Elshtain, glorification and appreciation of the labor and 
care-giving women perform in the home. In fact, some socialist-feminists (for example 
Gardiner, 1975, mentioned above) wanted to “socialize” housework so that it would then 
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be recognized as part of the labor-exchange system and therefore likewise recognized as 
valuable.  
As was explained in Chapter II, what we are seeing here is two distinct 
conceptualizations of what it means to be “empowered.” One group of feminists believes 
that domestic work must be recognized as devaluing to women before women can be 
freed from coercion to perform it. This group believes that “empowerment” means 
freedom from coercion and domestic labor. The other group wants the domestic work 
that many women chose to perform to be valued, so that women who performed it can be 
empowered through social prestige and be paid, by some means, what their work is 
actually worth. 
 
Sexual Empowerment Within the Family 
Finally, when we discuss family structure as something that is located within the 
“private sphere,” it is also important to note that although Marxists talk about the public 
and private split, their conception of it is very different than that of liberals. This fact 
will become more clear in Chapter IV, but for now it is important to note that one reason 
for this, according to Jaggar (1983), “is that the Marxist conception of human nature as a 
continuous social creation precludes the view that there is any aspect of an individual’s 
life which, in principle, is of concern only to that individual” (61), and therefore 
“private” in the liberal sense. In fact, MacKinnon (1993) insists that liberal-political 
notions concerning the private sphere have caused harm to women. While the private 
sphere has been an assumed place of privacy for man, it has been an assumed place of 
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the sexual “consent” of women. This is another reason why socialist-feminists 
sometimes argue that the public/private split should be abolished or at least completely 
restructured. Ideas about how to end female sexual oppression within the family include 
the suggestion that women can be empowered by movement of sexual rights from the 
“private” control of the family into the public realm of social and political control 
(Davis, 1993; MacKinnon, 1993). 
It is when we turn to sexual oppression and violence that can occur within the 
“private” family structure that we find reason for Jaggar’s assertion that “Marxist 
analysis fails to acknowledge the extent and depth of women’s oppression.” It is here 
that we see the opposite end of the family-relations spectrum from that portrayed by 
Elshtain and which I discussed above. That is, in a family that is abusive to the woman, 
she can have no “stay-at-home” choice that will bring her personal satisfaction or 
empowerment, because the barter system it requires is dependent upon functional and 
satisfactory relations between the concerned parties, that is, between male and female if 
in a heterosexual household. In fact, there can never be empowerment for an abused 
woman so long as she both remains in the abusive home and the male-over-female 
hierarchy is in place in that home.  
The fact that radical theory places male power and brutality within his sexuality 
and places female powerlessness within her sexuality explains why Firestone felt that 
empowerment had to entail the abolishment of sexual difference. This also explains why 
Jaggar declares that if there is a “sex-ordered” division of labor, there can be no 
empowerment for women without abolishing “normative heterosexuality.” If we are 
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talking about a division which necessarily places woman in the home, if that home is 
heterosexual, and if men do in fact tend to be both brutal and power-seeking, 
empowerment for the woman is impossible. However, Jaggar, like Rowland-Serdar and 
Schwartz-Shea (1991), fails to realize that this series of assumptions only accurately 
applies to dysfunctional families. A similar mistake is made by MacKinnon when she 
assumes that the reason some women resist change in their lives must be that they are 
simply unaware of their own “oppression.” 
 
Consciousness Raising 
Consciousness-raising hopes to empower women by giving them first an 
understanding that they are, in fact, oppressed. It assumes, then, that all women are 
oppressed by men, but some of them simply do not realize it. This is rooted in the radical 
assumption, explained in Chapter II, that all women (as a group) are oppressed by all 
men because, for example, of fear of rape. Following this radical influence, as I have 
explained, some socialist-feminists took a broad view of problems such as rape, 
prostitution and pornography, asking what about these is unique to women, in what ways 
these things are the result of socially-constructed heterosexuality, and/or in what ways 
they contribute to and reinforce the oppression of women as a class. In fact, it is because 
of this broad view of what happens to women as a collective group or class that 
“consciousness-raising” theory belongs within the socialist-feminist category. 
As Marx used his alienation theory to explain the psychological effects of 
capitalistic divisions of labor on workers, MacKinnon (1982) and other “consciousness 
  
99 
raising” feminists used sexual control/use theory to explain the psychological effects of 
male-centric gender identity on women. Although “consciousness raising” theory is not 
always considered to be a part of socialist-feminist theory, I argue that MacKinnon 
(1982, 1989) uses the Marxist method even while she declares that her “consciousness 
raising” method is in “contrast” to it. It is in “contrast” only in that it centers on the 
effects of gender rather than economic class. That is, the Marxist method of examining 
class structure must be “dialectical materialism,” because it is examining power 
structures that are born out of materialism. MacKinnon’s approach focuses instead on 
gender construction. Because its focus is not economic class, it has no reason to use 
materialism as a base. It is dialectical, in that it uses the spoken and written words of 
women to raise awareness about women’s oppression. Further, it uses a historical 
approach, as Marxism also does, to demonstrate this oppression across time.  
However, as I mentioned above, while this line of theory attempted to explain 
what happens to women in general, it failed to see that the problems it addressed simply 
were not faced by all women alike. One again, the theory was hindered by its own “self-
directed gaze.” This same “self-directed gaze” created a notion of the “universal 
woman,” which is also what sparked criticism from black feminists, as I demonstrate 
next. 
 
Expanding to Include Other Marginalized Groups 
 
 As I mentioned earlier, some of the early second-wave socialist-feminists were 
concerned that radical feminist theory tended to cause feminists to narrow their focus to 
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themselves, forgetting about the marginalization of other groups. Given this, it is not 
surprising that growing protests by emerging black feminists that racial oppression was 
not properly addressed within the mainstream of feminist theory were welcomed and 
embraced by socialist-feminist theory. In fact, the problem of racial oppression accorded 
well with Marxist-feminists, who had always considered sexual oppression to be but one 
of multiple facets of the oppression that various groups of people faced.3 Jaggar (1983), 
for example, mentions that “contemporary society” is composed of “groups of 
individuals,” that are “defined simultaneously by age, sex, class, nationality and by 
racial and ethnic origin” (125). She further states that “these groups differ markedly 
from each other, both physically and psychologically” (126). 
Socialist-feminism sought to empower all women, all classes of workers, and all 
races within the material realm of human existence. Within socialist theory, capitalistic 
hierarchy is understood as a problem that affects all of humanity that lives under its roof. 
From the feminist view, the problem is compounded for women by patriarchy and, for 
blacks, by white supremacy, both of which are also types of hierarchal human 
arrangements. The path to achieve empowerment was understood to be the destruction of 
all hierarchies which exploit women, proletariat workers and blacks (Berkeley-Oakland 
Women’s Union, 1974; see also Segal, 1989). 
Further, we see that the study of the sexual wage division sheds light on racial 
problems as well. Mitchell (1972), for example, pointed out that in America the wage-
structure revealed a discriminatory pattern as follows: white men over black men, black 
men over white women, white women over black women. One possible reason why 
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black males came to feel that the women’s movement was damaging to them is 
imaginable if one thinks about prejudice and social norms as they affect the changing 
dynamics of hierarchy under the women’s movement. An increase in wages or social 
status for white women would not necessarily mean an increase in the same for black 
men or black women. If this is the case, black women’s lot would not change, but black 
men would actually find themselves moving downward in the hierarchy, to be eventually 
placed below white women.  
On the other hand, if blacks as a group could move up the hierarchal scale, both 
black men and black women would find themselves raised up within the wage and social 
orders, black men equal to, or at least closer to equal to, white men, and black women 
equal to or closer to equal to white women. Perhaps then further equality could be 
achieved without first harming the wage and social status of some segment (men) of the 
race. This brings to light one of the problems that black women faced: to follow 
mainstream (that is, “white”) feminist precepts without regards to their racial effects 
could often pose a paradox, for what might seem helpful to them as women might harm 
them as blacks. 
This begins to explain why it is that while Marxist-feminists tried to be more 
inclusive of problems such as race and class in their theories than radical feminists who 
generally focused solely on sexual oppression, black feminists rightly accused the 
mainstream Marxist-feminists of a “false universalism” (Coole, 1988, 249), and 
“ethnocentrism” (Barrett and MacIntosh, 1985; Mirza, 1986; Ramazanoglu, 1986) that 
ignored or misunderstood the particular types of oppression and problems faced by black 
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women. While “white solipsism” (Rich, 1979) among feminist theorists was not 
deliberate racism or a “consciously held belief” that whites are superior to other races, it 
nonetheless created a “tunnel-vision” which simply could “not see nonwhite experience 
or existence” and therefore could not describe it in any way that would have long-term 
“political usefulness” (306, emphasis mine). 
When black women began to make an effort to “shift socialist-feminist politics” 
to include them and their struggles (Bhavnani and Coulson, 1986/2001, 65), socialist-
feminists at last began to recognize that their sisters of other classes and races had been 
left out of the feminist “revolution” because the movement itself was largely populated 
by, and tended to serve, upper-class white women (Hooks, 1984). At this point, the 
struggles black women faced at last began to be discussed at length within the theory. As 
Marxian frameworks for understanding work and social experiences were put to use 
within black feminist thought (Collins, 2000), specific problems missed by mainstream 
theory because of its “tunnel vision” became apparent.  
For example, Spelman (1988/2001) states that it is important to recognize “the 
many varieties of oppression” (86). She further states that “we need to keep a cautious 
eye on discussions of racism versus sexism” because “what sexism means and how it 
works is modulated by racism,” and likewise how racism works and what is means “is 
modulated by sexism” (85). She points out that “Black women and other women of color 
are at the bottom of the economic heap” and that this clearly cannot be “fully understood 
in the absence of class analysis” (86). King (1988) also discusses the “multiple 
jeopardy” that Black women face, stating that “the physical and psychological impact of 
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racism is qualitatively different from that of sexism” (45). Hooks (1984) also explains 
that “being oppressed means the absence of choices” (5). She further asserts that “many 
women do not join organized resistance against sexism precisely because sexism has not 
meant an absolute lack of choices,” and they therefore do not equate it with oppression 
(5). 
Capitalism is attacked within some black feminist thought not only because of its 
creation of hierarchal class relations, but because slavery as it had existed in the U.S. 
could be seen as an extreme form of “capitalist exploitation” of blacks (Collins, 2000, 
51). Hooks (1984) argues that “it is only by analyzing racism and its function in 
capitalist society that a thorough understanding of class relationships can emerge. Class 
struggle is inextricably bound to the struggle to end racism” (3). In fact, ideas about the 
varying ways that the social contexts of women’s lives affect them has expanded 
socialist-feminist theory into a social-feminist theory that includes discussion of the 
cross-sectional ways that women are oppressed within and across class, race, religion 
and culture (for example see Bhavnani, 2001). However, socialist-feminism and 
Marxist-feminism have not altogether disappeared into this expansion. For example, 
Fraser (1998) reminds us that while “cultural recognition displaces socioeconomic 
redistribution as the remedy for injustice,” we should not forget that these “struggles for 
recognition occur in a world of exacerbated material inequality” because, rather than 
lessening, “material inequality is on the rise in most of the world’s countries” (19). King 
(1988) also states that “multiple oppressions,” including “racism, sexism, and classism,” 
must all be addressed if liberation is to truly be achieved (47).  
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Finally, black feminists charge that the family unit which is described and 
attacked by Marxist-feminists is European in kind and is not typical of many other 
cultures. They argue further that, in their unceasing attack on the patriarchal family, 
Marxist-feminists fail to recognize its “whiteness.” That is, they miss the “solidarity” 
with which black men and women often work to combat racism (Coole, 1988, 249). 
Hooks (1984), for example, says that black men and women are united in the struggle 
against racism. This, she says, is something that white bourgeois women fail to 
understand because they “have not had as many positive experiences working with men 
politically” as have black women working with black men in the political struggle 
against racism (69). White socialist-feminists also miss problems within the structure of 
family that black women face which are atypical of the white family. For example, while 
white feminists were struggling for the right of women to leave the home and join the 
public workforce, “many black women were saying ‘we want to have more time to share 
with family, we want to leave the world of alienated work’” (Hooks, 1984, 134). Further, 
King (1988) states that assumptions made by white feminists,4 such as the notion that 
“family is by definition patriarchal,” stand as hindrances to black women’s association 
with feminism (58).  
 
Types of Empowerment 
Socialist-feminism sometimes claims to be concerned with something other than 
empowerment of the autonomous being (Jaggar, 1983). This is because it deals with 
groups and the “concrete person” as opposed to liberalism’s “abstract person.” When we 
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examine these matters from an empowerment outcomes perspective, however, we find 
that we are by and large still talking about the empowerment of the autonomous 
individual. Therefore, I find it expedient to point out some oft-times misunderstood 
concepts concerning self, other and context. It is important to untangle these concepts in 
order to understand the underlying assumptions about types of “empowerment.” 
It is carefully pointed out by socialist literature, whether feminist or otherwise, 
that the plight of individuals can never be understood without taking into account the 
context of the social environment that the individual lives in. This is certainly true, and a 
more holistic approach to any study would examine both the individual as an individual 
and the individual as part of a group and/or within some social setting. Certainly much 
feminist material has tried to do just this. What is often misconstrued, though, is just 
what level of understanding doing so brings and thereby what type of empowerment we 
are then talking about.  
What is needed is an understanding of the multiple spheres of reality in play for 
the individual. There is, of course, the subjective self, which we can only observe when 
dialogue and writings reveal thought, and only to some minimal degree. There is also the 
objective self, which we observe by watching someone’s actions and behavior and also 
how the self interacts with the social and political environment within which s/he lives. 
Much of feminist literature brings the subjective feminine-self into political and social 
studies, which is something that had not previously been done except on rare occasions. 
The objective self has long been studied, though for millennia most of the studies and 
philosophical discussions saw all important objective selves as male and, often, as white.  
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Next, there is the objective “we,” or groups of individuals. This we can observe. 
We can see the effects that groups have on each other and on the individuals within the 
groups. This, too, has long been studied, particularly by “communitarians” and by 
“socialists.” Again, unfortunately, the studies and philosophies for millennia saw the 
“important” groups to be at least led by males and the “important” influenced individuals 
to be likewise male and, again, mostly white. Feminists brought in a discussion about 
women, their interaction within groups and the influences that the groups have on the 
individuals therein.  
What is all too often missed, however, is an observation of the subjective “we.” 
That is, when feminists engage in discussion about the subjective “we,” it is often only 
to try to influence that “we” in a particular way, based on assumptions made by 
observations of the objective “we” rather than to inquire what the true subjective “we” 
needs are. I discussed this briefly in the “consciousness-raising” portion of this chapter 
as well as in the portion about black feminism’s complaint against mainstream (white) 
feminism. 
When we talk about groups, socialism and communitarianism, we have to be 
very careful about our concept of “empowerment” and just what major type of 
empowerment we are talking about. Remember that there are two primary types of 
empowerment: empowerment of the autonomous self, and empowerment of the 
relational self. Now, when we talk about empowerment of groups, we are not necessarily 
talking about empowerment of the relational self as one might at first assume. This is 
because when we are looking at the objective “we,” we can talk about empowerment of 
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groups, but the goal is really just the autonomous empowerment of each individual 
within the group even though these individuals might be empowered collectively as a 
group. 
However, if the members of a group work to empower each other, a relational 
empowerment can manifest from within the group. For example, if we attempt to exert 
an influence, to “raise consciousness,” so that the individuals in the group might then 
help each other, rather than to let social norms that may indeed be disempowering to 
dictate social interaction within the group, we have promoted relational empowerment. 
But to truly understand relational empowerment, we cannot simply exert a force from 
the outside, assuming that we know what the end results will be. This is very likely what 
frustrated much of the early “consciousness raising” efforts. What is needed instead is 
inquiry into the individuals’ own understandings of their interactions with each other and 
just how it is that they go about attempting to empower (or disempower) each other 
and/or empower others who may otherwise be helpless, such as children. This is the 
bedrock of empowerment of the relational self, and where understanding of it must 
begin.  
This is why I label most socialist empowerment goals as “empowerment of the 
autonomous self,” even though they deal with group interaction. The exception to this is 
such efforts as consciousness raising, which were relational attempts at empowerment, 
sometimes of the autonomous self and sometimes of the relational self.  These attempts 
could definitely have been better informed, however, had they more seriously examined 
the subjective “we” and notions about relational empowerment contained therein. 
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Nonetheless, while socialist-feminism overall was concerned primarily with 
empowerment of the autonomous self as I have explained, “consciousness raising” did 
make some feeble attempt at promoting empowerment of the relational self, as did black 
feminist theory in its discussion of black women’s need and desire to spend more time 
with their families. 
As will be seen, most of liberal theory also promotes empowerment of the 
autonomous self, but we do see some attempts to promote empowerment of the 
relational self therein as well. 
 
Differences Between Socialist-feminism and Liberal Feminism 
 
Socialist-feminism touted itself as the best overall solution to women’s problems 
in the modern world. It gets into trouble though, with confusions about what it does and 
does not do. First, writers (for example, Jaggar, 1983) tried to bring under the one 
umbrella socialist perspectives, radical perspectives, multicultural perspectives and 
psychoanalytical perspectives, labeling all of these as “socialist-feminism.” While the 
attempt to synthesize is to be applauded, it must also be recognized that each of these 
areas of feminism was actually distinct from the others in varying ways, as I have 
demonstrated. Second, while theorists tried to rope all of these categories under one by 
using Marx’s interpretation of “praxis,” they nonetheless focused on specifically 
economic materialistic solutions as the best route to female empowerment.  
Further, they tended to exclude liberalism from their realm of accepted theory, 
facing off against it both because of its tendency to accept capitalism as the preferred 
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mode of economic function in society and because of its focus on individual autonomy. 
However, by the mid-1980s, we see some speculation within the socialist-feminist ranks 
that it may be possible after all to have a capitalistic society without patriarchy (see Van 
Allen, 1984). This does not mean that to socialist-feminists socialism is not still 
considered to be the preferable economic system, but rather a recognition that it may not 
be the only one in which women would gain empowerment. 
 
Other Differences 
On Praxis and Rationality 
The concept of rationality, as will be seen in my next chapter, is very important 
to liberal theory and feminist liberal theory. But as Jaggar (1983) argues, for Marx, 
rationality is not the defining characteristic that separates humans from non-human 
animals. Rather, the defining characteristic is “praxis,” defined as “conscious physical 
labor directed toward transforming the material world so it will satisfy human needs” 
(54). Marx further theorized that the combination of physical activity, rational thought 
and social interaction is what makes human beings unique among species and also what 
caused us to evolve the way we did. For example, bipedalism freed human hands to pick 
up objects, which led to tool use, which likely led to more complete bipedalism and 
development of the hands.  
Part of what matters so much about this Marxist understanding of praxis, 
according the Jaggar (1983) is that its intent is to satisfy biological human needs. But 
this is not based on a notion of biological determinism, because biological and social 
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aspects of human existence are not “conceptually separable from each other; rather they 
are related in such a way that each partially constitutes the other” (55). Jaggar also 
argues that this is one of the primary foundational differences between liberal theory and 
Marxist theory. Certainly, and as will be seen in my next chapter, liberal feminist theory 
is partially preoccupied with human rationality and shuns most inclusion of biological 
arguments within its political theory. 
 
Woman as a “Class” Versus Woman as an Individual  
Eisenstein (1981) states that liberal feminism is “more than the simple addition 
of liberalism to feminism because its feminist commitment derives form the recognition 
that women are members of a sexual class and as such are excluded from liberal 
democracy” (24, emphasis mine). However, liberal feminists do not appear to agree with 
this class distinction. Also, when the distinctive characteristic of a line of theoretical 
argument is class, that line of theoretical argument is commonly classified as socialist or 
Marxist. Though admittedly women are understood by liberal feminist theory to have 
long been oppressed under the patriarchal system it is not because of a distinction that 
we would normally refer to as “class.”  
Eisenstein (1981) attempted to theoretically wed socialist-feminism to liberal 
feminism. It would seem that having made this effort she then began to define liberal 
feminism in her own, new terms. While her attempt to strengthen feminism by 
recognizing commonalities between some branches thereof are to be applauded, it is also 
true that her conflation of two types of feminist theory serve to further confuse debate. 
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This is because each category of theory is grounded in a distinctive set of notions 
concerning the origins of the problems women face as well as a distinctive set of goals 
intended to cure those problems. It was because Eisenstien believed that liberal feminism 
had become “subversive to the state,” and because she believed that since it was 
grounded in a distinctly male liberalism it actually furthered male supremacy, that she 
argued that the theory should turn its attention to the problem of women as a class 
(1981). She declared that the needs of “feminism cannot be met by the liberal state” 
because it has “no commitment to women’s liberation” (248).  However, simply 
declaring that a particular category cannot be successful in its mission unless it changes 
focus does not actually change the focus within the category. Doing so merely moves the 
work of the theorist from one category to the next. Liberal feminist theory has continued 






1. For example, see contemporary feminists’ quotes in Wallis, 2004. 
 
2. This radical-feminist assumption also seems to be the primary reason that many feminists 
discuss a “necessity” for “consciousness-raising” for women in general. While this appears in 
some socialist-feminist writings, its appearance there is primarily due to the intermingling of 
radical-feminism with socialist-feminism. 
 
3. This, plus the beginning dialogue between black-feminism theorists and social-feminism 
theorists discussed in this chapter is why I place black feminism into this “socialist-feminist 
theory and emergent-diversity feminism” category. 
 
4. It is interesting to note, as will become apparent in Chapter V, that some white feminists make 
this same charge against the way these feminists describe the family and also against the fact that 
they assume that all women would prefer to be working in the “public sphere” if they were only 





THE QUEST FOR LEGAL EQUALITY:  
 




 Liberal feminist theory agrees with many of the basic ideals of traditional, 
masculine liberal theory. That is, it demands freedom of individual choice, it valorizes 
equality of opportunity, and it holds individual autonomy sacrosanct. It is also true that 
all feminist theories contain, at their core, at least these aspects of liberalism (Eisenstein, 
1984) and that no feminism has gotten beyond the need to make basic demands for civil 
rights, education and autonomy (Snitow, 1990). Yet, although intertwined with other 
forms of feminism, liberal feminist theory nonetheless may be clearly distinguished from 
them, as was explained in Chapter I. This is because liberal feminist theory both engages 
and criticizes traditional liberal theory, with its emphasis on contract theory, its 
interpretations of the public and private realms of human activity, and its notions of 
“rational citizenship,” rights, justice and the autonomous self in ways that other 
feminisms do not. 
As I also mentioned in Chapter I, it has been the stated purpose of liberal 
feminism to “empower” women within the public and the domestic spheres (Rowland-
Serdar and Schwartz-Shea, 1991). Empowerment in this case has been loosely defined as 
the process by which women come to have, believe in, and make actual choices in their 
lives and in politics (Alcoff, 1988; Rowland-Serdar & Schwartz-Shea, 1991). The 
primary goal is to extend rights to women that, in the past, were typically reserved for 
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males. In other words, legal equality is presented as an “alternative to masculinist 
citizenship" (Dietz, 2003, 415). 
 
“Irrationality,” “Usefulness,” and a Male-centric Notion of the “Value” of Women 
 
Like masculine liberal theory, liberal feminist theory criticizes particular aspects 
of traditional western political thought. Not surprisingly, though, the feminists give 
particular attention to western political thought’s treatment of women across time, as will 
be shown in this chapter. Thus, and as with other categories of feminist theory, we find 
within liberal feminist theory ideas that parallel masculine liberal theory, simply adding 
feminist consciousness to it, and ideas that starkly criticize what is seen as male-centric 
ideas within traditional liberal theory. I begin my discussion with the former. 
As explained in Chapter I, liberal theory forwards a distinct notion of the 
importance of individual autonomy. Autonomy means that the individual must be free to 
choose his or her values, goals and corresponding actions. It is based on the Lockean 
notion that, under God and the law of nature, "all men are free and equal" (Schochet, 
1971, 15). Liberal feminists agree with this notion, but charge that the emphasis in 
traditional theory is literally on men, for women are not considered to be equal or given 
true freedom. 
There is an overarching concept within liberal feminist theory of a form of human 
interaction defined as “patriarchy.” This patriarchy, or “masculinist citizenship,” has 
traditionally given legal rights to males that females do not share. That is, within liberal 
feminism, patriarchy is most simply defined as a system that gives rights to males as 
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“dominators” and withholds rights from females as the “oppressed” (for an analogy, see 
Williams, 1988). However, patriarchy is not merely understood as a political or societal 
male-privilege hierarchy, but also as a system that deliberately devalues all women. This 
notion is similar to the notion of male domination discussed in the chapter on radical 
feminist theory, but liberal feminist theory adds an important distinction: an emphasis on 
the historical-masculinist definition of rationality. For example, Wollstonecraft (1792) 
wrote: 
Avoiding … frankly acknowledging the inferiority of women … 
I shall only insist that men have increased that inferiority till 
women are almost sunk below the standard of rational 
creatures. (35, emphasis mine) 
 
There is within historical western political thought a long-standing stereotypical notion 
that women are not as capable of rationality as men. This particular notion, though in 
modern time manifest in various liberal and non-liberal texts, has been around since at 
least the writings of Aristotle. As a result, this stereotypical notion was so deeply 
ingrained in western political thought that Ryan (1992) tells us that American republican 
ideology, from the beginning, “held that the female sex embodied those uncurbed human 
passions that inevitably subverted the self-control and rationality required of citizens” 
(201).  
That this notion is forwarded by traditional liberal theory rather than corrected by 
it is illuminated by the fact that in Locke’s seventeenth century theory, women were 
“seen as ‘naturally’ lacking in rationality” (Brennan and Pateman, 1979, 195). That little 
or no progress in this theory was made prior the advent of second-wave feminist theory 
is demonstrated by the fact that in 1978 the idea that women are “lacking in rationality” 
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and therefore unfit for political life was “frequently presented as one of the ‘natural’ 
differences of character and attributes between the sexes” (Brennan and Pateman, 1979, 
196, emphasis mine).  
 The idea that women were not fit for rational citizenship was an important part 
of how Locke justified excluding them from the social contract (Eisenstein, 1981). I will 
return to this matter later, but for now I would like to suggest that this is likely why 
Jaggar (1983) supposes that one way to show that women are "equal to,” or as human as, 
men is to show that they are fully "capable of reason” (also see arguments by Baer, 
1999). To understand fully the problem posed by the women-are-irrational stereotype, 
though, we need an understanding of its roots. Said understanding will then help to 
clarify part of liberal feminist theory’s empowerment themes.  
The notion of what it means to be rational or irrational has evolved over time. 
Today we think of irrational as an inability or refusal to think logically, usually because 
of excessive emotional reponse to something or someone. However, in the seventeenth 
century, Locke tied the notion of “rationality” to property ownership. I will expound 
upon this when I discuss liberal feminism’s charge that traditional liberal theory only 
further increased women’s powerlessness. First, though, I search farther back in time for 
the likely origins of the western notion that women are “irrational.” For that, I look to 
the writings of Aristotle. The relevance of my doing so will be apparent in a moment. 
Although the meaning of “irrational” was somewhat different in Aristotle’s day 
than what we understand it to mean now,1 the original notion as Aristotle conceived it 
did not leave women faring any better than today’s notion of female “irrationality” 
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which is based on the notion that women are more emotional and less reasonable than 
men. This is because the Aristotelian concept of rationality was based on an authority-
equals-rationality value-system that saw to the needs of men at the price of devaluing all 
women. Aristotle believed that women were inferior to men and “naturally” belonged in 
the “private sphere,” taking care of everyday biological necessity (Okin, 1989, 14). This 
arrangement afforded men the freedom to exercise rationality and thereby to pursue a 
higher quality of life in the polis or “public sphere.” Because men had the authority to be 
“rational,” women, who served men, did not. 
This Aristotelian notion gives males the privilege of being cared for and deferred 
to by females. Western political thought, then, was in part shaped by a masculinist, 
narcissistic value system that sought to keep women in a position most beneficial and 
convenient to males. It was reasoned therein that women “should” be in service to men 
because they were not capable of rational decision, and within this circular argument, 
they were not capable of rational decision simply because their “proper place” was to be 
in service to men! Though traceable to Aristotle, this type of reasoning is pervasive 
throughout historical western political thought. For example, in Emile, Rousseau 
explains: 
A woman’s education must therefore be planned in relation to 
man. To be pleasing in his sight, to win his respect and love, to 
train him in childhood, to tend him in manhood, to counsel and 
console, to make his life pleasant and happy, these are the duties 
of woman for all time, and this is what she should be taught 
while she is young. (1782/1998, 255) 
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While masculine liberal theory argues a number of points put forth by Rousseau, it 
largely ignores this statement of women’s “duties,” because much of masculine liberal 
theory held no quarrel with the notion that women are, and should be, “useful” to men.  
Liberal feminists, however, borrowing from theories forwarded by Kant, point 
out that theories that emphasize the usefulness of women to men have served to 
dehumanize and thereby devalue them throughout the ages. To be thought of only in 
terms of one’s usefulness to others robs one of intrinsic value, that is, value as an 
individual without measure according to someone else’s needs. The assertion that one 
must always obey another has the same effect. To be human is to have an independent 
will, and to have a will is to have autonomy. Therefore, humans who are not granted a 
will of their own come to be thought of as less than human, as less valuable than “real” 
humans, in a way like inanimate objects (Williams, 1988). 
 Eisenstein (1981) argues that men have deliberately kept women in a subordinate 
position in order to maximize their own benefit, and Baer (1978) effectively 
demonstrates this phenomenon in historical American law. This intent, carried out in 
both law and social norms, effectively robs women both of recognition of their own 
intrinsic value and of their own independent will. I will show that liberal feminists rally 
against this ideology of enforced female “usefulness” (to males) because it is the 




Liberal Feminism’s “Empowerment” 
Context of the Problem 
 
As I explained in Chapter I, the combination of the “assumed cause” of the problem 
and the “human interaction addressed” reveals each theorist's understanding of the 
context of the particular problem that empowerment is intended to overcome. The 
assumed cause of the limited self-determination suffered by women is “patriarchy,” 
defined by liberal feminist theory as a masculinist, narcissistic value system that 
maximizes benefit to men at the expense of women. It is believed that patriarchy 
produces the following cultural norms which are the cruxes of general human 
interactions between the sexes in the modern world: (1) a culturally embedded and 
enforced belief that women “ought” to obey men, for the sake of men, which is 
rationalized among men by a notion that women are not fully able to make decisions for 
themselves; (2) relegation of women to the private sphere, which is supported by a 
notion that women are “supposed to” take care of men and others; (3) designation of 
duty to women to mind a specific need of the human race – reproduction – which is used 
to excuse a number of discriminatory actions against and even sexual subversion of 
women; and (4) a culturally embedded, biased framework of assumptions that allows 
some desired quality of life to be gained for males by building blindly upon the backs of 
females who are denied the privilege of a comparable quality of life. 
 Because liberal feminist theory addresses specific laws and sociopolitical 
situations, most of these theorists also address very specific human interactions within 
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these broader categories of general interactions. I will mention these as I go, because this 
will help to clarify the nuances of the theorists’ understandings of “empowerment.”  
 
Recommended Methods for Empowerment 
Many liberal feminists train their attention upon the discriminatory laws that man 
has created. These laws protect a “males only” mentality that has long excluded women 
from the public sphere and has maintained the reign of male authority that denies women 
their own autonomy and independence. Therefore, liberal feminism fights for legal 
rights for women on many fronts: they seek equal opportunity in work and careers, equal 
pay, abortion rights, the right to fair treatment in the event of divorce and so forth. They 
demand legal recognition that women are as valuable in their own right as men.  Friedan 
(1981) emphasized women’s need for the right and ability “to take control of their own 
bodies, their own lives” and their demand for “equal opportunity with men” (30). Landes 
(1998) tells us that liberal feminists wanted to “democratize and feminize the public 
sphere” (156) from which women had long been excluded.  
 
Empowerment Goals 
Friedan (1981) describes the intent of the liberal feminist movement –which 
theory closely paralleled, at least in the beginning - this way: that these feminists sought 
to end sexual discrimination in “employment, professions, education, the church,” that 
they wanted to gain for women the “economic independence and self-respect they so 
desperately needed,” that they wanted women to be able to have “control over their own 
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bodies and reproductive process,” and that they wanted “simple, nonhumiliating police 
protection against rape” (50-51). Yet though the specific issues are numerous, overall 
liberal feminism seeks to empower women in four general ways: (1) to gain for them 
recognition as rational free agents; (2) to end their relegation to the private sphere and 
gain for them equal opportunity to compete in the public sphere2; (3) to gain control over 
what happens to their own bodies; and (4) to end bias against them caused by 
assumptions and oversights built into traditional liberal theory. The overall goal is to 
gain legal right to and ability of self-determination for all women.  
 
Types of Empowerment 
Liberal Feminism has dealt primarily with the autonomous self much as it had 
been defined within non-feminist Liberal Theory. However, relatively recent theoretical 
writings are discussing the relational self in two important ways. The first way deals 
with concrete laws and the corresponding problems that women face. For example, it is 
noted that laws and policy that deal with family leave affect how working women 
interact with their families. It therefore has been suggested that empowerment of women 
must include an understanding of their relational roles as wives and mothers. The second 
type of theory that has brought in discussion of the relational self takes issue with Rawls' 
concept of justice as it was applied to an "abstract other." This argument maintains that 
the concept of the "concrete" other is needed in justice theory, because it is this concrete 
other that places the self in a relational role to others who may be different than, and 
have needs different from, the autonomous self. 
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Specific Empowerment Themes 
As I have mentioned and as will be shown, liberal feminists expend a good deal 
of effort to debunk the notion that women are inherently less than fully rational beings. 
Notions of rationality are tied to notions of human worth (for examples, see Kant, 1785 
and Schmidtz, 1998). That is, a rational being is intrinsically valuable, in a way 
deserving of rights and respect over non-rational beings. Further, an intrinsically 
valuable being is not measured according to his or her usefulness to someone or 
something else. It is suggested that cultural and political norms which require women to 
care for men and to submit to their demands must be eradicated from society. Said 
norms are damaging to women both because of their coercive nature and because of the 
psychological effect they have on women. Women socialized to believe that they are 
inherently irrational and that they are “supposed” to take care of men usually tend to 
behave accordingly. Empowerment themes centered around these ideas forward a notion 
that women should and must be recognized as fully rational beings, that women must be 
as fully educated as men, and that women’s rights as rational, autonomous citizens must 
be fully recognized by the law.  
It is believed that these items are the cornerstones to all other empowerment 
goals that women might hope to pursue. This is in part because the process of 
overcoming outside control requires the rational ability to recognize one's own 
individual will as separate from the demands and/or control of others.  This is what 
Rowland-Serdar and Schwartz-Shea (1991) define as a "sense of self," which is 
necessary in order for one to be able to recognize and choose one's own values and 
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goals.3 However, in addition to this recognition, women also are thought to need legal 
help to prevent male coercion and to ensure that they have ample opportunity to pursue 
their own individual goals. The ability to recognize one's own values and goals alone 
does not ensure that one has the corresponding ability to take action according to those 
values and goals. This is where the need for “positive” freedom, or the ability to pursue 
one's own will, comes in. The combination of "negative" freedom – freedom from 
coercion - and "positive" freedom – the ability to pursue one’s own will (Berlin, 1969) 
together with a recognition of one’s own will - allow for the empowerment of the 
autonomous self (see Simhony, 1993).4 Therefore, liberal feminists present a rage of 
specific empowerment themes within the legal contexts of either protection from male 
coercion or ensured equality of opportunity, or both. 
This is also why traditional notions concerning the “public/private split” are 
criticized as containing an ever-present assumption that women “belong” in the private 
sphere while men “belong” in the public sphere. Tied to ideas concerning the private 
sphere are notions that it is a sanctuary and place of refuge/protection for the family, and 
that women therefore are “supposed” to, or rather are coerced to, remain there to take 
care of children, the elderly and the infirm. Women first need freedom from this 
coercion, and second need freedom to compete on an equal footing with men in the 
“public realm” of work and politics. In other words, they need to be not only freed from 
the notion that they must be “useful” to men, but also given equal opportunity to 
compete with men for jobs, political power and so forth in the public realm. 
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Likewise, traditional liberal theory is criticized for a recurring notion that women 
need a special kind of male-defined protection from the rigors of the public realm. It is 
pointed out, as I will soon demonstrate, that these supposed “protections” only serve as 
further coercive techniques to keep women locked within the private realm and in 
service to men. However, given the perceived problems of patriarchy and domination, 
“protective” legislation is not abolished within liberal feminism, but rather redefined as 
protection against sexually aggressive males and degrading or even debilitating cultural 
norms. Specific lines of liberal feminist theory have emerged to deal with each of these 
issues and sometimes stand in conflict with each other, as will be seen. 
Finally, traditional liberal theory is criticized for failing to recognize the plight of 
individuals and groups who fall prey to biases within the framework of liberal-
democratic systems. These biases are not merely created through inequalities, but also 
through assumptions built into traditional liberal theory. Because of these damaging 
assumptions, traditional liberal theory is seen as worsening the plight of women, as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter. An example of this is the concept of the “abstract 
other,” which assumes that all individuals share a basic and similar type of thought 
process, and therefore any given individual who finds him/herself in a particular 
situation will likely desire the same things as any other individual placed in the exact 
same circumstance (see Rawls, 1971/1999).5 For argument against this assumption, see 
Benhabib (1987) discussed later in this chapter. The demand here is for a recognition of 
varying individual viewpoints and needs. 
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These are the primary contentions that liberal feminism holds against traditional 
liberalism, which express specific arguments about the problems faced by women under 
patriarchy, and therefore also express specific notions about what “empowerment” 
would mean for women. As this chapter proceeds, I will present additional examples of 
each of these arguments. 
 
 
Autonomy, Citizenship and Rationality 
  
Vogel (1986) points out that among the male writers of the eighteenth century, a 
difference in “ways of knowing” between men and women was assumed. Yet not all of 
these writers granted that women’s “way of knowing” was inferior to that of males. For 
example, she compares and contrasts Wollstonecraft’s writings to those of eighteenth 
century “romanticists” such as Friedrich Schlegel. While Wollstonecraft believed that 
“knowledge must be conceived as being the same in nature for both sexes” (Vogel, 
1986, 28), Schlegel believed that women possess a unique capacity for a special kind of 
reason that is superior to the type of reason employed by the average male (Vogel, 1986, 
38). While the distinction does not purely arise from biology, it is stimulated by nature, 
because it has to do with “motherliness.” Women are able to “harmonize experience and 
knowledge from an inner center of intuitive understanding and reflective feeling” 
(Vogel, 1986, 38). Vogel further states: 
Although women are perhaps less equipped for the rigour of 
analytical thinking and abstract speculation, their “lyrical 
philosophizing” will in many cases, where men’s rationality 
tends towards dissection, isolation and fragmentation, come 
closer to embracing the whole and undivided nature of truth. The 
well-worn comparison between analytical and intuitive modes of 
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knowledge turns in romantic thinking often to the disadvantage 
of the former: enslaved to abstraction and lacking in feeling and 
imagination, men’s reason is prone to neglect the wholeness of 
experience. (Vogel, 1986, 38) 
 
 
Finally, Vogel (1986) points out that these ideas put forth by the “romantics” not only 
did not place women as inferior to men, but also did not establish “absolute divides” 
between the genders, because it was suggested that nature only “stimulated” the gender 
types, rather than made them certain. Further, both genders were seen as having the 
capacity to develop either type of reasoning.  
However, the problem, as is argued by liberal feminists today (see, for example, 
Baer, 1999), was that this notion of “difference” between the genders was used in 
western political thought as justification for the separate and inferior education of 
women. Rousseau, for example, is guilty of just this practice in Emile when he “infers 
from women’s natural, physical weakness a limited capacity for knowledge bounded by 
physical concerns” (Vogel, 1986, 28; see also Pateman, 1989, and Rousseau, 
1762/1998). It was also used to declare that women “naturally” belong in the private 
sphere (Okin, 1989) because of an intuitive understanding that best suits them to care for 
children, the elderly and the infirm. This kind of use of the notion of feminine 
“motherliness” is one reason that liberal feminists tend to bristle against care theory 
notions of the importance of giving prestigious respect to feminine “mothering.” It is 
believed by these liberal feminists that any focus on “mothering” or “motherliness” as a 
specifically feminine trait only gives an excuse to theorists such as Rousseau to use as a 
reason to exclude women from the public realm. It was even suggested by Rousseau that 
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this ability to care for others was in direct opposition to the ability to understand justice, 
a notion that was not corrected by traditional liberal theorists such as Locke. Rather, 
Locke, too, suggested that women were not capable of “rational citizenship.” I will 
address each of these ideas in turn. 
 
“Limited Capacity” and the Education of Women 
 
 To Rousseau’s argument about women’s “limited capacity for knowledge,” as 
mentioned above, the early liberal feminist Mary Wollstonecraft (1792/1998) replies that 
the social focus of the times on women’s physical attributes is the real cause of their lack 
of knowledge, not a “natural limited capacity.” She explained that the education of 
women in her time is faulty because, in it, “the cultivation of understanding is always 
subordinate to the acquirement of some corporeal accomplishment,” leaving the women 
“without a knowledge of life” and therefore willing to “blindly submit to authority” 
(255, emphasis mine). Wollstonecraft further argues that education for both men and 
women should “enable the individual to attain such habits of virtue as will render it 
independent,” adding that “being virtuous” results from the exercise of reason (254). 
Wollstonecraft concludes that sexual difference (in reason) would disappear should 
education be the same for both sexes. 
Contemporary liberal feminists, too, argue that psychological difference, such as 
it exists, is caused by inferior education and other social problems (for example, see 
Jaggar, 1983). Wendy Williams (1997) reminds us that “less than a decade ago,” many 
scientists and doctors still held the view that women’s capacity for both education and 
reasoning was biologically limited. Rationale for this ranged from a notion that women 
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are governed by their emotions and the biology of their bodies to the bizarre notion that 
women’s brains are smaller than men’s and therefore incapable of holding as much 
information as the male brain (Glen et al, 2005). In other words, in spite of more than 
two centuries of argument by women that equal education would dissolve the 
psychological difference between the sexes, some men continued to argue that women 
simply are not capable of being educated in the same manner as men.  
Further, “the entitlement of rights” is based upon “autonomous reason,” which 
“is staked upon certain methods of acquiring knowledge” (Vogel, 1986), which 
historically were distributed between the sexes in an unequal manner. Reason was 
assumed to be “a typically male capacity” (ibid, 28). This assumption lay “at the root of 
all social and educational arrangements” which had traditionally prevented women from 
“attaining a sense of their own worth as rational and moral agents” (ibid, 28). Women 
could not rise above this problem until they gained access to better education, but they 
were refused better education in part because it was assumed that they were not as 
capable of learning as men. The problem became circular, with no obvious way out. 
Traditional masculinist liberal theory assumed that it is “natural” for women to 
remain in the private realm of the home and for men to rule over them as “head of the 
family” (Clark, 1998; Okin, 1979). This assumption followed a notion that women are 
not mentally or emotionally capable of being educated into “rational citizenship.” Their 
exclusion from “rational citizenship” meant that they were relegated exclusively to the 
“private sphere” (Eisenstein, 1981; Pateman, 1989). Further, and as mentioned earlier, 
the “lacking in rationality” theme was an important part of Locke’s explanation as to 
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why women were excluded from the social contract (Eisenstein, 1981). The “rationality 
that Locke describes is not understood as inherent in men but is socially acquired” via 
their ownership of property (Eisenstein, 1981, 44).  
Eisenstein (1981) further explains that because private property is gained as the 
fruit of labor, the ownership of property is “a reflection of one’s personality and the 
control one has over one’s life and activity” (ibid, 44). Eisenstein bases these ideas in 
part on writings by Macpherson (1962). Macpherson argued that “Locke regards 
propertyless males as less than fully rational” (195), and therefore, the “free rational 
individual” (262) was one who owned property. However, Brennan and Pateman (1979) 
point out that this line of reasoning is somewhat faulty, because seventeenth century 
women were not dependent upon men and were, within the family unit, “economic” 
equals to men. For example, women made clothing for the entire family. Clothing is a 
form of private property and was also the “fruit of labor.” By the eighteenth century, 
however, women had also begun to lose their economic equality with men, which only 
worsened their sociopolitical positions, because they were then both dependent on men 
and considered to be “irrational” in the more modern sense.6 
Brennan and Pateman (1979) also point out that, under Locke’s social contract 
theory, men gain acknowledgement as rational beings and citizenship as soon as they 
marry. Women, however, are denied citizenship throughout their lives. It did not matter 
that women had authority over children or whether or not women owned the fruits of 
their own labor, such as the clothing they made for their families, because they were, in 
Locke’s eyes, naturally subordinate to the men and lacked the rational ability to enter 
  
129 
into a social contract (Brennan and Pateman, 1979). It is interesting to note that in a time 
when women were politically considered as little more than the property of their 
husbands, the act of marriage itself afforded men the right of citizenship. This parallels 
that fact that ownership of real property also afforded men right to citizenship. As Engels 
(1884/1998) explained, in monogamous marriage under patriarchy, the wife became the 
property of the husband. Brennan and Pateman (1979) point out that, under Locke’s 
social contract theory, men gain acknowledgement as rational beings and citizenship as 
soon as they marry. Remember that for Locke, ownership of property signifies 
rationality, because ownership of property is “a reflection of one’s personality and the 
control one has over one’s life and activity” (Eisenstein, 1981, 44). Similarly, marriage 
affords the male a political authority as head of the family. As assumed head of the 
family, the male entered the political world because he now was part of a “new economic 
unit,” separate from previously existing families ((Brennan and Pateman, 1979, 186). 
“Rationality,” then, is recognized as soon as some form of right of political participation 
or recognition is gained. 
Women, however, have no way to become rational or to gain political 
recognition within Locke’s theory. If lack of political recognition brands one as 
“irrational” and being branded as “irrational” leaves one with no political recognition, 
then there is no way out except for those who are granted some way of gaining said 
rationality or said political recognition. Locke offered women no such way. Instead, their 
plight was explained away by referral to their “natural” state. Given this, it is 
understandable that liberal feminists would “rage against narrowly instrumental 
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conceptions of rationality” (Lloyd, 1997) and find it necessary repeatedly to make the 
point that women are, in fact, as capable of rational thought as men (for example Ryan, 
1992; Baer, 1999). This emphasis on women’s cognitive equality to men employs a 
method of empowerment that attempts to change stereotypical misconception about the 
mental capacities of women. The goal is to break out of the circular traps that women 
have faced due to this misconception. 
 
 
Woman’s “Place” Under the Law: the Public/Private Split 
 
Labeling women as irrational both gave an excuse for their designation as the 
property of their husbands and effectively kept women out of the public realm of 
citizenship and in the home, where they were most “useful” to men (see Baer, 1978). 
Therefore, this notion that women are inherently irrational was a very convenient 
assumption for the support of patriarchal political systems, and one that generally was 
not challenged by traditional, masculinist liberal thought. Baer (1978), for example, 
addresses male-favoritism in the market, which is supported and enhanced by laws that 
purport to “protect” women while actually limiting their ability to compete with males in 
the workforce. According to Baer, these laws limit women’s public-sphere liberties 
without affording them any real benefits in exchange because they are masculine 
attempts to keep women in the private sphere where they are thought to be most 
beneficial to patriarchal society (Baer, 1978; see also Eisenstein 1984; 1988). That is, 
masculinist society has coerced women into caring for others by blocking their access to 
the “public sphere” (Baer, 1978, Okin, 1979; Elshtain, 1981).  
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Usually, liberal feminists do not argue against the public/private split, but since 
Arendt (1958) wrote on the subject, there has been continuing argument about exactly 
where the dividing line should be drawn. Davidoff (1998), for example, tells us that 
“public and private are not (and never have been) ‘conceptual absolutes’”(165). 
Although “they have become a basic part of the way our whole social and psychic 
worlds are ordered,” it is “an order that is constantly shifting” (165). Nonetheless, the 
primary argument put forth by feminists is focused not on the split itself, but instead on 
the notion that women somehow “belong” exclusively in the private sphere because they 
“naturally” belong in the service of men and also are “natural” caretakers of children and 
others in need of care (Okin, 1979; Elshtain, 1981).  
The difficulty for women was that they were the expected caretakers of their 
children and of the home (Baer, 1999), yet this role, coupled with their exclusion from 
the public realm, placed them largely into dependency upon males and left them unable 
to pursue meaningful choices of their own. Further, their assumed “natural ability” to 
carry out this responsibility is said to somehow be in conflict with their ability to 
understand justice, as though no human could conceivably do both (Pateman, 1989). 
Further, it was believed that the public realm is where “rational citizenship” is 
experienced, while the private realm is where “passion” is experienced (Coltheart, 
1986).7 Rousseau, for example, equated women with “love and passion,” both of which 
he considered to stand in opposition to justice (Pateman, 1989). Again, traditional liberal 
theory, while arguing with Rousseau on various other points, did not attempt to correct 
this assumption. However, early liberal feminists (Wollstonecraft and Mill) called for the 
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education of women in order to “develop their sense of justice” which would then allow 
them “to participate in political life” (Pateman, 1989, 27, emphasis mine).  
Susan Okin (1979) tells us that in order for women to be valued equally as 
citizens, they must be able to improve their education, economic independence and 
occupational status. Yet if women are somehow, by nature, not equipped to understand 
justice, then education alone could not make women “fit” for public life (Pateman, 
1989). Again, we are faced with a circular dilemma. Even if it is recognized that women 
are at least capable of being educated to a point to where they can understand justice, 
they are still thought to “belong” in and to be best suited to remaining in the home caring 
for others instead. And this “belonging in the home” is thought to be “natural” because 
their nature suits them to love and care rather than to think about or understand justice 
(see Okin, 1979). Therefore, even with the availability of education to women, it is 
assumed that the majority of women would remain in the home anyway in order to care 
for the family (Pateman, 1989). As Baer (1978) pointed out, this was quite convenient 
for men. This line of reasoning led to discussion about assumptions within traditional 
western and liberal theory that placed the obligation of “care” for men and responsibility 
for the reproduction of the human race squarely on the shoulders of women. 
 
 
On Care and Obligation 
 
Baer (1999) asserts that liberal theory needs to rethink “obligation” in order to 
lift the unfair and unequal burden of care that has been placed on women. An alternative 
to completely freeing women from the responsibility of caring for others would be to 
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involve men equally in it, so that women would not be seen as the only humans bound 
by duties of love or influenced by “passion.” If this could be accomplished, then it could 
be shown that understanding of love and understanding of justice are not incompatible 
with each other. It would simultaneously free women from the necessary assigned duty 
of caring for others, allowing them the freedom to be educated and to be fully admitted 
into “rational citizenship.”  
Giele (1980), for example, suggests as a remedy to the dilemma of “care duty” a 
process which she calls “crossover” (3). Simply put, she suggests that men should share 
equally in home and child-care duties, so that women can share equally in work and 
politics. Women need the right to share equally in work and politics so that they can find 
happiness and fulfillment of their own, rather than giving up their own needs for the 
needs of others. Similarly, Okin (1989) argues that the equal sharing of both paid and 
unpaid labor by men and women is the only “just and fair solution to the urgent problem 
of women’s and children’s vulnerability” (171). Eisenstein (1984) further asserts that 
laws should recognize that women’s needs and right to happiness/fulfillment are just as 
important as men’s needs and right to happiness/fulfillment. 
In her explanation of the plight of isolated women, Baer (1978) attempts to 
refocus attention from the needs of the male to the needs of the female. She points out, 
for example, that housework and/or the daily routine of a stay-at-home mom is not likely 
to be satisfying, at least for long, to most women in America (see also Friedan, 1963; 
Friedan, 1981). Because of their isolated households, women are left alone or alone-
with-children for the majority of the day. This leaves them without needed social stimuli 
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(Baer, 1978). Yet Betty Friedan (1963) pointed out that in spite of this problem, the 
majority of women had, prior to and during the time of the writing of her book, been 
socialized to believe that their proper place was in the private sphere, caring for men and 
children. Those who deviated from this norm through education and non-domestic 
employment found themselves feeling guilty and oddly out of place. 
 
On Fair Competition 
If women are at last set free from the private realm, they may still lack the right 
to compete equally within the public realm. This why Harlan (1998) tells us that liberal 
feminists seek for women the right to choose their own social or work circumstances and 
that American liberal feminists have placed much emphasis on the importance of “equal 
access for women to jobs and careers, equal pay, and equal consideration for promotions 
and career enhancement once they are on the job” (79). In fact, Betty Friedan, frustrated 
with some feminists’ preoccupation with the creation and passage of laws that would 
restrict pornography and other male sexual expression and activity, commented that to 
her it “seemed irrelevant, wrong” for feminism to “waste energy” protesting 
pornography or other sexual issues “when their very economic survival” is at stake 
(Frieden, 1981, 20).  
Finally, liberal feminist theory has concentrated some effort on ensuring that even 
women who do become mothers still have some opportunity to participate in the public 
realm of work and politics. The issue of pregnancy and the workplace as well as the 
plight of working mothers are addressed. For the most part, liberal feminism has shied 
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away from declaring that pregnant workers and working mothers are different than and 
pose a different problem than do men. This is because the “difference” arguments were 
for so long used to keep women out of the public sphere. Eisenstein (1981) further 
complains that “biological arguments” have long been used to “sideline” women into the 
“private sphere of home and family” (16).8 However, eventually, liberal feminists found 
it necessary to come to grips with the modern “sameness versus difference debate” and 
to take their own stand on the issue.  
Eisenstein (1988) points out that the female body is more like the male body than it 
is different. Although she acknowledges that “equality based on sameness of the sexes is 
problematic” because of the female body’s capacity for reproduction, she does not 
advocate that the sexes be treated differently under the law, because this leads to 
inequality of opportunity in the marketplace. Yet she does advocate the special treatment 
of pregnancy in the marketplace under the law. She says, “Pregnancy is the hard issue to 
resolve because it combines specificity and engendered ‘difference’” (197). Pregnancy, 
she tells us, is unique among human conditions, and as such cannot properly be treated 
the same as any given “disability.” She goes on to tell us that “a commitment to 
equality” must recognize sex and gender difference, but must also require that this 
recognition of differences not be used “in restrictive ways” (200).  
Eisenstein draws a distinction between equal treatment and treatment as equals. She 
says that to treat pregnancy the same as disability means to treat it as equal to “other 
disabilities,” but that this is not the same thing as “treating the pregnant worker as equal 
to nonpregnant workers.” Pregnancy, she tells us, “may need to be treated differently,” 
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because that may be the only way “to ensure that the pregnant worker will come out 
equal” (219). The concerns are that women not be relegated back to the private sphere 
simply because they do happen to become pregnant and/or become mothers.  The 
assertion is that women must be empowered in a way that will allow them to compete 
equally with males in the public sphere in spite of their reproductive capabilities. 
Liberal feminists have also dared to challenge the assumption that women should 
have to bear children, and thus become care-givers by way of becoming parents, at all. 
They assert that women’s lives should be as valuable as men’s lives, without regards for 
whether or not they will reproduce and then nurture other humans. Much of liberal 
feminism is focused on reproductive freedom for just this reason (see Olsen, 1993b; 
Smith, 1993a; Baer, 1999). I will return to this discussion in a moment. 
 
Reclaiming the Body 
 
Control over one's body is an essential part of being an 
individual with needs and rights, a concept which is, in turn, the 
most powerful legacy of the liberal political tradition. 
(Petchesky, 1980, 665) 
 
The idea that one has no rights at all if one does not have self-ownership of the body is 
the primary rationale behind the notion that women should have full reproductive 
freedom, from complete freedom of sexuality to the right to deny sexual access to others, 
and from the use of contraceptives to the right to abortion (Heywood, 1982 [1893]; 
Pateman, 1988b). Yet “control over one’s body” for the sake of individual right alone is 
not the only reason liberal feminists have sought reproductive freedom for women. The 
other reason is, as I have indicated, a notion that women should be able to choose 
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whether or not to take on the responsibility/burden of being mothers. In other words, 
women need not only rights but also freedom from imposed, unwanted responsibility 
(Baer, 1999, 2002).  Since women are the ones primarily responsible for the care of 
children, women should have the right “to decide about contraception, abortion and 
childbearing” (Petchesky, 1980, 662).  
Also, even if the issue of who is most likely to care for the children is ignored, it 
can still be accurately stated that reproduction places tremendous burdens upon women. 
Pregnancy is a nine-month, usually uncomfortable, and sometimes very dangerous, 
ordeal. Childbirth can also be dangerous. Once a child is born, the mother’s only choices 
are to spend many years nurturing the child, or to give it over to someone else to raise. 
Even the latter choice may not set the mother free from grief, worry or other emotional 
and mental stress, for there is no guarantee than any given adoptive parent will turn out 
to be a good one. The only real point at which a woman may have an opportunity to 
avoid such burden is prior to childbirth, via birth control or abortion. It is argued (for 
example, Baer, 1999) that the state should have no say in the matter prior to childbirth, 
because the woman, already an individual, should have full right to decide whether to 
confer life upon a potential individual, since to do so will certainly add responsibility 
and burden to her own life (see also MacKinnon, 19939). 
 Further, because the responsibility of propagating the human race has always 
largely rested on women, and likely also because of the pleasure and instinctual 
components of the sex act, much of patriarchal right over the female has to do with 
sexual access (Pateman, 1988). The socialist theorist Engels (1884/1998) also tells us 
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that much of patriarchal control of the female has had to do with ensuring paternity. This 
is one reason why the marriage contract bound one woman to one man and gave that 
man free and unlimited sexual access to the woman and much legal control over her 
actions. Liberal feminists have complained about all of these aspects of patriarchy, 
asserting woman’s right to deny sexual access to her husband (the recognition of marital 
rape), and be recognized as an autonomous individual even when married, rather than as 
simply under the legal jurisdiction of her husband (for examples, see Brennan and 
Pateman, 1979; Pateman, 1988). 
 Pornography is also seen by some liberal feminists to be a problem, because it 
concentrates on woman’s sexuality and thereby her usefulness and sexual availability to 
man (for example, see Wolgast, 1993). In pornography, as in coerced prostitution and in 
coerced reproduction, women’s bodies are used to satisfy a need of the dominant males. 
Female bodies become objectified for their usefulness to and for the males, without 
regards to the needs, health and happiness of the females. Here, too, women are reduced 
to little more than inanimate objects. Some liberal feminists have therefore turned their 
attention to the laws that could protect women from being treated as sexual objects 
rather than as equal and autonomous human beings (see Smith, 1993b).  
 Once again, as in other areas of liberal feminist theory, the emphasis is on 
empowering women in such as way as to separate their autonomous value from their 
usefulness to males and/or to society in general. The purpose is to grant women not only 




Systemic Bias and the Relational Self 
 
Baer (1999) says that “law is male” (71).  She urges feminism to 
 
reject the conceptual traps of man-made law and to devise new 
approaches to legal reasoning which consciously employ the 
emotional, intuitive, and imaginative faculties of the mind. One 
reason this enterprise is legitimate is that conventional legal 
decision making incorporates the emotional, concrete, and 
contextual thinking it claims to reject. (79) 
 
Recognition of the autonomous self of the female requires recognition of the “moral 
identity of the concrete other” (Benhabib, 1987, 748).10 This is because within traditional 
social contract theory the female has no autonomy and no identity: she is simply what 
the man is not. Social contract theory removed “gender relations from the sphere of 
justice” (ibid, 741). The concept of privacy in social contract theory subsumed under it 
the entire domestic-familial sphere. Yet, while it is declared therein that this is a region 
of “personal decision-making” (741), female autonomy is not recognized. Instead, an 
“entire domain of human activity” (741) is excluded from political consideration. 
Women are banished to this excluded domain and defined as “what man is not.”  
 Okin (1989) weighs in on the discussion of the abstract other with her statement 
that “the best theorizing about justice” must come from a careful “consideration of 
everyone’s point of view,” and must not be based on “some abstract ‘view from 
nowhere’” (15). She further states that a “capacity for empathy,” which she equates with 
the ability “to see things from the perspective of others,” is “essential for maintaining a 
sense of justice of the Rawlsian kind” (21). However, Okin is confusing the abstract and 
concrete other concepts.  Rawls’ “abstract other” and “veil of ignorance” concepts were 
meant specifically to allow for justice even when empathy is missing from most people’s 
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perspectives. According to Rawls, laws are most just when lawmakers assume that the 
laws will apply equally to all people in all situations and further assume that they 
personally could end up in any given situation. This does not require empathy of how 
others in any given situation would feel or think, but only of how each lawmaker 
believes that he would personally feel upon finding himself in any given situation. This 
is why Rawls uses an abstract point of view and why Benhabib argues against it as a 
means of deciding what is just.  
Justice theory is built upon an idea of “moral impartiality” within the political 
realm and upon recognition of the claims of an “abstract other” who is assumed to be 
much “the same” as oneself. There can be no justice or fairness that extends to the 
female within this line of reasoning because liberal justice theory is based on masculine 
concepts that view the feminine as “other” or “different” (Benhabib, 1987). A failure by 
theory to recognize both the abstract and the concrete “other” will continue to exclude 
women so long as the “ideal of autonomy” is “conceived in the image of a disembedded 
and disembodied male ego” (Benhabib, 1987, 750). Since women cannot be accepted by 
men as being entirely “the same” as themselves, and since, as I have shown, it may not 
be just or fair in all circumstances for them to do so anyway, empowerment for women 
would require an abandonment of the “abstract other” as the sole basis for determining 
justice. Instead, justice theory must be expanded to include a concept of the “concrete 
other.” This is necessary before justice and fairness can be extended to women within 
liberal justice theory.  
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It is also within this concept of the “concrete other” that we can begin to see 
individuals in relational terms. Every individual recognizes “self” simultaneously as 
unique and has having a commonality with others. It is suggested that feminist theory 
must therefore move to a “synthesis of collective solidarities with plurally constituted 
identities” (Benhabib, 1993). For example, it must recognize that women make 
important contributions to society, whether they choose to be mothers and caregivers or 
whether they choose to reject these traditional roles (Baer, 1999). Further, it should 
recognize that some women choose to give care while others give care because they are 
coerced to do so. Women who are coerced need empowerment against coercion. This is 
empowerment of the autonomous self. Yet it is also important to recognize that someone 
must “take care of the children” (Baer, 1999, 190), and therefore ways are also needed to 
empower those who must or who choose to care for children to do so without depleting 
the quality of their own lives. This, for example, is why liberal feminism seeks “flexible, 
family-friendly” workplaces (Harlan, 1998, 79; see also Littleton, 1997). 
It is also why liberal feminism examines and seeks female empowerment within 
family and divorce law. For example, Weitzman (1988) observed that in contemporary 
divorce cases, judges tend to place the needs of the father above the needs of the mother 
and children. It is common for the father to be allowed to keep two-thirds of his income 
for himself, while his former wife and children were expected to survive on the only 
one-third. She states that “the judges we interviewed gave first priority to the husband’s 
needs” and that they viewed his money as “his rather than theirs” (322). Okin (1989) 
adds to this concern with her statement that even the “wives experiencing divorce, 
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especially if they have been housewives and mothers throughout marriage” tend to 
discount their own rights to shares of household assets, because they devalue their own 
contributions to those assets (141, emphasis mine). Further, in the cases discussed by 
Weitzman (1988), the needs of the mother were dismissed with a suggestion that it 
would be best for her to work and to become independent from her former husband. No 
consideration as to what amount of income she would be qualified to earn or how she 
might provide for the care of the child(ren) while she worked was typically given. 
Empowerment, then, would have to include some way for divorced mothers to be able to 
care properly for their children, financially and otherwise. 
Pateman (1988) also tells us that women have had to provide unpaid care to 
others and that they have also been required to care for themselves. Yet it is also 
presupposed within modern society that women are in need of protection by and are 
dependent on men. She turns to the modern welfare state to give explanatory examples 
of interdependence, suggesting that there is an interdependence between the sexes which 
is contradictory to the socially held notion that women are “dependent” and men are 
“independent.” Betty Friedan (1981) also wrote about this interdependence. She 
observed that many women had needs other than those set out earlier (1963) by herself 
and by other early liberal feminist writings. Women wanted and needed more than equal 
rights and equal opportunity. Many of them also wanted children and husbands and 
needed time to spend with both, time for quality relationships. What’s more, she tells us 
that men and women need each other. “Most men,” she writes, “sense that they are 
really dependent on women for security and love and intimacy, just as most women 
  
143 
learn… that they are dependent on men for these same qualities” (155). Friedan, 
Benhabib and others wished to forward a relational empowerment for women that 
would recognize this interdependence between men and women. 
 
“Mothering” Theory and Relational Empowerment 
What is missing from this discourse is an understanding that some give care not 
just because others are in need of care, or because the survival of the human race 
depends upon reproduction and “mothering,” or even because of any real personal 
choice or external coercion, but rather or also because failure or inability to provide that 
care causes suffering of the would-be care-giver via empathy. This is the psychological 
and emotional “connectedness” that the theorists in my next chapter try to explain, and 
either defend, promote and glorify and/or express as an inhibitor to the freedom of 
women unless and until men are adequately socialized to experience the same. To these 
theorists, empowerment of the autonomous self requires empowerment of the relational 
self, not just because society is in need of caregivers, or because men and women may 
need each other, but because many “feminine” human beings are generously endowed 
with empathy, whether for social or biological reasons, and whether they wish to be or 
not. I will address the problems inherent in the term “feminine” in my final chapter, but 
for now I turn to an analysis of Psychoanalytic/Cognitive Development Theory and the 





1. I will discuss this and other theoretical confusions in my final chapter. 
 
2. It is important to note a distinction between economic equality for all, including women, as 
is sought by socialist theorists, and equality of opportunity as it is forwarded by liberal 
theorists. Largely because liberal theory holds private property ownership rights to be 
sacred, it tends to promote capitalism, and faces off against traditional Marxism. 
 
3. It is interesting to note the implication that not all women are able to recognize their own 
needs and will. This, too, begins far back in theoretical history and continues to this day in 
the guise of “false consciousness” theory. I will discuss this briefly in Chapter VI. 
 
4. For discussion of the inseparability of positive and negative freedoms, also see MacCallum, 
1967. 
 
5. It is important to note here that liberal feminism shies away from viewing women as a group 
as “different” from the “average” individual portrayed by liberal theory (i.e, rational, self-
serving, happiness-seeking, etc.), and instead focuses on the diversity found across all 
humanity. 
 
6. I discuss the evolution of the term “irrational” as it correlates with changing notions about 
authority, property ownership and political association in my final chapter. 
 
7. I find it likely, although I have not yet seen it suggested by other theorists, that male theorists 
of the past labeled women as “sexual and passionate” only because they are the objects of 
men’s passion, and the private sphere, where they believed women belonged, as the realm of 
passion only because that is where their own passions are played out. This narcissistic 
transference of one’s own views or feelings to the “other” that is the subject of or object of 
said views or feelings is prevalent in many forms of theory. 
 
8. It is largely because of this problem that the “equality versus difference” debate became so 
intense. 
 
9. Although much of MacKinnon’s work falls under my socialist-feminism category, I remind 
the reader that boundary lines of the theoretical categories are admittedly blurry, and many 
theorists cross back and forth between them, sometimes even within a single chapter or 
article. This same chapter by MacKinnon does in fact ground most of its argument in the 
socio-political constructs of the public/private spheres, arguing that the spheres are a “social 
organization of reproduction”(391) that place women as a group as socially inferior to men 
(which places this theoretical argument in the socialist-feminism category as I mentioned). 
However, I mention her work here because her arguments about the individual pregnant 
woman’s rights closely parallel Baer’s arguments about the autonomous rights that should be 
conferred upon individual pregnant women. 
 
10. Seyla Benhabib presents epistemological theory that is neither liberal nor social, but which 
blends, criticizes and transcends both. However, in as much as her theories address both the 
rights of individuals and liberalism’s concept of the abstract other, I use her arguments here 
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to show additional ways in which feminism has addressed and criticized masculinist liberal 








THEORIZING GENDERED THOUGHT: 
 




“Care theory” supposes that there is a feminine, though not necessarily female, 
tendency to feel empathy for, and therefore want to care for, other human beings. It 
further supposes that this tendency to care has been undervalued, given that it is required 
for the survival of the human race as well as individual happiness and well-being. 
However, partly because “feminine” is often equated with “female,” and also partly 
because women have traditionally taken on the caregiver role in families, the notion that 
to care is “feminine” is often equated with a notion that all women have an innate ability 
and tendency to care for others to an extent that men do not share. From the latter notion 
emerged what eventually came to be known as “difference” feminism, a line of 
theoretical reasoning that sparked the heated “sameness versus difference” debate within 
feminist theory, as I have mentioned in previous chapters. Rhode (1994) adequately 
defines the dilemma of this debate when she says that theories that emphasize difference 
have the effect of permitting "the positive valuation of qualities associated with women," 
but risk allowing women to be labeled as deviant, thus allowing the (male dominated) 
status quo to remain intact (514). Yet minimizing difference, Rhode tells us, "fails to 
acknowledge that equal treatment" may not truly empower women "as long as women's 




In spite of this theoretical dilemma, however, this chapter will reveal 
philosophical ideas that, although having created the spark that ignited the sameness 
versus difference argument, nonetheless largely operate outside of this debate. To 
understand this, it is important to acknowledge the separation of feminists’ philosophical 
musings into the different quadrants of human experience upon which they focus. The 
heated “sameness versus difference” debate is grounded primarily within liberal political 
theory. This debate raged in part due to a belief that women, because they have been 
seen as the only or best “natural” caregivers, have been and will continue to be coerced 
into providing care for others whether they want to or not, as I discussed in Chapter IV. 
Entwined with this is an almost unspoken fear that women can not be seen as both 
different and equal, or rather that they cannot expect to be treated as equal so long as 
they are perceived as being different than men.1 Therefore, there is a fear that serious 
theoretical or research work that focuses on ways in which men and women are or might 
be different impedes the progress of women towards social and political equality. This is 
because of a corresponding notion that human beings respond to each other socially and 
politically according to views of power, said power historically having been stratified 
according to perceptions of difference.2 These “sameness versus difference” debates, 
then, focus on the collective quadrants of human experience – social “we” 
understandings and political “its” structures.  
On the other hand, the focus of both psychoanalytic and cognitive-development 
research and theory, the forerunners to care theory, is mostly on childhood, when 
powerlessness is assumed. These fields of study ask how the consciousness of human 
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beings forms and develops during childhood, from infancy through adolescence. That is, 
the debates in this chapter focus on the quadrant of human experience that deals with the 
inner psychological workings of the individual, especially during the powerless, 
formative years of the individual’s life. Therefore, theorists and researchers who ask the 
adult-world political question of whether or not perceptions of gender difference lead to 
power-abuse must look to a different quadrant of human experience than do 
psychoanalytical and cognitive development feminist theorists and researchers. All of 
these matters are related and intertwined, but the feminists in question actually perform 
research within and theorize about different quadrants of human experience.  
This is not to say that psychoanalytic and cognitive development feminists did 
not recognize the influence that one quadrant of experience may have on the other. 
Mitchell (1974) tells us that “if patriarchal thought is dominant (in society) then 
(individual) femininity will reflect that system” (128). Also, Gilligan (1993) conceded 
that in some ways “psychological theory becomes prescriptive” (xv, emphasis mine). 
Gilligan, however, also makes it clear that her writings are based on observation and 
therefore should not be ignored. Freud, too, based his theories on observation, as 
Mitchell (1974) discusses at length.3 I will discuss Gilligan’s work and Mitchell’s 
interpretation of Freud’s work as this chapter proceeds. For now, the important point is 
that open-minded analysis of any psychological theory or cognitive development 
research requires recognition that the theory is based on and developed from researchers’ 
observations of individuals’ behavior. This is a point that feminists within these fields 
repeatedly make in defense of their research and/or theories (for examples, see Mitchell, 
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1974; Chodorow, 1978; Gilligan, 1982, 1993). Of course, this does not mean that these 
theories are therefore correct. Yet, if fears of the possible misuse of research findings 
and theory are allowed to curtail theory and research within the psychoanalytic and 
cognitive development fields, these theorists and researchers can not hope to find 
possible answers to the problems they believe individual women psychologically face 
due to patriarchy. This is not to say that such fears have had no effect on the feminists 
engaging in this work. Mitchell, as I will show, was particularly worried about societal 
use of deterministically suggestive theories. Nonetheless, researchers, clinicians and 
theorists maintain that observations do suggest that, for whatever reasons, perception of 
gender difference, as well as actual gender differences in thought processes and 
behavior, manifest early in childhood and ultimately affect how growing children, 
adolescents and, finally, adults view themselves and others. 
The beginning theoretical question in this category of feminist writings, then, 
was not whether or not perception of gender difference is good. The primary question 
instead was whether or not gender differences and/or perceptions of gender difference 
exist prior to adult notions of whether or not they should. Having established to their 
own seeming satisfaction that at least early childhood gender difference perception does 
exist, theorists then asked in what ways it manifests itself, what effects it has on the 
individual human psyche, and, finally, what if anything can or should be done to change 
this situation. The feminists within the psychoanalytic and cognitive development fields, 
then, largely did not quarrel with the idea of gender difference per se or the research 
there about. They did, however, argue with their male colleagues’ interpretation of the 
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degree of actual difference and especially how any difference should be interpreted. 
They also argued with each other about the effects that difference perception has on the 
psyche and about whether and in what ways the causes of difference perception should 
be changed.  
 
Reinventing Freud 
 Freud believed that girls between the ages of three and five develop “penis 
envy.” According to Freud’s theory, all small children in this age category begin to 
desire to have sexual relationships with their mothers, and they all begin to feel envy of 
their fathers, who have such desired sexual relationships. However, said Freud, gender 
difference in the children will cause the object of this envy to vary. That is, while a little 
boy will envy his father’s family position and power, a little girl will envy the father’s 
penis, simply because she does not have one and therefore cannot engage in sex with the 
mother in the same way that he can. Although largely dismissed today as both 
assumptive and wrongheaded, given the extent to which most modern children are 
ignorant of their parents’ actual sexual activities, Freud’s “penis envy” theory was 
nonetheless in fashion for a number of decades before it fell out of favor.  
It should come as no surprise, though, that female psychoanalysts fairly promptly 
attacked Freud’s theories as patriarchal and misogynistic. Karen Horney (1924), for 
example, complained that the notion that girls had reason to envy the anatomy of boys 
while boys did not suffer a similar problem assumed inadequacy of the female body. Of 
course, as was pointed out by Juliet Mitchell some decades later, Horney’s argument 
  
151 
ignored Freud’s belief that it is the mother that children of both sexes desire to have a 
sexual relationship with, and therefore must be the father’s sexual ability that they envy. 
Instead, Horney primarily focused on the idea of power, writing that if a little girl 
wanted a penis, it was likely only because she thought the male way of urinating was 
powerful and because a male could both see and hold his own genitalia while she could 
not (Horney, 1924; see also Mitchell, 1974).  
Horney’s arguments, then, largely changed the argument from one of female 
sexual envy to one of female power envy. Mitchell makes extensive use of this particular 
idea, as I will demonstrate. However, Mitchell objects to the fact that Horney then went 
on to theorize that boys likewise envied the female ability to bear children, a notion that 
“was to become the main thrust of her further work” (Mitchell, 1974, 128). This notion 
equalizes the problem of envy, in that it suggests that both girls and boys envy what they 
see as some form of power held exclusively by the other sex. However, Mitchell is 
starkly critical of Horney’s belief that females have “an innate biological disposition to 
femininity” (131), even though, and perhaps partly because, this belief contradicts 
Freud’s notion that both sexes experience sexual desire of their mothers early in life. 
Mitchell’s expressed concern is that Horney’s theory amounts to biological determinism, 
which she fears creates an impassable block for female empowerment. Her implied 
concern is that Horney’s theories also discount much of Freud’s presented “evidence” in 
the form of notes on his female patients. Both of these worries – how to avoid biological 
deterministic ideas and how to preserve the integrity of one’s own theoretical 
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perspectives – are seen constantly at work within psychoanalytic and cognitive 
development theory as well as within the various debates that surround them. 
Also, of course, this debate over the Freudian notion of envy was only one of a 
number of male-originated psychoanalytic theoretical concepts that would be challenged 
by feminist psychoanalytic theory and research. Further, as second-wave feminism 
emerged, challenges came not only from within Freud’s own field of psychoanalytic 
theory, but also from within the closely related field of childhood cognitive development 
research. As Mitchell (1974) points out, the work of psychoanalysts, beginning with 
Freud, attempted to reconstruct theoretically unconscious childhood thought by 
analyzing adult psychosis. Cognitive development research, on the other hand, attempts 
to verify or discount psychoanalytic theories about childhood cognition through research 
on children. Feminists in the latter field used various research methods and theories to 
illuminate other male-biased assumptions pervasive throughout child development 
studies, as this chapter will demonstrate. 
Of course, simply to demonstrate the inaccuracy of any given male-originated 
theory was never an end in and of itself. The purpose was the empowerment of women. 
Freud's theories, partly because they were based on research, were particularly damaging 
to women. His notion that girls were somehow "deficient," that they were physically and 
therefore emotionally and rationally inferior to boys, gave justification to patriarchal 
systems that oppressed women. The primary recurring theme among feminists who 
accept the notion of gender difference but criticize prior interpretation of it is that 
females, although different than males, are not therefore somehow deficient and inferior 
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to males. In other words, new theoretical interpretation of research findings was needed 
as a foundation to other avenues of empowerment for women.  
Mitchell (1974), as I mentioned, sought a way to empower women within society 
without having to discredit decades of psychoanalytic research and theory in order to do 
so. This goal was the driving force behind her insistence that miscalculations within the 
psychoanalytic field occurred primarily because of patriarchal society’s influence on the 
studies rather than because of any real failing of Freud’s research or of the 
psychoanalytic field itself. This is an important point, because it seems that the 
theoretical leaps she takes to empower women are closely flanked by the theoretical 
leaps she takes to defend psychoanalysis. For women, she sparks a new line of feminist 
thought. For psychoanalysis, though, she offers up a very mangled Freud. The result of 
this finagling is that psychoanalytic theorizing by feminists veers away from the 
Freudian notion of biological influence on the psyche and focuses instead on social 
influence on the psyche (for examples, see Sayers, 1986; Wilkinson, 1985). Mitchell’s 
motives in creating this shift are plain: she fears, as have other feminists, that admission 
of a biological influence on the female psyche must then be deterministic of her fate 
under patriarchy. This notion of biological determinism is what first causes feminists to 
attack Freud and, later, each other. Mitchell could only preserve both Freudian 
psychoanalysis and the feminist denunciation of biological determinism by creating a 
perception of Freudian theories that had nothing to do with biology. Understanding how 
she accomplishes this conceptual transformation requires discussion of her critiques of 
other feminists’ writings. 
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Mitchell (1974) wrote what she referred to as a “reference source” (xxiii) of 
psychoanalytic literature. Of course, it is full of her own interpretations and biases, but 
she does offer a good deal of information from within the field in this one book. 
Interestingly, however, she both defends Freud’s notions of biological influence on the 
unconscious mind and concludes that biology has little influence on the unconscious 
when compared to the influence of culture. She also both criticizes other feminists’ 
works for missing “the whole point” (8) of Freud’s work and fails to defend adequately 
his work against their protests. It is important to realize, though, that Mitchell was 
writing in the early stages of the second wave of feminist theory, and her work 
illuminated key aspects of the debate that seem to have been later forgotten, as I will 
show.  
 Mitchell’s first critique of other feminists is that they seem to take Freud’s 
suggestion of penis envy “outside of the context of the mechanisms of unconscious 
mental life” (8). “Desire, phantasy, the unconscious or even unconsciousness,” Mitchell 
declares, “are absent from the social realism of … feminist critiques” (9).  However, 
what Mitchell then proceeds to do is take penis envy out of the context of biology, which 
contradicts Freud’s idea about the influence of biological urges on the unconscious 
mind. Her conclusions, very much like Horney’s conclusions after all, are simply that 
little girls envy the penis because the penis represents power: hence, no power, no envy. 
She manages to sidestep Freud’s biological arguments by stating that although he 
“longed for a satisfactory biological base on which to rest his psychological theories,” 
such base was never proven and soon “forgotten” (407). This is interesting, given 
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Mitchell’s further suggestion that it is folly to worry about proof of Freud’s theories 
because they are grounded in the “unconscious” and thereby unknowable to the 
conscious mind.  
 As I mentioned earlier, Mitchell’s philosophical engagements with specific 
feminists’ theories are likewise unsatisfactory. She attacks de Beauvoir’s interpretation 
of Freud by focusing on her assertion that Freud’s philosophies are deterministic. Her 
method of attack, though, is to expose the fallacies in de Beauvoir’s work that have little 
to do with what might be deterministic about Freud’s biological theories. Mitchell 
criticizes de Beauvoir for seeing Freud’s developmental stages as distinct steps, while in 
Freud’s work the stages were described as having a “constant overlap and commingling” 
(Mitchell, 1974, 312). She further criticizes de Beauvoir for ignoring “the permeation 
throughout Freud’s work of… the presence in both sexes of the inclinations of the 
opposite sex” (312). Next, she berates de Beauvoir for conflating Freud’s theories with 
those of other theorists who were considered to be “Freudian.” But the sticking point for 
Mitchell, who admits to agreeing with much of what de Beauvoir has to say, is her 
“implicit denial of the unconscious” (318). Here we see Mitchell again defending her 
field of psychoanalysis but failing to demonstrate that de Beauvoir’s arguments are 
otherwise incorrect or damaging to women.  
What de Beauvoir saw as deterministic about Freud’s writing had less to do with 
any of Mitchell’s complaints and more to do with Freud’s notion that both boys and girls 
desired at some point to sexually possess, that is to penetrate, their mothers. To escape 
the frustration caused by the denial of this desire, the boy had only to grow up, thereby 
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gaining power to penetrate some other woman in place of his mother. A little girl, on the 
other hand, had to accept her “castrated” fate: she would never penetrate anyone, so 
must both accept her biological limitation and find some other means of satisfaction. If 
one accepts Freud’s view that what a little girl truly desires is the sexual ability to 
penetrate a female body, then one must also accept that her fate of disappointment and 
realization of her own physical inadequacy is determined. This is the point that Mitchell 
sidesteps. We see this sidestepping repeat itself as Mitchell takes on the work of other 
feminists. Rather than addressing Betty Friedan’s anger at the Freudian notion of “penis-
envy” head-on, Mitchell attacks her attempt to use Freud’s personal life to illuminate the 
possible origins and implied meanings of his theory. She launches similar attacks on the 
theoretical soundness of works by Eva Figes, Germaine Greer and Shulamith Firestone. 
While the weakness in their theories is real, pointing these weaknesses out, alone, does 
nothing to address the focus of their real objection to Freud’s theory, which was his 
assumption that the unconscious mind of a little girl is envious of a particular sexual 
functioning that only males have.  
 Mitchell did, however, have some profound insights to offer that thereafter 
mostly disappeared from feminist thought, at least for a time. For one, although she 
missed the significance of Freud’s assertions about the influence of biology on the 
psyche, she nonetheless recognized a split between biologically grounded arguments and 
psychically grounded theories that sometimes caused the debates across these fields to 
reach an “impasse” (130). Certainly, it is a valid notion that theorists who ground their 
ideas within different quadrants of human experience4 then tend to talk past each other. 
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Unfortunately, however, Mitchell accepts Freud’s own insistence that his theories of 
gender difference in the unconscious mind had nothing to do with biological difference. 
Freud’s stance on this seemed to be due to his failure to realize his own bias to 
masculinity as the natural beginnings of human sexuality, a point that Mitchell misses. 
Therefore, a closer examination of Mitchell’s theoretical confusion on this point is 
needed.  
Mitchell (1974) tells us that in Horney’s version of the story of the sexes, man 
and woman “are created in nature,” while in Freud’s version they are made in culture 
(131). What Mitchell ignores is that in Freud’s version of reality, both sexes begin as 
virtually male. To Freud, sexual desire is born of an infantile wish to possess the 
mother’s body, which provides sustenance. Sexual desire is biological, and in this case is 
decidedly masculine since it involves Oedipal desire to possess, even penetrate the 
mother, even if happens to manifest the same in both sexes. Further, according to Freud, 
it is the female frustration at her own physical inadequacies, relevant to her Oedipal 
desire of her mother, that then drives her to penis envy. This, in spite of both Freud’s and 
Mitchell’s objections, is a biological argument for sexual difference. The arguments 
between Freud and Horney were not, then, cleanly divided by quadrants of human 
experience as Mitchell suggests. This fact, however, does not invalidate Mitchell’s 
observation of theoretical impasse as it applies to quadrant-specific theories. 
Another important insight put forward by Mitchell is that, in Freud’s analysis, it 
is the father who has power, power that is desired by both sexes but can only be acquired 
by males, and only truly acquired by murder of the father. This is the completion of the 
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Oedipal myth, and thereby becomes the basis for the “exchange of women” (409), 
because it is only by the “giving” of women to or acquiring women for his sons that a 
father can avoid murder at the hands of his envious sons. Within patriarchy, it is also by 
the “acquiring” of a woman that a man’s power-position in society, as head-of-
household, is solidified. Yet this insight, too, is lost in subsequent psychoanalytical 
works, and only scantily paralleled within feminist’s writings in liberal theory, as I have 
shown.  
The portion of Mitchell’s reasoning, then, that is taken up by other feminists in 
the psychoanalytical field can be mapped as follows: Freud was right that the 
unconscious guides human behavior. Freud was further right that little girls 
unconsciously envy males. Freud was wrong that little girls envy males for any 
biological reason, such as that males have penises while girls do not, but yet right about 
what the penis supposedly represents in the infantile mind: power to “possess” the 
mother. The envy that girls experience, then, is strictly of male power. This envy causes 
all sorts of emotional difficulty for both men and women in the real world. The whole 
problem can be solved, and thus women can be empowered, by doing away with male 
patriarchal power. This line of reasoning opened a theoretical door for other feminists 
within the psychoanalytic field. Nancy Chodorow, for example, discusses cross-
generational “reproduction” of traditions that, while practiced by women, help to 





Chodorow’s Mothering Theory 
 Chodorow (1978) analyzes “the way women’s mothering is reproduced across 
generations” (3). She argues that the maternal role that women play affects not only the 
lives of individual women, but actually reproduces sexual inequalities across 
generations. Chodorow challenges claims that it is biologically “natural” for women to 
“mother.” For example, she argues that women cannot be said to be more biologically 
prone to “mother” merely because they bear children and lactate. She further argues that 
there is a need for extensive studies of the effects of oxytocin on humans - both males 
and females – and suggests that findings from studies of monkeys cannot be extrapolated 
to humans. She also criticizes behavioral studies that had thus far been conducted on 
mother-child relationships as too limited. She likewise cites chromosomal research and 
declares that it, too, is limited and uncertain. While Chodorow is correct in all of these 
ascertains, she then goes on to make a very common mistake. She puts her own field of 
psychoanalytic research on a pedestal, sure that it alone can correctly answer the posed 
question of why women mother.  
Further, having excluded all biological arguments from her list of acceptable 
ideas, Chodorow turns solely to social influences on the human psyche to explain the 
mothering phenomenon. Chodorow does this, apparently, because she, like others 
previously mentioned, believes that biological arguments are deterministic and therefore 
effectively block most, if not all, avenues for the empowerment of women. Interestingly, 
however, she denounces all prior psychoanalytic work as continuing to emphasize 
biological arguments in spite of the fact that she gives brief analysis of Mitchell’s work, 
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discussed above. She gives Mitchell’s work no credit for its admonition that 
psychoanalysis should turn its quest for answers to the “woman question” to social 
influences, and proceeds to declare that her own theories give new direction to 
psychoanalysis. While her “reproduction” of mothering theory is new, the turn of 
psychoanalytic studies to sociological influences had already begun, as I have shown 
above. 
Having then turned her critical eye on her own psychoanalytic field, Chodorow 
(1978) next discusses Freud. She accepts part of Freud’s analyses as correct, pointing to 
his clinical observations. However, she also starkly criticizes him for making 
“unsupported assertions” and for being misogynistic (142). Chodorow saw Freud’s 
theories of Oedipal sexual conflict in children as being born of biology and having a 
single purpose: to ensure that females, who would otherwise naturally prefer to be 
masculine, accept their fate as physical receptacles for the reproduction of mankind. She 
asserts that her own findings accept Freud’s “methodologically consistent clinical 
findings” concerning the object-relational experience of infant Oedipal complex “but not 
its assumptions about sex, gender, and innate determining drives” (159). Further, she 
tells us that although others have disputed Freud’s “unwarranted assumptions,” his 
theories have “never been systematically refuted within the psychoanalytic tradition in a 
manner that presents a coherent alternative theory” (154). It is her intent, of course, to 
create said “coherent alternative theory.” 
Chodorow accepts Freud’s idea of penis envy, but says that males are just as 
prone to a similar type of envy – envy of their fathers – and that all this envy has more to 
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do with envy of “social privileges” (165) than with anything biological. Like Mitchell, 
Chodorow is adamant that causes other than physical biology must be at fault. She 
further is uncomfortable with placing any blame on actual sexual desires originating 
with the infant, and presents ideas from other theorists that suggest the desires could just 
as easily originate with the parents, with the infant merely responding to perceived 
parental fantasies. Finally, she is sure that the imbalance of expressed anxiety between 
the sexes is most likely because of the limited role that fathers traditionally play in 
childrearing. Herein we find the backbone of her theory. 
 Chodorow’s 1978 theory is rooted in the portions of Freudian theory that she 
believes will not doom women to perpetual second-class citizenship and the role 
differentiation that she sees around her. She describes a situation much like the one 
described by other feminists of her time: the mother who works part or full time to 
supplement the family income, but who must come home to childcare obligations that 
are almost strictly her own. She tells us that this division of labor is perpetuated by a 
particular kind of mother-child relationship which almost excludes the father and which 
creates resentment on the part of the mother and of the child. Given that her description 
of the family is one that is also predominantly a two-parent – male and female – family 
with multiple children, it makes sense that her prescription for empowerment is as 
simple as the idea that men should share equally in childcare. 
 The unfair division of labor in society, Chodorow (1978) tells us, is not 
determined by biology, neither is it solely rooted in society. It is rooted deep in the 
psyche of each individual man and women by ideas that are planted there prior to age 
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five. Far from suggesting that it is then something which cannot be changed, she 
suggests that simply understanding this fact affords two very real steps which can be 
taken to empower women. First, both women and men must realize the psychological 
roots of the problem so that they understand that change begins with and within each 
individual. This gives the individual man or woman both the responsibility and the 
power to make change happen. Second, men and women who are parents should 
consciously change the way that they parent, in order to assure that men and women 
spend equal time with and have equal attachment to their children. These steps, 
Chodorow believes, will begin widespread change that will eventually undo patriarchy 
and replace it with a much more sexually-egalitarian society. 
There are, of course, flaws in Chodorow’s reasoning. Writing in 1978, she could 
not see the problems that changes in the family structure would pose for the possibility 
of wide-spread implementation of her recommendations. As the divorce rate and the 
number of unconventional partnerships have risen, the idea that fathers’ “must” 
participate equally in order to break the chains of patriarchy has turned out to be as 
pessimistic as any so-called biological deterministic theories. That is, this notion leaves 
no room for the claim that single mothers and lesbian couples can parent as successfully 
as traditional heterosexual couples. Further, in her attempts both to present theoretical 
ideas for the empowerment of women and protect her psychoanalytic field, Chodorow, 
like Mitchell before her, manages to miss some of the most fundamental problems with 
Freud’s theories. She, like Mitchell, accepts his theories as fully “clinically tested” 
without considering the most fundamental flaws of those “tests.” For example, Freud 
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assumed that the “memories” his patients talked about were not real simply because he 
did not think that so many women could have really experienced such trauma. This 
belief on his part led to his “discovery” that the women were really remembering 
childhood fantasies (see discussion by Horney, 1924 and by Mitchell, 1974). Further, 
and as Mitchell also pointed out, Freud’s patients, if they were only remembering 
childhood fantasies, were remembering those fantasies within the framework of an adult 
mind. Freud reconstructed his patients’ unconscious experiences from their remembered 
fantasies. However, he did not consider the possibility that those “memories” could be 
distorted within the adult mind, and perhaps overlain with adult sexual yearnings. 
While Mitchell discusses and then dismisses various possible problems with 
Freud’s reconstruction techniques because she thinks such arguments undermine the 
integrity of psychoanalyses as a field (see Mitchell, 1974), Chodorow, in 1978, does not 
even bring up these problems with the Freudian technique. This is somewhat surprising, 
given that she so thoroughly analyzes, and finds fault with, other aspects of his work. 
Like Mitchell, Chodorow’s 1978 work seemed to straddle two goals: carefully defending 
the psychoanalytic field of research and theory and finding some way within that field to 
promote ideas that might help to empower women. 
 Overall, the problems that Chodorow’s theories address are two-fold. First, 
women are seen by Freud’s version of psychoanalysis as inferior to men. This is evident 
in his ideas that men have a physical characteristic that women lack and want, and in his 
corresponding belief that this unfulfilled desire leads to emotional and psychological 
instability. Second, women are seen by Freudians to be “natural” mothers, while men are 
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not. This dooms women, collectively, to the mothering role, whether they want it or not. 
Given these two problems, Chodorow’s method of empowerment is simple to 
understand. Like Mitchell, she attempts to defend at least part of what Freud had to say, 
along with his clinical studies, while criticizing the areas of his theory that doom women 
to a biologically determined fate. Chodorow argues that Freud was right about female 
infantile envy and the roots of studied psychosis; however, he was wrong about the 
source of all of this grief. The problem, Chodorow argues, is not biological. The 
problem is social, and affects infants strictly because they are mothered by women. 
Because social norms can be changed, Chodorow insists that her theory alone is 
empowering, since it suggests a way out of Freud’s envy-complex dilemma. 
By 1989 Chodorow had come to reevaluate some of her earlier ideas. She says 
she would no longer “give determinist primacy to social relations” as generating 
“psychological patterns and processes” (7). She further states that individuals “can help 
to create for themselves a more meaningful life” (9, emphasis mine). Further, she now 
believes that “an open web of social, psychological, and cultural relations, dynamics, 
practices, identities, beliefs” all come together to create and sustain gender “as a social, 
cultural, and psychological phenomenon” (7). Nonetheless, while Chodorow (1989) 
argues that feminisms that focus on “male dominance in the community, the economy, 
and the state” are “extremely important,” she continues to place the emphasis of her own 
work on the psychological aspect of gender relations. For example, she tells us that, in 
contrast to Freud’s belief that sex difference does not matter until about age four, it may 
psychologically affect girls as young as age one. She further states that gender is “part of 
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what is often on people’s minds” even though it is “differentially salient at different 
times and places” (196). Finally, she argues that, while our life situations are not always 
determined by “gendered and sexualized psychological experiences,” these nonetheless 
“are situated in, as they help to create, life in general” (198). 
 
Feminist Cognitive Development Theory and Research 
 Gilligan, too, discusses the theories of Freud. She explains that Freud “built his 
theory of psychosexual development around the experiences of the male child” (6). 
Then, Freud attempted to find a way to reconcile this theory with “the different 
configuration of a young girl’s early family relationships” (6). Unable to explain 
adequately the reasons for the apparent difference in young girls’ development, Freud 
simply concluded that it was due to a failure or inadequacy on the part of the females. 
“Thus,” Gilligan tells us, “a problem in theory became cast as a problem in women’s 
development” (7).  
This idea was not unique to Gilligan. Miller (1976), a social psychologist, and 
Smith (1987), studying situational sociology, both propose ideas about women’s ways of 
knowing and understanding their lives. These theorists wrote that although policies and 
research affected women as well as men, studies focused first and primarily on men and 
boys, taking their lives to represent the whole of the norm while excluding women and 
girls. Similarly, Gilligan explains that although some studies had seemed to demonstrate 
that little girls were less intellectually developed than little boys, in reality the thought 
processes of girls were simply misunderstood because the male framework of evaluation 
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was imposed upon them. She partially concluded that the observed males had simply 
been inclined to focus more on justice, while the observed females had primarily focused 
more on “care.” Gilligan incorporates much of Chodorow’s theory into her own. She 
refers to Chodorow’s assertion that the differences between the sexes are not due to 
anatomy but rather to the fact that women take care of young children. She discusses 
Chodorow’s ideas about the personality development of these young children as it is 
affected by mothering. Gilligan then tells us that these differences, caused perhaps by the 
fact that women mother as Chodorow says, can be seen in the behavior of young 
children as they play. With this idea in mind, Gilligan then turns similar criticism upon 
the conclusions of cognitive development theorists who had researched children’s 
behavior during games.  
Not unlike Freud, early cognitive development theorists based their ideas first on 
the behavioral development of boys, creating developmental models from observed male 
behavioral. Seeing that the behavior of girls did not fit into these models, theorists 
concluded that girls had deficient development. We see this problem repeatedly. In 1932, 
Piaget concludes that girls do not develop moral judgment as completely as boys 
because they do not place as high of an importance on following game rules as do the 
boys. Writing in 1950 and 1968, Erikson, also observing boys, defines what he deems to 
be an essential step toward adulthood and moral maturity as developing a “sense of 
separateness and agency” (Gilligan, 1982, 12). For Erikson, when adolescent girls focus 
more on attracting a male mate than on their own individuation, their moral development 
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becomes impaired. Again, a model based on males, once females are shown to not fit 
into it, is used as a basis to conclude that females’ development is deficient. 
Gilligan also offers in-depth criticism of the conclusions of Jean Piaget and 
Lawrence Kohlberg, who believed that girls did not learn moral lessons as well as boys. 
Because boys, for example, would stick to the rules of a game and girls often would not, 
Piaget and Kohlberg assumed that the girls simply could not comprehend the moral 
importance of the rules. Gilligan, using Chodorow’s ideas as a foundation, offered a 
different perspective. Gilligan suggests that the girls, having learned the importance of 
preserving relationship from their relationships with their mothers, were simply more 
concerned with preserving relationship than with following rules. As Gilligan further 
explains, Kolberg’s 
six stages that describe the development of moral judgment from 
childhood to adulthood are based empirically on a study of 
eighty-four boys whose development Kohlberg has followed for 
a period of over twenty years. Although Kohlberg claims 
universality for his stage sequence, those groups not included in 
his original sample rarely reach his higher stages [references 
listed in Gilligan’s text]. Prominent among those who thus 
appear to be deficient in moral development when measured on 
Kohlberg’s scale are women…” (Gilligan, 1982, 18, emphasis 
mine) 
 
What these male theorists miss, Gilligan asserts, is that, while adult women’s moral 
judgments may be different from men’s, the nature of women’s developed moral 
judgment provides “an alternative conception of maturity by which these differences can 
be assessed and their implications traced” (22). In fact, Gilligan tells us, “women bring 
to the life cycle a different point of view and order human experience in terms of 
different priorities” (22). 
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 It is upon these ideas that Gilligan bases her work. She is very careful to state 
that she is not making assertions about how girls may come to develop this different 
sense of morality, except to give nod to Chodorow’s belief that it has much more to do 
with the mother-child relationship than with any biological difference between the sexes. 
Her primary concern is to show that girls do in fact develop through a full range of 
moral-judgment stages, just as boys do, but girls’ development follows a different path. 
It is not, then, that the girls’ development is deficient or stunted. Girls don’t develop less 
moral understanding, Gilligan suggests, rather they develop it differently. 
 At this point in Gilligan’s work, we see an empowerment goal that has to do with 
how women and girls are viewed culturally, and with how they view themselves. Her 
1982 book is based on a reexamination and reconceptualization of the findings of three 
studies in which male and female moral development were measured according to 
Kohlberg’s six-stage scale. She points to repetitive trends in the research. The 
interviewed males, when evaluating moral action, tend to place emphasis first on care of 
the self and only limited, secondary emphasis on concerns for others. The interviewed 
females, on the other hand, were more likely to consider the well-being of others first 
and themselves secondarily. This different development, suggests Gilligan, is perhaps 
caused by a girl’s identification with her mother’s role as caregiver and nurturer for the 
family. Further, the maturing boys in the studies cited by Gilligan first embraced a 
strong sense of self and of what was fair to that self. Only with greater maturity did they 
begin to embrace an idea of social responsibility. In other words, as the boys in the 
studies matured from childhood, across puberty and then into adulthood, they progressed 
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from childhood attachment to pubescent separate individuation to adult individuation 
that embraced some amount of a sense of responsibility and care for others. The girls, on 
the other hand, began with the same childhood attachment which evolved to a sense of 
responsibility towards and desire to care for others to an adult sense of responsibility 
centered in connectedness and relationship but which also embraced some sense of 
individuation and need for care of the self. 
Gilligan asserts that Kohlberg’s misguided judgment that women are deficient in 
moral development has a detrimental effect on individual women, causing them to be 
reluctant to speak their thoughts, to second-guess themselves and their judgment 
abilities. Expounding upon this idea almost two decades later, Gilligan (2002) explains 
that human happiness and pleasure requires relationships, and relationships require that 
each human involved in any given relationship be able to have a “voice.” That is, each 
must be able to express her or his self so that the true self is engaged in the relationship, 
rather than an engagement in the relationship of a false-self, the presentation of which is 
based on what the other might expect or require. Part of what is often overlooked in 
Gilligan’s 1982 research is her observation of adolescent women in the process of losing 
their “voice” due to external pressure to think that their own way of viewing life and 
morality is not “correct.” To give women back the ability to speak confidently their 
thoughts is a form of empowerment of the autonomous self, but it is also a form of 
empowerment of the relational self because it allows them to engage the authentic self in 




Feminine Ethics and “Care Theory” 
Drawing on Gilligan’s theories and observations, both Ruddick (1989/1995) and 
Noddings (1984) further suggest that the mental processes that are used to produce 
decisions about what is “good” and “right” within an ethic of caring are distinctly 
“maternal” or “feminine” (see also Brownmiller, 1984). These processes are not inferior 
to masculine morality-based notions about justice and fairness, they are simply different.  
Ruddick attempts to explain the difference between what she calls “maternal thinking” 
and the traditional masculine approach to ethics, which she says represent the “dominant 
values” of society (237). The point is not, she tells us, “to respect law and order for 
themselves, but for their contribution to the maintenance of caring” (201). It is important 
to ask, Ruddick tells us, “whose interests” these values serve and also to ask how these 
values affect children (237) and other people that women tend to “care for” (238). 
Noddings (1984) adds that “[o]bedience to law is simply not a reliable guide to moral 
behavior” (201). Held (1993) later adds to this discussion when she writes that caring 
and empathy "may be better guides to what morality requires... than may abstract rules 
of reason or rational calculation" (52). Noddings further contends that it is essential that 
an ethic of “care” be valued by society, and that those who care for others, be they male 
or female, should be encouraged and helped in their efforts to do so. 
It is within this idea of an essential “care ethic” that we see a demand for 
relational empowerment. Feminist discussion about “mothering” and “care” forwards a 
notion that women need an empowerment that is other than an empowerment of the 
autonomous self. It is suggested, both directly and indirectly, that in order for a mother, 
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or anyone who is what Noddings (1984) calls “the one-caring,” to be able truly to 
partake of the proverbial “good life,” she or he must not only be autonomously 
empowered, but must also be empowered in the ability to care for “the other” (see also 
Reddy et al, 1995). Tronto (1993) greatly extends the scope of the “care ethic” by 
asserting that a political concept of care must include "everything we do to maintain, 
continue, and repair" (103) the world we live in, although she, too, gives strong 
emphasis to ideas about how parents can best be empowered in their abilities to care for 
their children. 
Once criticism of this “feminine ethics” theory is that it paints too rosy a picture 
of the human race, seeming to assume that most humans desire to care for others and 
will be happy if empowered to do so (see, for example, Card, 1991). It is further 
suggested that this perspective does not see women as universally oppressed (James, 
1995). However, we see repeated in this literature a notion that patriarchy is, in fact, 
oppressive to women. At issue is not over whether there is oppression, but whom or 
what is to blame. Gilligan (2002), for example, suggests that men are as oppressed and 
damaged by patriarchal social and political systems as women. Another part of the 
argument concerns changes that must be made before oppression can end. Conceptual 
confusion arises because theories about “mothering” forward a notion that an ethic of 
care is essential to human survival. This causes a dispute about whether women are 
oppressed because they are traditionally coerced into mothering by patriarchal society, 
or are oppressed because men do not equally share in this “duty,” or are oppressed 
indirectly because of the fact that “mothering” itself is under-valued. If the latter, as 
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“care theorists” tend to argue, this undervaluation causes two primary problems. First, 
those who “mother” and/or are caregivers to others, whether they be male or female, are 
treated with less respect, less social status and less monetary rewards than they deserve, 
given that they ensure the survival of the human race. Second, mothering and care-
giving are under-supported in various ways. Lack of support, whether monetarily or 
otherwise, causes care-giving to be much more difficult than necessary. From this 
perspective, the surest route to the empowerment of women as a group is to cure both of 
these ills. Further, such cure would also serve to improve the entire human condition. 
Another criticism leveled at feminine ethics theory has to do with “essentialist” 
concepts that quickly became entangled with “care ethics.” For example, Greeno and 
Maccoby (1986), while disagreeing with Gilligan (1982) on a number of points, 
nonetheless argue that studies indicate that women are more “empathetic,” and thus 
more prone to be caregivers than men. Against this and similar ideas Alcoff (1988) 
argued that a universal concept of woman is essentialist and exclusive (see also Fraser & 
Nicholson 1990). Alcoff also questioned the normative significance of maintaining a 
concept of gender that is rooted in male/female differences as opposed to understanding 
gender as a concept that is constantly changing. Not all “care theorists,” however, made 
truly gender-specific claims. Noddings (1984), for example, explains that she labels the 
‘ethic of caring’ as a “feminine” ethic, not because only women ‘care,’ but because 
caring has been, throughout many ages, recognized as a feminine attribute of humans in 
general. However, because Noddings uses terms like masculine and feminine, much of 
what she wrote on this topic has been misinterpreted and mislabeled as sexual 
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“difference” theory, even though she expressed plainly that she believed these attributes 
had little, if anything, to do with one’s being male or female.  
The problem, of course, is that it is difficult to distinguish between “masculine 
versus feminine” attributes as they have been traditionally understood and “male versus 
female” attributes. This conceptual confusion is rampant partly because it is assumed 
that Gilligan believed that the findings of her gender studies had universal applicability 
(see for example Shogan, 1988), although Gilligan did not actually make this assumption 
(see Gilligan, 1982/1993). This confusion is also furthered by feminists’ attempts to 
explain why women are oppressed by men under patriarchy. For example, Calhoun 
(1988) says that moral priorities in traditional liberal thought exclude women’s lived 
experiences. By this, Calhoun in part means women’s experiences as “feminine” care 
givers of children, of the ill, or of the elderly (see also Hirschmann, 1992). However, it is 
suggested that the promotion of care-giving as a valuable feminine attribute contributes 
to women’s oppression under patriarchy (Wilson, 1988). This is partly because, as 
Shanley and Pateman (1991) argue, concepts of the “political” in traditional western 
political thought are constructed in such a way as to exclude women, the female body 
and femininity (see also Calhoun, 1988; Jaggar, 1992).  
In other words, these theorists claim that care-giving is traditionally considered 
to be “feminine” (Chodorow, 1978; Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984; Calhoun, 1988; 
Ruddick, 1989). Both care-giving and femininity are traditionally undervalued 
(Noddings, 1984; Ruddick, 1989; Hirschmann, 1992), given care-giving’s importance to 
human survival and given that “feminine” is descriptive of half of the human race. In 
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comparison, “masculine” traits such autonomy, separation, obedience to cultural rules 
and laws, and competition are overvalued (Jaggar, 1992).  This failure to value that 
which is “feminine” contributes to women’s oppression (Calhoun, 1988; Shanley and 
Pateman, 1991; Hirschmann, 1992). This makes the under valuation of care-giving and 
the oppression of women difficult to conceptualize separately, even though some 
attempts were made to do so (for example see Tronto, 1987). This difficulty is such that 
some theorists maintain that “mothering and caring,” as well as the traditional mother-
child relationship, are causes of oppression because they “serve the patriarchal order” 
(Tong, 1993, 8; see also Myers, ed., 1997; Trebilcot, ed., 1984). Like many of the radical 
feminists, these theorists claim that childcare is bad for women and for society, at least 
so long as it is primarily carried out by women. The result of the traditional mother-child 
relationship is the creation of dominating males and docile and dependent females. 
Within this line of reasoning, a woman who is the primary caregiver of her children is 
participating in and furthering her own subordination. This is another reason for the 
seeming irreconcilability of much of feminist psychoanalytic with “care theory.” 
On the other hand, Kittay and Meyers (1987) suggest that the care perspective 
offers an avenue for moral autonomy that does not preclude human connectedness. Care 
theory seeks recognition and prestige for women for their roles as nurturers and 
caregivers. It is further hoped that this prestige will allow women the opportunity to 
promote nurturing and communitarian ideals within the family and ultimately within 
larger political realms. Theorists also attempt to demonstrate that some people give care 
not just because others are in need of care, or even because the survival of the human 
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race depends upon reproduction and “mothering,” but also because failure or inability to 
provide that care causes the suffering of the would-be care-giver via empathy (for 
examples, see Reddy et al, eds., 1995). To these theorists, empowerment of the 
autonomous self requires empowerment of the relational self, not just because society is 
in need of caregivers, or because men and women may need each other, but because 
many human beings are generously endowed with empathy whether they wish to be or 
not (see also Gilligan, 2002). For these empathetic people, no “pursuit of happiness” is 
possible so long as those they love cannot be adequately cared for. To enable and 
ennoble the act of care-giving, then, is to empower the care-giver. 
With these thoughts in mind, I give a final summary of the differences between 
“empowerment” as it is understood and forwarded by feminist psychoanalytic theory and 
“empowerment” as it is understood and forwarded by feminist cognitive development 
theory and “care theory.” The primary problem addressed by both forms of theory within 
this quadrant category is a perceived “deficiency” of females which is imparted by 
theoretical and research interpretational flaws. The dispute, however, is found within the 
understood of the context of the problem that "empowerment" would need to overcome. 
Remember that this "context" includes both (a) the assumed cause or causes of the 
problem and (b) the kind of human interaction that is being addressed. Psychoanalytic 
theory predominantly concludes that the cause of the problems women face is the fact 
that “mothering,” or care-giving, is traditionally and primarily carried out by women. 
The human interaction that they address, then, is the traditional family with a more or 
less absentee father and a “mothering” mother. Cognitive development theory and care 
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theory, on the other hand, suppose that the cause of the problems women face is the 
undervaluation of the care-giving that women traditionally do. Whether women are 
naturally predisposed to care-giving or whether this tendency is culturally imposed is 
basically irrelevant. This is because care-giving and the empathy that tends to develop 
with in those who regularly give care are considered to be good things for both the care-
giver and others, so long as care-giving is both socially valued and properly facilitated.  
This difference explains why the methods for attaining empowerment that these 
two types of theories suggest are opposed.  Psychoanalytic theory suggests that women 
must distance themselves from the care-giving role at least enough to ensure that men 
are forced to take up half or more of the responsibility for it. Cognitive development and 
care theory, on the other hand, suggest that the attempt to distance oneself from care-
giving further erodes the social perception of the value of care-giving. This attempt also, 
when it is contrary to what one truly is predisposed or desires to do, causes a separation 
of self from one’s innermost desires and drives, thus causing emotional distress and 
confusion. According to Gilligan (2002), this leads to a loss of the individual’s 
“authentic voice,” and thus a complete loss of the empowerment of the authentic self, 
both autonomous and relational. Psychoanalytic theory, then, largely aims to empower 
the autonomous self, while care theory aims to empower the relational self. 
Empowerment of the relational self allows one adequately to give needed care without 
detriment to oneself, so long as giving care is what the individual desires and 
emotionally needs to do. This form of empowerment also includes a granting of social 
acceptance of care-giving and of prestige for the care-giver. Said social acceptance and 
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prestige grants further relational empowerment as well as empowerment of the 
autonomous self.  
While these two recommendations for paths to empowerment may seem 
incompatible, they are not necessarily so if it is understood that these prescriptions need 
not be, in fact can not be, applied universally.5 That is, no woman or man who does not 
wish to be a caregiver should be coerced to do so. However, those who are generously 
endowed with empathy and the desire to give care should be empowered and 
emboldened to do so, with pride rather than with shame. Once again, this simply 
demonstrates that universalistic ideas are likely to impede empowerment for some even 
as they may allow for the empowerment of others. What is actually needed is an integral 
perspective, which would take into account all the quadrants of human experience and 
the various types of human personality as they operate within those quadrants. This will 
be more thoroughly discussed in my final chapter. 
 
Notes 
1. This is due to the premises upon which liberty and equality have been based within western 
political thought. 
 
2. I will give some discussion of this stratification of power, which is largely based on 
perceptions of difference, in my final chapter. 
 
3. The difference between Gilligan and Freud’s work is not only sex of the researcher and time 
frame. Gilligan’s observations in the research leading to the writing of In a Different Voice 
were of children, thus falling within the cognitive development field, while Freud’s 
observations were of adults with psychological problems who, with Freud’s help, tried to 
reconstruct their childhood memories, thus falling within the psychoanalytic field. 
 





5. However, not all theories that have been accused of being universalistic actually are. What is 
universalistic is the assumption that all women must follow some particular avenue to 
empowerment in order that no one’s individual actions should cause detriment to the 


















MacKinnon (1989) says of the feud between traditional Marxism and socialist-
feminism that each side accuses the other side of 
seeking what in each one’s terms is [merely] reform … where, 
again in each one’s terms, a fundamental transformation is 
required. At its most extreme, the mutual perception is not only 
that the other’s analysis is wrong, but that its success would be a 
defeat (6, emphasis mine). 
 
These comments may be applied to the varying sides of second-wave feminist theory. 
The debates within feminist theory were and are still often very heated. Further, there 
was a seeming inability of second-wave feminist leaders to communicate and cooperate 
with each other (Debold, 2005). Before the cause of this problem may be accurately 
understood, however, it is necessary to examine what is missing from the whole of 
second-wave feminist theory: an across-the-field discussion of what I will call the “big 
picture.” That is, each category of feminist theory may be understood as presenting an 
important piece of a larger puzzle. Without the inclusion of all pieces, the distorted 
picture that this puzzle presents is at best incomplete and at worst horribly misconceived. 
 
 
Pieces of the Puzzle 
 
 As I explained in previous chapters, the major categories of second wave 
feminist thought correspond roughly to the quadrants of human experience. These are: 
the internal individual – the thoughts and emotions of individuals; the external individual 
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– the outward physical and behavioral manifestations of individuals; the internal 
collective – the cultural mores, languages, customs and shared understandings of social 
groups; and the external collective – the observable political structures, written laws, and 
institutional organizations created by organized social and political groups. The table 























Social & Political Systems 
 
 
The notion that no single-quadrant specific theory can possibly be complete by 
itself, that it is necessary to examine any given human problem as it manifests within 
each quadrant, is only recently gaining widespread acceptance among academic political 
writers (for example, see Beck2, 2001; Crittenden3, 1998; Ury4, 2004). Given this, it is 
interesting that second-wave feminist theory nonetheless fairly adequately covered the 
quadrants, as I have shown. The problem has been the tendency of theorists to attack 
each other across these categorical lines. When the focus is on theoretical differences, 
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not only do feminists often miss the deep implications of the “big picture,” but they also 
fail to realize that they are talking past each other.5 
In hopes of clarifying some of the confusion, as well as opening avenues for the 
development of new theoretical precepts, I present in this chapter my own ideas about 
feminist theories as they correlate to human-experience quadrants, world view change 
across time, the “war” between the sexes and genders, and the effects these have on 
“empowerment” goals. I hope to demonstrate that each of these relates to and influences 
the other in a rich, complex tapestry, the whole of which must be considered if the goals 
of the “empowerment” of the autonomous self and the relational self are to be 
simultaneously accomplished for women. With that in mind, I turn first to a discussion 
of specific questions that remain unanswered. 
  
 
Biological Difference, Social Mores and Political Equality 
 
Early radical feminists discussed the vulnerability of women because of their 
biological differences from men. As I have discussed in previous chapters, this 
discussion became unpopular as worries surfaced that, within a liberal system such as 
the one governing the United States of America, women could not be accepted as both 
different and equal. This is further complicated by a high valuation of any given 
individual’s employability versus the fear of burden-to-business caused by the unique 
problems brought to the workforce with the employment of mothers outside of the home 
in the postindustrial-revolution world. If “protectionist” policies that were oppressive to 
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women were to be eradicated while simultaneously protecting capitalism, mothers’ 
employability problems had to be minimized or even ignored. 
In hopes of eventually eradicating said protectionist policies, second-wave 
feminists exposed the possible sinister motives behind some of these policies and the 
hardships they often caused women (see Baer, 1978). Because of the hard work and 
dedication of these feminists, women today are able to pursue careers of their choice 
with much less difficulty than women once had to endure. Unfortunately for women, 
however, it did not take long for employers to take strides to eliminate the risks involved 
in hiring mothers and potential mothers. Women soon found that the road to business 
success involved finding ways to ensure that family life did not interfere with work 
productivity. For mothers, this meant a near impossible double work load because of 
double fulltime commitments (Mason, 1988). It also meant a silencing for a time of 
those who would speak out about the physical dangers and other problems that 
motherhood posed for women, likely because of a fear that admitting such problems 
would bring back “protectionist,” oppressive policies. 
This silence, however, was not destined to last. Third-wave feminism has 
resurrected discussion about the vulnerability of women as mothers. For example, March 
(1994) discusses the need for greater social understanding of the fear and vulnerability 
involved in childbirth. This social “understanding” is something that was, at one time, 
built into the social norms of the American family life, just as it is still, as March points 
out, built into the social norms of women in third-world countries. While March puzzles 
over the silence about this problem in the United States, I suggest that it is at least in part 
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due to a belief that to talk about biological fears and weaknesses experienced by women 
is counterproductive to the pursuit of women’s equality in a political system that is based 
on an ideal of the rugged and self-sustaining individual. Also of concern are business 
systems that measure women’s value against a male standard as it existed in a culture 
that kept men’s roles distinct and separate from the role of nurturer or care-giving parent. 
Where cultural norms once emphasized the problems of childbearing and birth and a 
corresponding need to give special attention to and protection for pregnant women and 
women who were nursing young children, the emergence of a culture that emphasized 
instead the ways in which women were as strong and as employable as men began to 
shun the discussion of the many things that could go wrong for women and their children 
during these vulnerable times. That is, discussion of childbirth fear and vulnerability is 
seen as display of weakness that encourages the hierarchy of male over female within 
the economic system via ‘protectionism.’  
However, if women who experience the many problems associated with bearing 
children are silenced in the name of equality, how can empowerment of these women be 
achieved? I suggest that this dilemma should be understood by an examination of the 
effects of theory and political-climate change across the quadrants of human experience. 
For example, this problem of “silence” in the U.S. about the physical complications that 
women who bear children endure (March, 1994) may well be produced by a post-
industrial cultural and theoretical overemphasis of the economic and political structures 
in the external-collective quadrant, while theoretically ignoring and/or politically 
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attempting to hide the differences between the sexes found in the individual-external and 
individual-internal quadrants. 
Not only is this trend counter-productive to the empowerment of millions of 
women, it is increasingly both impractical and nonsensical. Modern medicine and 
science increasingly discuss the physical, emotional and psychological differences 
between the sexes which seem caused not only by genitalia difference but also by the 
effects that hormonal differences (Taylor et al, 2000; see also Rhoads, 2004) and even 
differences in chromosomal configurations (Philips etal, 1987; Hamer, 1993)  may have 
on the human brain. In the face of increasing evidence of very real “difference,” it seems 
that attempts to illustrate sameness in order to appease a system that grants equality 
based on sameness is foolish and increasingly counter-scientific. Would it not be better 
to change the system to one that grants political equality in spite of and by taking into 
account any biological difference between the sexes? Nowhere is difference more 
profound than between women who become or try to become pregnant and all other 
people who do not. While not all women will conceive or attempt to conceive children, 
this experience is nonetheless, at least so far, unique to women. Liberal feminist theory 
has begun to examine the ways that labor law might protect mothering women without 
restricting women’s overall access to employment, but this alone is not enough. As 
further demonstration of this point, I discuss domestic labor and childcare in the next 







Capitalist Economics and the Value of Domestic Work and Care-giving 
 
Some socialist-feminists examined the effects of economic systems on cultural 
norms and expectations as they apply to women. The cultural norms are internal-
collective, while the economic systems themselves are external-collective. While these 
feminists attempted to address the internal-collective quadrant via their analysis of the 
family, a theoretical problem was created by the fact that they often failed to take the 
interior workings of the economic structures into account. Instead of a failure to take 
more than one quadrant of experience into consideration, the error here is one of 
conflation. It is assumed by these theorists that “value” which is not measurable in the 
external economic structure therefore does not exist at all. Vogel (1973), for example, 
says that domestic labor - women’s labor in the home - is neither ‘productive’ labor nor 
directly paid for. As I mentioned in Chapter III, to understand the problem with her 
theory, we must first take our emphasis off of money, which is after all only a specific 
medium to facilitate exchange, and think instead of the entire exchange system. If we 
take money out of the picture and look only at what it buys, we begin to see a truer 
picture of the partnership men and women in traditional households often have. Many 
domestically –laboring women would argue that they do receive direct “pay” for their 
labor, primarily in the form of living quarters, food, family medical insurance and so 
forth. Economists, at least, have begun to understand domestic labor’s hidden value. 
This is evident in the fact that “unpaid” labor is now part of the sum total figures of 
“national gross products.” It is understood, then, that there are types of “payment” other 
than payment with cash. Vogel’s attempt to explain the difference between domestic 
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labor and other forms of labor focused, in part, on the lack of wages paid to those who 
perform it. By measuring exchange value only through wages visible to the external 
structures of society, Vogel misses the value gained by women’s domestic labors which 
are evident only internally within the family. 
Okin (1989) makes a similar mistake in her analysis of the power-structure 
problems in heterosexual marriages. She discusses “pooled resources” (140) within 
marriage, observing that unmarried couples were less likely to assume that one partner 
would provide the primary wage, or that income and assets would be pooled. Okin 
argues that pooled resources and wage-disparity within the household are unhealthy 
relicts of patriarchal-marriage traditions. What she misses is that the purpose of pooled 
resources and the stay-at-home care-giver role, as these practices now exist, are 
primarily a function of families with children, the goal being, of course, to take proper 
care, both economically and physically, of said children. The problem has not been that 
resources were pooled, the problem was the power-structure which allowed men to 
“enforce their views or wishes” (141) while suppressing the views and wishes of 
women. In other words, the economic and childcare arrangements are not the problem, 
they are merely the excuse for oppression. Attacking the excuse instead of the problem 
only makes the problem worse, because it fails to recognize the original goal – the care 
and feeding of children. By focusing on only one piece of the problem, Okin and other 
feminists failed to recognize that relational empowerment is just as necessary as 
empowerment of the autonomous self. It also puts all the blame squarely on the 
shoulders of men, while the real culprit is the hierarchal power-structure of patriarchy. 
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Hierarchies came out of cultural norms in place for millennia. While such are no longer 
desired or necessary, hierarchies are not the fault of all modern men, nor are they 
desirable by many modern men. Hierarchal structures, as Gilligan (2002) explains, can 
be as damaging to men as to women. It is the hierarchal structure that needs abolished, 
and this, in spite of appearances, has little to do with who cares for and who financially 
supports the family. This is because the notion that only those who earn wages, or own 
property, are fully human and therefore deserving of rights is also an archaic and 
damaging notion. 
That all of this was not adequately theorized is one reason for much of the 
tension and misunderstanding between feminists and “traditional” women. Vogel’s 
(1973) theory, for example, suggests that domestic labor is merely a necessary, 
unpleasant chore that all humans should have to share unless someone is hired, and paid, 
to do it. Grasping for tools to “empower” women, second-wave feminists often failed to 
understand that it was neither necessary nor prudent to insist that domestic work was 
degrading to women, because this implies that domestic labor has no real value and, 
further, is not something that anyone who can choose otherwise would do. This demeans 
all people who choose to perform it, whether as part of the family barter-system, or 
because it is, to some, enjoyable, or even as paid-for labor. The same problem has 
plagued stay-at-home moms and workers in the childcare field. 
Feminist discussions of domestic work and childcare also tend to ignore 
interdependence as it affects the psychology of individual women (interior-individual). 
Part of the problem is that interdependence is seldom discussed in terms of 
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empowerment. For example, Baer (1999) discusses the responsibility that society places 
on women, stating that it is too seldom noticed “that women… have a disproportionate 
share of [it]” (3). While her assertion is correct, the question that goes unanswered is: 
who would take up this mantle of “burden” should these women decide to lay it down? 
Not all women carry a burden that they could lay down without seriously damaging 
someone else whom they love. This is because various types of “care” are necessary 
within all human cultures: of infants, of the ill, of the very aged and so forth. In modern 
society, care can be “bought” by the affluent, but it is still, even for them, provided by 
someone. Further, humans are drawn to care that is given out of love rather than because 
it is bought. Finally, some people greatly enjoy giving care, and consider doing so to be 
among the most fulfilling and noble of occupations. 
Part of what has been missed by feminists who argue with each other over the 
issue of “nurture” is that in the traditional family structure, both men and women have 
historically “cared for,” or nurtured, each other and their children. Men “nurtured” by 
providing finances, the women by providing physical nurture/care. The problem is that 
this system was never truly “equal,” partly because financial control means power and 
partly because providing finances is a part-time job (until the end of the work-day), 
while providing nurture, especially to babies and young children, must occur around the 
clock. Changing the expectations of who “must” provide what kind of “nurture” and 
increasing the value of the domestic variety of nurture should not be seen as opposed 
goals, but as varying aspects of “empowerment.” The quandary that we find ourselves in 
is this: to demand freedom from the “responsibility” to nurture labels responsibility as 
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“bad”; labeling “responsibility to nurture” as “bad” further devalues the type of 
“nurture” that women have for so long performed; devaluing this nurture causes society 
to turn a blind eye to the fact that responsibility for each other is necessary for the very 
survival and overall societal health of the human race; and when society at large turns a 
blind eye, it falls to those who have traditionally taken up this “responsibility to nurture” 
to continue to carry it, for if they do not, no one will. The trap is perfect, unless we 
realize that each form of empowerment that has been discussed in this book is actually 
needed, and is merely one small piece in a larger puzzle, as I have said. 
Because of love and empathy, empowerment of the relational self is desperately 
needed by many. There are those among us who cannot fully enjoy our own lives and 
fortunes so long as those we love are in pain. Therefore, what people, women or men, 
who care for others need is not release from the “responsibility,” but an empowerment 
that allows for the sharing of this responsibility with other capable and willing human 
beings. We would do well to realize that when fellow human beings are in true need of 
help, which everyone is at some time in his or her life, saying “I can not be responsible” 
is synonymous with saying “I do not care.” Too much apathy creates widespread 
desperation. The extent of this is evident currently in various societal problems, such as 
homelessness of the mentally ill and disabled, infant abandonment, and abuse of the 
elderly. Empathy is what allows for human co-existence and the very survival of the 
species. The “ethic of care,” whoever carries the mantle, is what holds the fabric of the 
human race together. To understand this is to know that empowerment of the 
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autonomous individual can never be realized without simultaneous empowerment of the 
relational self. 
It was with an eye to this problem that “care” feminists began to theorize about 
why the care ethic has been degraded and equated with weakness and dependency within 
modern patriarchy. However, because of the nature of the theorizing by these “care” 
feminists, yet another argument arose: whether there is a difference between “masculine 





It helps to understand the varying contexts within which these “masculine and 
feminine” terms are used, but the entanglement of social-gender terms with biological-
sex terms is so complex as to make a clear distinction between them almost impossible 
given the historical usage of the terms. In fact, in recent decades researchers in various 
disciplines have conflated these terms, using “sex” and “gender” as interchangeable 
words (MacKinnon, 1989; Walker and Cook, 1998). I suggest that what we do know is 
that there are at least two distinctive ways of “knowing.” However, the labels of 
“masculine” and “feminine,” when placed on these two ways, immediately cause 
problems. What is needed is to recognize that on this subject we are dealing with a 
problem of semantics. Noddings (1984) explains that she labels the ‘ethic of caring’ as a 
feminine ethic, not because only women ‘care,’ but because caring has been, throughout 
many ages, recognized as a feminine attribute of humans in general. However, because 
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she uses terms like masculine and feminine, much of what she and others wrote on this 
topic has been misinterpreted and mislabeled as a sexual-difference theory, even though 
she expressed plainly that she believed these attributes had little, if anything, to do with 
one’s being male or female. 
 The problem comes from the fact that language itself is so entangled with the 
experiences of human beings across time, as languages and societies have evolved 
together. Women for millennia have been the primary caretakers of children and men, 
having both shaped and controlled the public realm, have been the primary creators of 
concepts about social and political justice. Therefore, a “feminine” ethic that emphasizes 
care has been conceptually tied to females, while a “masculine” ethic that emphasizes 
justice has conceptually associated with males. How do we adequately define the 
difference in these ethics without confusing masculine with necessarily male and 
feminine with necessarily female? It may be impossible to untangle these concepts 
without creating new terminology to describe the difference between these two types of 
ethics. 
Connectedness and care are labeled “feminine,” and have been so historically 
because mothers must be connected emotionally and psychically to their infants in order 
to properly care for them. When an infant cried, the mother had to know whether the 
child was in need of nursing, which she alone could provide, or in need of something 
else that could perhaps be provided by someone else. Nature somehow provided this 
“intuitive” wisdom, and it therefore became known as a feminine (mother) trait. But 
because femininity has been equated with this intuitive wisdom and “ethic of care” – the 
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latter of which often refers to a mother’s instinct or desire to do what is necessary to 
ensure the survival of her infant – women find themselves both collectively coerced to 
be care-givers, whether or not they are mothers, and to give care to others besides just 
their own offspring. Because of this, we find it necessary in the modern world to declare 
that “caring” is not a “feminine” characteristic. If we call it “feminine,” then we are 
suggesting that women ought to have it, that those who have it are “feminine” (whether 
they are male or female), and that those who do not have it are not feminine (whether 
they are female or male). This gets theorists into trouble, because in the modern world 
the term “femininity” means a great deal more than the possession of intuition or the 
care ethic, and one can likewise be “feminine” without either one. Further, women who 
have these traits should nonetheless be spared coercion just as one should not be forced 
to paint simply because one can. The real problem lies with the definitions. This is only 
clear if we examine these internal-individual ideas in light of the influence of internal-
collective language evolution. 
 
 
Liberal Political Theory’s “Rationality”: Language and Changing World Views 
 
The effects of language evolution can also be seen in attempts to reconcile 
ancient notions about rationality with modern ideas about the gender-neutrality of the 
human capacity for rational thought. In the western tradition, at least, the roots of most 
political writing can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle. It was certainly not with these 
authors that the female portion of the human race began to have problems with the male 
portion. However, their writings simultaneously brought these problems into the realm 
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of the written history of civil society and obscured them from political debate for 
millennia by pronouncing the social and political “place” held by women at that time to 
be both natural and unavoidable.  
Plato depicts human society as a hierarchal ladder with cross-cutting dimensions. 
That is, depending upon one’s rank in society, there is, according to Plato, a precise 
placement of each human in relation to others who are either above or below one in 
status. This creates a metaphorical ladder, upon which women on one rung may be 
ranked above men on a lower rung. However, each rung of the ladder has its own 
hierarchy in that men on any given rung are ranked above women on the same rung, and 
both men and women are ranked above children (Plato, The Republic; Lange, 1979).  
Aristotle disagreed with Plato on a number of fronts, but the two to which I shall 
give attention here have to do with woman’s place in the “natural” human hierarchy and 
with whether or not any woman should be a part of the polis. As I mentioned above, 
Plato’s version of the hierarchy would allow some women to be on “rungs” that would 
place them equal to or above some men. To Aristotle, this was an abomination. Aristotle 
instead collapsed the ladder dimensionally, so that all women were placed below all men 
except, perhaps, slaves. His reasons for doing so were clear: to him, no woman was 
capable of being “rational,” and therefore could never be on a level with men who were. 
He uses this same rationale to place women firmly in the “private sphere” of life, 
because, to Aristotle, it is there that all things “irrational” belong (Spelman, 1998).  
However, “irrational” did not appear to mean to Aristotle precisely what the 
word brings to mind in the modern world. To Aristotle, in order to be counted as 
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“rational,” one must have both the capability of making reasoned decisions and the 
ability to act on those decisions. Whether or not one was simply denied the latter by 
others with power over them had nothing to do with the matter (Politics, 13). It is not 
difficult to see how this notion of rational versus irrational could be detrimental to those 
who held no power within the power-makes-right (and rational), hierarchal framework 
of society in Aristotle’s day. No matter how capable of rationality a person on the 
bottom of the hierarchy might actually be, he or she (slave or woman) would never be 
viewed as capable of rationality by those on the top of the hierarchy because they could 
never have the power (which translates to ability) to act on their own decisions. 
For Locke, however, “reason” was measured in part by one’s ability to gain 
property or economic wealth for oneself. Brennan and Pateman (1979) discuss the notion 
that “Locke regards propertyless males as less than fully rational” (195).  They go on to 
tell us that, for Locke, men all can gain rationality by the “tying of the conjugal knot” 
(195). Women, however, have no way to become rational in Locke’s theory. Brennan 
and Pateman also point out that, while women in the seventeenth century were not 
economically dependent on their husbands, they were still subject to them (186). While 
Brennan and Pateman successfully point out these oft-times overlooked facts, they do 
not follow through to explain why these seeming contradictions exist within Locke’s 
theory.  
We can come to understand what is going on, however, if we consider the 
possible evolution of the word “rational.” I have explained that, for Aristotle, “rational” 
meant having the ability both to deliberate and to act. The term evolved across time, so 
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that by the seventeenth century it meant something different, but still did not mean what 
it does today. We can come to understand what “rational” meant in the seventeenth 
century if we carefully examine the arguments presented by Brennan and Pateman, 
adding in consideration of the point made by Macpherson. Men who had no property 
were not “rational” (Macpherson, 1962) unless and until they married (Brennan and 
Pateman, 1979). Remember that to Locke, ownership of property signifies rationality, 
because ownership of property is “a reflection of one’s personality and the control one 
has over one’s life and activity” (Eisenstein, 1981, 44). Therefore, gaining a wife, which 
is gaining property, as well as a position of power and control, also signifies rationality.  
If lack of ability to control one’s own life and activity brands one as “irrational” 
and being branded as “irrational” leaves one with little or no control over one’s own life 
and activity, there is no way out except for those who are granted some way of gaining 
said control. For women, no path to gain either was offered by Locke. The political 
thought offered by both Aristotle and Locke kept women out of the public realm and in 
the home caring for children, managing domestic resources and under the control of 
men. However, this does not mean that an increased valuation of care in the modern 
world need have a detrimental effect on women as some liberal feminist writings imply. 
Further, a propensity for care need not be equated with irrationality. The notion that 
these two are equated is rooted in past worldviews and now outdated semantics. 
However, the question of whether or not women tend to have more of a natural 
propensity for care than do men is one that cannot be raised without sparking heated 
controversy. This is in part due, as Eisenstein (1984) states, to liberal feminist demands 
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that “woman be treated as equal to man, rather than differentiated from him” (12, 
emphasis mine). Eisenstein characterizes feminism that focuses on “sexual difference 
issues” as “reactionary,” and thereby tosses it aside as though it is not “real” feminism at 
all. She reveals the basis of her frustration with “difference theory,” however, when she 
equates “different” with necessarily “unequal” (13). Yet both Aristotle and Locke’s 
ideas about what makes one an equality-deserving citizen grew out of an ethnocentristic 
worldview that only recognized others who are most similar to oneself as deserving of 
equal treatment. This worldview therefore offers no avenue for the equality of all 
peoples. According to modern ethics, it is not what people own, what they do, or how 
similar they are to one another that should determine their equality to each other. We can 
only understand the dynamic of political change across time if we account for change of 
worldviews across time and therefore also the evolution of language across time – 
because language and speech reflect worldviews. 
 
 
Sex and Gender “Wars” 
 
No discussion of the confusion posed by empowerment fetishizing could be 
complete without mention of the gender wars spawned by some feminist notions about 
the victimization of all women by all men. In her assessment of the modern condition of 
women in America, Baer (2002) comments that, while some important legal strides have 
been made, women in general are no better off now than they were decades ago. They 
are overworked, underpaid and have little job or marriage security. She adds that one 
  
197 
observing the present situation is left with “a suspicion that women are still doing what it 
is in men’s interest for them to do” (300).  
Baer’s statements reveal a frustration with the slow pace of change as well as 
with the dilemmas women face under patriarchy that have as yet found no solution. This 
same frustration has fed much of the anger towards men apparent in feminist theory. 
However, Gilligan (2002) suggests that patriarchy, having grown out of a now-archaic 
worldview, is detrimental to modern men as well. It is indeed interesting to note how 
completely the plight of men under patriarchy is downplayed by most feminist theory. 
The perceived problems posed by patriarchy are couched only in terms of how these 
affect women, and it is assumed that women’s plight is always worse than anything the 
men might have to suffer. For example, when speaking about the draft during the 
Vietnam War, Philipson and Hansen (1990) explain why this phenomenon was a 
problem for women: men were given a chance to be “heroes” of the antiwar movement 
by burning their draft cards and resisting the draft, but women were “marginalized” 
because this experience was “unavailable” to them (5). In a rush to demonstrate that 
women are always the victim in any given scenario, these authors attempt to romanticize 
an experience that was surely traumatizing to the men who experienced it, given the real 
possibility of court-marshal for AWOL soldiers and imprisonment for men refusing 
military induction. This not only makes a mockery of real instances of victimization of 
women, it ignores the plight of men, which cannot be so easily disentangled from the 
plight of women. After all, why did women join the protest movement against the 
Vietnam War? Was it to gain heroic recognition for themselves or was it to help to stop a 
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heinous war that was killing thousands of American men in addition to uncounted 
Vietnamese, both male and female, both young and old? 
 
 
Empowerment for All 
 
This dissertation has focused on the various categories of feminist theory, based 
on their associated realms of human existence. This understanding is necessary, for we 
cannot advance the understanding of women’s condition, and therefore the overall 
human condition, without examination of each of these realms. This is because the 
realms do not and have never existed independent of each other. Rather, each influences 
the other in a profound, entangled way. No “big picture” understanding can be formed 
without first creating conceptual building blocks. That second-wave feminists presented 
opposing views based on their own quadrant-specific concerns is neither surprising nor 
unfortunate.  
What I find unfortunate is that the ensuing cross-categorical bickering at times 
led to the broad dismissal of important theoretical insights, led to the breakdown of a 
number of feminist-progressive movements, and helped to spark the “gender wars” as 
well as anger between varying women’s groups. Third-wave attempts at a truce, 
however, led to a type of feminist relativism that fetishizes “empowerment” through a 
conceptual confusion that equates the attainment of personal physical enhancements 
through procedures akin to self-mutilation or torture - such as painful do-it-yourself 
procedures intended to have beauty-enhancing effects similar to a surgical facelift - with 
the attainment of employment or education goals (see Chapter I). All are hailed as 
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similarly “empowering” to the individual woman. In addition, a similar conceptual 
confusion is to blame for the overemphasis of empowerment of the autonomous self 
while all but ignoring empowerment of the relational self. This tendency sometimes 
borders on the absurd. For example, Barnett and Rivers (2004) call the relational self a 
“straightjacket” which prevents women “from ever putting ourselves first,” and declare 
that women must “break free of the caring trap” (45). As I have shown, however, both 
relational empowerment and autonomous empowerment are needed. Caring is only a 
“trap” if it is coerced or overemphasized. Self-care becomes an equal trap if it is 
overemphasized, because said overemphasis damages human relationships that are 
needed by all, and forwards the myth of the rugged individual who is never in need of 
assistance or care from others.  
Each of these problems – theoretical relativism and overemphasis of self-care - 
arise from shifting worldviews.6 The now-archaic hierarchal worldview that produced 
the power stratification between the sexes also forwarded a notion that equality could 
only be based on sameness, with all persons not “the same” as the elite group at the top 
of the hierarchy suffering systemic denial of rights. In time, this worldview gave way, at 
least within the some parts of the world, to a notion that equality should be based instead 
on some measure of acquired property or power, thus glorifying the “rugged individual” 
who could manage to attain such for himself. Eventually even this worldview has 
altered, shifting to one that grants an intrinsic worth, and therefore a “natural” right to 
equality, to all humans regardless of property ownership or power acquisition.  
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An integrally empowering feminism, then, would pull together theoretical 
insights from all quadrants of human experience, would include an understanding of 
worldview changes across time, as well as the effects of this change on language 
evolution, and would not place the biological sexes in a deadlock of opposition to each 
other. It also would not elevate either empowerment of the autonomous self or 
empowerment of the relational self above the other, because it would recognize the 
codependence of these forms of empowerment upon each other. An understanding of all 
of the varying components of feminist theory, as well as what sort of empowerment each 
intended to accomplish, will allow us not only to more clearly trace where we have been 
and what we have accomplished so far, but also to map where we hope and intend to go 
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